[Note that this file is a concatenation of more than one RFC.]




Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           S. Kent
Request for Comments: 6484                                       D. Kong
BCP: 173                                                          K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice                                 R. Watro
ISSN: 2070-1721                                         BBN Technologies
                                                          February 2012


                     Certificate Policy (CP) for
            the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

Abstract

  This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
  Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet
  Number Resource (INR) holdings.  Each organization that distributes
  IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization
  will, in parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
  distribution.  These certificates will enable verification that the
  resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
  holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
  the current, unique holder of these resources.

Status of This Memo

  This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction ....................................................6
     1.1. Overview ...................................................7
     1.2. Document Name and Identification ...........................7
     1.3. PKI Participants ...........................................7
          1.3.1. Certification Authorities ...........................8
          1.3.2. Registration Authorities ............................8
          1.3.3. Subscribers .........................................8
          1.3.4. Relying Parties .....................................8
          1.3.5. Other Participants ..................................8
     1.4. Certificate Usage ..........................................9
          1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses ........................9
          1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses .........................9
     1.5. Policy Administration ......................................9
          1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document .............9
          1.5.2. Contact Person ......................................9
          1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures ..............................9
     1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................10
  2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................11
     2.1. Repositories ..............................................11
     2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................11
     2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................12
     2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................12
  3. Identification and Authentication ..............................12
     3.1. Naming ....................................................12
          3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................12
          3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................12
          3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........13
          3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........13
          3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................13
     3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................13
          3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key ......13
          3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............13
          3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............14
          3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information ................14
          3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................14
          3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................14
     3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests .....14
          3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
                 Routine Re-Key .....................................14
          3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
                 Re-Key after Revocation ............................15
     3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..15



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  4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements ................16
     4.1. Certificate Application ...................................16
          4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........16
          4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............16
     4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................16
          4.2.1. Performing Identification and
                 Authentication Functions ...........................16
          4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..16
          4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........17
     4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................17
          4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............17
          4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
                 Issuance of Certificate ............................17
     4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................17
          4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........17
          4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........17
          4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................17
     4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................18
          4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......18
          4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....18
     4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................18
          4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............19
          4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................19
          4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............19
          4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                 Subscriber .........................................19
          4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                 Renewal Certificate ................................19
          4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...20
          4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................20
     4.7. Certificate Re-Key ........................................20
          4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key ................20
          4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..20
          4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests ..........21
          4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                 Subscriber .........................................21
          4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                 Re-Keyed Certificate ...............................21
          4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA ..21
          4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................21
     4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................21
          4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........21
          4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........21
          4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......22




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          4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                 Subscriber .........................................22
          4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
                 Certificate ........................................22
          4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..22
          4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................22
     4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................22
          4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................22
          4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................22
          4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................23
          4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................23
          4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the
                 Revocation Request .................................23
          4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
                 Parties ............................................23
          4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................23
          4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................23
     4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................24
  5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................24
     5.1. Physical Controls .........................................24
          5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................24
          5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................24
          5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................24
          5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................24
          5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................24
          5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................24
          5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................24
          5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................24
     5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................24
          5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................25
          5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................25
          5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....25
          5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............25
     5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................25
     5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................25
          5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................25
          5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................25
          5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................26
          5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................26
          5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................26
          5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................26
     5.6. Key Changeover ............................................26
     5.7. CA or RA Termination ......................................26
  6. Technical Security Controls ....................................26
     6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................27
          6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................27
          6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................27



