Network Working Group                                             T. Ts'o
Request for Comments: 2953                               VA Linux Systems
Category: Informational                                    September 2000


            Telnet Encryption: DES 64 bit Output Feedback

Status of this Memo

  This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
  not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
  memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

  This document specifies how to use the data encryption standard (DES)
  encryption algorithm in output feedback mode with the telnet
  encryption option.

1.  Command Names and Codes

  Encryption Type

     DES_OFB64        2

  Suboption Commands

     OFB64_IV         1
     OFB64_IV_OK      2
     OFB64_IV_BAD     3

2.  Command Meanings

  IAC SB ENCRYPT IS DES_OFB64 OFB64_IV <initial vector> IAC SE

    The sender of this command generates a random 8 byte initial
    vector, and sends it to the other side of the connection using the
    OFB64_IV command.  The initial vector is sent in clear text.  Only
    the side of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the
    OFB64_IV command

  IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY DES_OFB64 OFB64_IV_OK IAC SE
  IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY DES_OFB64 OFB64_IV_BAD IAC SE




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RFC 2953               DES 64 bit Output Feedback         September 2000


    The sender of these commands either accepts or rejects the initial
    vector received in a OFB64_IV command.  Only the side of the
    connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the OFB64_IV_OK and
    OFB64_IV_BAD commands.  The OFB64_IV_OK command MUST be sent for
    backwards compatibility with existing implementations; there really
    isn't any reason why a sender would need to send the OFB64_IV_BAD
    command except in the case of a protocol violation where the IV
    sent was not of the correct length (i.e., 8 bytes).

3.  Implementation Rules

  Once a OFB64_IV_OK command has been received, the WILL ENCRYPT side
  of the connection should do keyid negotiation using the ENC_KEYID
  command.  Once the keyid negotiation has successfully identified a
  common keyid, then START and END commands may be sent by the side of
  the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT.  Data will be encrypted using
  the DES 64 bit Output Feedback algorithm.

  If encryption (decryption) is turned off and back on again, and the
  same keyid is used when re-starting the encryption (decryption), the
  intervening clear text must not change the state of the encryption
  (decryption) machine.

  If a START command is sent (received) with a different keyid, the
  encryption (decryption) machine must be re-initialized immediately
  following the end of the START command with the new key and the
  initial vector sent (received) in the last OFB64_IV command.

  If a new OFB64_IV command is sent (received), and encryption
  (decryption) is enabled, the encryption (decryption) machine must be
  re-initialized immediately following the end of the OFB64_IV command
  with the new initial vector, and the keyid sent (received) in the
  last START command.

  If encryption (decryption) is not enabled when a OFB64_IV command is
  sent (received), the encryption (decryption) machine must be re-
  initialized after the next START command, with the keyid sent
  (received) in that START command, and the initial vector sent
  (received) in this OFB64_IV command.

4.  Algorithm

  Given that V[i] is the initial 64 bit vector, V[n] is the nth 64 bit
  vector, D[n] is the nth chunk of 64 bits of data to encrypt
  (decrypt), and O[n] is the nth chunk of 64 bits of encrypted
  (decrypted) data, then:





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     V[0] = DES(V[i], key)
     V[n+1] = DES(V[n], key)
     O[n] = D[n] <exclusive or> V[n]

5.  Integration with the AUTHENTICATION telnet option

  As noted in the telnet ENCRYPTION option specifications, a keyid
  value of zero indicates the default encryption key, as might be
  derived from the telnet AUTHENTICATION option.  If the default
  encryption key negotiated as a result of the telnet AUTHENTICATION
  option contains less than 8 bytes, then the DES_OFB64 option may not
  be offered or used as a valid telnet encryption option.  If the
  encryption key negotiated as a result of the telnet AUTHENTICATION
  option is greater than 16 bytes the first 8 bytes of the key should
  be used as keyid 0 for data sent from the telnet server to the telnet
  client, and the second 8 bytes of the key should be used as keyid 0
  for data sent by the telnet client to the telnet server.  Otherwise,
  the first 8 bytes of the encryption key is used as keyid zero for the
  telnet ENCRYPTION option in both directions (with the client as WILL
  ENCRYPT and the server as WILL ENCRYPT).

  In all cases, if the key negotiated by the telnet AUTHENTICATION
  option was not a DES key, the key used by the DES_CFB64 must have its
  parity corrected after it is determined using the above algorithm.

  Note that the above algorithm assumes that it is safe to use a non-
  DES key (or part of a non-DES key) as a DES key.  This is not
  necessarily true of all cipher systems, but we specify this behaviour
  as the default since it is true for most authentication systems in
  popular use today, and for compatibility with existing
  implementations.  New telnet AUTHENTICATION mechanisms may specify
  alternative methods for determining the keys to be used for this
  cipher suite in their specification, if the session key negotiated by
  that authentication mechanism is not a DES key and and where this
  algorithm may not be safely used.

6.  Security Considerations

  Encryption using Output Feedback does not ensure data integrity; an
  active attacker may be able to substitute text, if he can predict the
  clear-text that was being transmitted.  For this reason, the Cipher
  Feedback encryption type  should be used instead, since it provides
  limited detectability to data modification.  Neither provides true
  data integrity, however.







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RFC 2953               DES 64 bit Output Feedback         September 2000


  The tradeoff here is that adding a message authentication code (MAC)
  will significantly increase the number of bytes needed to send a
  single character in the telnet protocol, which will impact
  performance on slow (i.e. dialup) links.

7.  Acknowledgments

  This document was originally written by Dave Borman of Cray Research
  with the assistance of the IETF Telnet Working Group.

Author's Address

  Theodore Ts'o, Editor
  VA Linux Systems
  43 Pleasant St.
  Medford, MA 02155

  Phone: (781) 391-3464
  EMail: [email protected]
































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RFC 2953               DES 64 bit Output Feedback         September 2000


Full Copyright Statement

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Acknowledgement

  Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
  Internet Society.



















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