Network Working Group                                          J. Altman
Request for Comments: 2949                           Columbia University
Category: Standards Track                                 September 2000


          Telnet Encryption: CAST-128 64 bit Output Feedback

Status of this Memo

  This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
  Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
  improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
  Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
  and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

  This document specifies how to use the CAST-128 encryption algorithm
  in output feedback mode with the telnet encryption option.  Two key
  sizes are defined: 40 bit and 128 bit.

1.  Command Names and Codes

  Encryption Type

     CAST5_40_OFB64   9
     CAST128_OFB64   11

  Suboption Commands

     OFB64_IV         1
     OFB64_IV_OK      2
     OFB64_IV_BAD     3

2.  Command Meanings

  IAC SB ENCRYPT IS CAST5_40_OFB64 OFB64_IV <initial vector> IAC SE
  IAC SB ENCRYPT IS CAST128_OFB64 OFB64_IV <initial vector> IAC SE

    The sender of this command generates a random 8 byte initial
    vector, and sends it to the other side of the connection using the
    OFB64_IV command.  The initial vector is sent in clear text.  Only
    the side of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the
    OFB64_IV command.



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RFC 2949            CAST-128 64 bit Output Feedback       September 2000


  IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY CAST5_40_OFB64 OFB64_IV_OK IAC SE
  IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY CAST128_OFB64 OFB64_IV_OK IAC SE
  IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY CAST5_40_OFB64 OFB64_IV_BAD IAC SE
  IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY CAST128_OFB64 OFB64_IV_BAD IAC SE

    The sender of these commands either accepts or rejects the initial
    vector received in a OFB64_IV command.  Only the side of the
    connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the OFB64_IV_OK and
    OFB64_IV_BAD commands.  The OFB64_IV_OK command MUST be sent for
    backwards compatibility with existing implementations; there
    really isn't any reason why a sender would need to send the
    OFB64_IV_BAD command except in the case of a protocol violation
    where the IV sent was not of the correct length (i.e., 8 bytes).

3.  Implementation Rules

  Once a OFB64_IV_OK command has been received, the WILL ENCRYPT side
  of the connection should do keyid negotiation using the ENC_KEYID
  command.  Once the keyid negotiation has successfully identified a
  common keyid, then START and END commands may be sent by the side of
  the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT.  Data will be encrypted using
  the CAST128 64 bit Output Feedback algorithm.

  If encryption (decryption) is turned off and back on again, and the
  same keyid is used when re-starting the encryption (decryption), the
  intervening clear text must not change the state of the encryption
  (decryption) machine.

  If a START command is sent (received) with a different keyid, the
  encryption (decryption) machine must be re-initialized immediately
  following the end of the START command with the new key and the
  initial vector sent (received) in the last OFB64_IV command.

  If a new OFB64_IV command is sent (received), and encryption
  (decryption) is enabled, the encryption (decryption) machine must be
  re-initialized immediately following the end of the OFB64_IV command
  with the new initial vector, and the keyid sent (received) in the
  last START command.

  If encryption (decryption) is not enabled when a OFB64_IV command is
  sent (received), the encryption (decryption) machine must be re-
  initialized after the next START command, with the keyid sent
  (received) in that START command, and the initial vector sent
  (received) in this OFB64_IV command.







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RFC 2949            CAST-128 64 bit Output Feedback       September 2000


4.  Algorithm

  CAST 64 bit Output Feedback

  key --->+------+
       +->| CAST |--+
       |  +------+  |
       +------------+
                    v
   INPUT --------->(+) ----> DATA

  Given:
     iV: Initial vector, 64 bits (8 bytes) long.
     Dn: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of data to encrypt
         (decrypt).
     On: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of encrypted (decrypted)
         output.

       V0 = CAST(iV, key)
       V(n+1) = CAST(Vn, key)
       On = Dn ^ Vn

5.  Integration with the AUTHENTICATION telnet option

  As noted in the telnet ENCRYPTION option specifications, a keyid
  value of zero indicates the default encryption key, as might be
  derived from the telnet AUTHENTICATION option.  If the default
  encryption key negotiated as a result of the telnet AUTHENTICATION
  option contains less than 16 (5) bytes, then the CAST128_OFB64
  (CAST5_40_OFB64) option must not be offered or used as a valid telnet
  encryption option.

  If there are less than 32 (10) bytes of key data, the first 16 (5)
  bytes of key data are used as keyid 0 in each direction.  If there
  are at least 32 (10) bytes of key data, the first 16 (5) bytes of key
  data are used to encrypt the data sent by the telnet client to the
  telnet server; the second 16 (5) bytes of key data are used to
  encrypt the data sent by the telnet server to the telnet client.

  Any extra key data is used as random data to be sent as an
  initialization vector.

6.  Security Considerations

  Encryption using Output Feedback does not ensure data integrity; an
  active attacker may be able to substitute text, if he can predict the
  clear-text that was being transmitted.




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RFC 2949            CAST-128 64 bit Output Feedback       September 2000


  The tradeoff here is that adding a message authentication code (MAC)
  will significantly increase the number of bytes needed to send a
  single character in the telnet protocol, which will impact
  performance on slow (i.e. dialup) links.

  This option was originally drafted back when CPU speeds where not
  necessarily fast enough to do allow use of CFB.  Since then, CPU's
  have gotten much faster.  Given the inherent weaknesses in Output
  Feedback mode, perhaps it should be deprecated in favor of CFB modes?

  Encryption modes using 40-bit keys are not to be considered secure.
  The 40 bit key mode CAST5_40_OFB64 is listed here simply to document
  the implementations that are already prevalent on the Internet but
  have never been documented.

7.  Acknowledgments

  This document was based on the "Telnet Encryption: DES 64 bit Output
  Feedback" document originally written by Dave Borman of Cray Research
  with the assistance of the IETF Telnet Working Group.

8.  References

  [1] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", RFC 2144, May
      1997.

Author's Address

  Jeffrey Altman, Editor
  Columbia University
  612 West 115th Street Room 716
  New York NY 10025 USA

  Phone: +1 (212) 854-1344
  EMail: [email protected]
















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RFC 2949            CAST-128 64 bit Output Feedback       September 2000


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Acknowledgement

  Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
  Internet Society.



















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