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          6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........27
          6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........27
          6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................27
          6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and
                 Quality Checking ...................................28
          6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
                 Usage Field) .......................................28
     6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
          Engineering Controls ......................................28
          6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........28
          6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control ......28
          6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................28
          6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................28
          6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................28
          6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
                 Cryptographic Module ...............................29
          6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........29
          6.2.8. Method of Activating a Private Key .................29
          6.2.9. Method of Deactivating a Private Key ...............29
          6.2.10. Method of Destroying a Private Key ................29
          6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................29
     6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................29
          6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................29
          6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
                 Pair Usage Periods .................................29
     6.4. Activation Data ...........................................30
     6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................30
     6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls .............................30
          6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................30
          6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................30
          6.6.3. Life-Cycle Security Controls .......................30
     6.7. Network Security Controls .................................30
     6.8. Timestamping ..............................................30
  7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................31
  8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................31
  9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................31
     9.12.  Amendments ..............................................31
          9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................31
          9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................31
          9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed .....32
  10. Security Considerations .......................................32
  11. Acknowledgments ...............................................33
  12. References ....................................................33
     12.1. Normative References .....................................33
     12.2. Informative References ...................................33






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1.  Introduction

  This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
  Infrastructure (PKI) used to attest to Internet Number Resource (INR)
  holdings (IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers).  An
  organization that distributes INRs to another organization MAY, in
  parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
  distribution.  These certificates will enable verification that the
  resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
  holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
  the current holder of these resources.

  The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
  this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
  INR holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued
  to that entity.  Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is
  intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that
  it is the current holder of an INR based on the current records of
  the entity responsible for the resources in question.  Verification
  of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
  to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
  contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
  certificate in the context of this PKI.

  This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of
  claims related to current INR holdings.  This includes any
  certificates issued in support of operation of this infrastructure,
  e.g., for integrity or access control of the repository system
  described in Section 2.4.  Such transitive uses of certificates also
  are permitted under this policy.  Use of the certificates and
  Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for any
  other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs)
  SHOULD reject certificates presented for such uses.

  Note: This document is based on the template specified in RFC 3647
  [RFC3647], a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
  stream.  In the interest of keeping the document as short as
  reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template have been
  omitted from this policy because they do not apply to this PKI.
  However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in
  RFC 3647 to facilitate comparison with the outline in Section 6 of
  RFC 3647.  Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No
  stipulation" in Certificate Policy (CP) / Certification Practice
  Statement (CPS) parlance.

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].



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1.1.  Overview

  This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
  holders of INRs, in accordance with the records of the organizations
  that act as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI.  The ability
  to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unambiguous
  distribution of these resources [RFC6480].

  The structure of the RPKI is congruent with the number resource
  allocation framework of the Internet.  The IANA allocates number
  resources to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), to others, and for
  special purposes [RFC5736].  The RIRs, in turn, manage the allocation
  of number resources to end users, Internet Service Providers, and
  others.

  This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6487] for
  more details):

  o  CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
     INR holders

  o  End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital
     signatures on RPKI signed objects

1.2.  Document Name and Identification

  The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
  Resource PKI (RPKI)".

  This policy has been assigned the following OID:

  id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)

                        identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)

                        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }

1.3.  PKI Participants

  Note that in a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
  organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA.  The
  term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
  qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
  the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
  service from an ISP.  In such cases, the term "network subscriber"
  will be used.  Also note that, for brevity, this document always
  refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
  some of them are individuals.



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1.3.1.  Certification Authorities

  The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA,
  RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI.

  Organizations that do not distribute INRs but hold such resources
  also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.

1.3.2.  Registration Authorities

  This PKI does not require establishment or use of a registration
  authority (RA) function separate from the one provided inherently in
  conjunction with the CA function.  The RA function MUST be provided
  by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in
  Section 1.3.1.  An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a
  formal relationship with each organization to which it distributes
  INRs.  These entities (the CAs) already perform the RA function
  implicitly since they already assume responsibility for distributing
  INRs.

1.3.3.  Subscribers

  These are the organizations receiving distributions of INRs: RIRs,
  NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.

  Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions
  from more than one source over time.  This is true even for RIRs,
  which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space.  This
  PKI accommodates such relationships.

1.3.4.  Relying Parties

  Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI
  signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.  Relying
  parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI.  (See Section
  1.6 for the definition of an RPKI signed object.)

1.3.5.  Other Participants

  Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
  responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
  with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects that it issues.
  The organization MAY operate its own publication point, or it MAY
  outsource this function (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2).







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1.4.  Certificate Usage

1.4.1.  Appropriate Certificate Uses

  The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
  support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.

  Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
  cited above, also are permitted under this policy.  For example,
  certificates may be issued in support of integrity and access control
  for the repository system described in Section 2.4.  Such transitive
  uses are permitted under this policy.

1.4.2.  Prohibited Certificate Uses

  Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited
  under this policy.

1.5.  Policy Administration

1.5.1.  Organization Administering the Document

  This CP is administered by

  Internet Engineering Steering Group
  c/o Internet Society
  1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
  Reston, VA 20190-5108
  U.S.A.

1.5.2.  Contact Person

  The contact information is

  EMail: [email protected]
  Phone: +1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)

1.5.4.  CP Approval Procedures

  If a replacement BCP is needed that updates or obsoletes the current
  BCP, then the replacement BCP MUST be approved by the IESG following
  the procedures of the IETF Standards Process as defined in RFC 2026
  [RFC2026].








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1.6.  Definitions and Acronyms

  CPS -  Certification Practice Statement.  A CPS is a document that
         specifies the practices that a Certification Authority (CA)
         employs in issuing certificates in this PKI.

  Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along
         the respective number hierarchy.  IANA distributes blocks of
         IP addresses and AS numbers to the five Regional Internet
         Registries (RIRs).  RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and
         AS numbers to organizations within their service regions, who
         in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.

  IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.  IANA is responsible for
         global coordination of the IP addressing system and AS numbers
         used for routing Internet traffic.  IANA distributes INRs to
         Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).

  INRs - Internet Number Resources.  INRs are number values for three
         protocol parameter sets, namely:

         o  IP version 4 addresses,

         o  IP version 6 addresses, and

         o  Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
            currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.

  ISP -  Internet Service Provider.  This is an organization managing
         and providing Internet services to other organizations.

  LIR -  Local Internet Registry.  In some regions, this term is used
         to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.

  NIR -  National Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
         manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
         geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.  NIRs form
         an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage
         INRs.

  RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
         manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.









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  RPKI signed object - An RPKI signed object is a digitally signed data
         object (other than a certificate or CRL) that is declared to
         be such by a Standards Track RFC, and that can be validated
         using certificates issued under this PKI.  The content and
         format of these data constructs depend on the context in which
         validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
         Examples of these objects are repository manifests [RFC6486]
         and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].

2.  Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1.  Repositories

  Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects (intended for public
  consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying
  parties, to enable them to validate this data.  This motivates use of
  a robust, distributed repository system.  Each CA MUST maintain a
  publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed
  objects (intended for public consumption) via this repository in a
  manner that conforms with "A Profile for Resource Certificate
  Repository Structure" [RFC6481].  (This function MAY be outsourced,
  as noted in Section 2.2 below.)  The collection of repositories forms
  the RPKI distributed repository system.

2.2.  Publication of Certification Information

  Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public
  consumption) that it issues via the repository system.

  Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that
  it issues via the repository system.

  Each CA MUST publish its RPKI signed objects (intended for public
  consumption) via the repository system.

  Each CA that issues certificates to entities outside of its
  administrative domain SHOULD create and publish a CPS that meets the
  requirements set forth in this CP.  Publication means that the
  entities to which the CA issues certificates MUST be able to acquire
  a copy of the CPS, and MUST be able to ascertain when the CPS
  changes.  (An organization that does not allocate or assign INRs does
  not need to create or publish a CPS.)

  An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data --
  certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects.

  The CP will be published as an IETF-stream RFC and will be available
  from the RFC repository.



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2.3.  Time or Frequency of Publication

  The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information:

  The period of time within which a certificate will be published after
  the CA issues the certificate.

  The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry
  for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.

  Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI
  repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively.
  Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
  nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.

2.4.  Access Controls on Repositories

  Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to
  prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying, or deleting
  repository entries.  A CA or repository operator MUST NOT
  intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its CPS,
  certificates, CRLs, or RPKI signed objects.  This data is intended to
  be accessible to the public.

3.  Identification and Authentication

3.1.  Naming

3.1.1.  Types of Names

  The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a
  single CommonName (CN) attribute with a value generated by the issuer
  of the certificate.  Optionally, the serialNumber attribute MAY be
  included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative
  distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of
  certificates associated with the same entity.

3.1.2.  Need for Names to Be Meaningful

  The subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful",
  i.e., the name is not intended to convey the identity of the subject
  to relying parties.  The rationale here is that certificates issued
  under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications
  that make use of attestations of INR holdings.  They are not used to
  identify subjects.






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3.1.3.  Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

  Although subject (and issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
  appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI; thus, no
  explicit support for this feature is provided.

3.1.4.  Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

  None.

3.1.5.  Uniqueness of Names

  There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this
  PKI.  Each CA certifies subject names that MUST be unique among the
  certificates it issues.  Although it is desirable that these subject
  names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within the RPKI
  cannot be guaranteed.

  However, subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a way
  that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
  assigned the same name.  The RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487]
  provides an example of how to generate (meaningless) subject names in
  a way that minimizes the likelihood of collisions.

3.2.  Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1.  Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key

  Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each
  subject to demonstrate proof of possession (PoP) of the private key
  corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
  the certificate.  The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
  each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA.

3.2.2.  Authentication of Organization Identity

  Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
  procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
  reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
  has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate.  The specific
  procedures employed for this purpose MUST be described by the CPS for
  each CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
  commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP in
  the management of the INRs.  This authentication is solely for use by
  each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes
  INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this
  CA-subscriber relationship.




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3.2.3.  Authentication of Individual Identity

  Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
  procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of
  each organization that is an INR holder.  The specific means by which
  each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
  organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA.  Relying
  parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with
  those it already employs as a registry or ISP in authenticating
  individuals as representatives for INR holders.

3.2.4.  Non-Verified Subscriber Information

  A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in
  certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject
  Information Access (SIA) extensions.

3.2.5.  Validation of Authority

  Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
  procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
  organization to which a certificate is issued is authorized to
  represent that organization in this context.  The procedures MUST be
  described by the CPS for the CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA
  to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
  registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for
  INR holders.

3.2.6.  Criteria for Interoperation

  This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
  other PKI.

3.3.  Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests

3.3.1.  Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

  Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
  procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
  legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and the
  associated INRs, and MUST require PoP of the private key
  corresponding to the new public key.  The procedures employed for
  these purposes MUST be described in the CPS for the CA.  With respect
  to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can
  expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
  already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.





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  Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
  with contractual agreements with the recipient.  If so, this MUST be
  described by the CPS for the CA.

3.3.2.  Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation

  Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
  procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
  revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was
  issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR.  The CA
  MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public
  key.  The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
  described by the CPS for the CA.  With respect to authentication of
  the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
  procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
  or ISP, in the management of INRs.  Note that there MAY be different
  procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses
  the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has
  access to that key.

3.4.  Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

  Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
  procedures to ensure that:

  o  an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of
     the certificate to be revoked.

  o  each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records with
     regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the
     INRs identified in the certificate.

  o  an individual claiming to represent an organization for which a
     certificate is to be revoked is authorized to represent that
     organization in this context.

  The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described
  by the CPS for the CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA to employ
  procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
  or ISP, in the management of INRs.











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4.  Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1.  Certificate Application

4.1.1.  Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

  Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate.  This
  includes Internet Registries and ISPs.  Additionally, entities that
  hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY
  acquire a certificate under this PKI.  The (CA) certificates issued
  to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined
  by RFC 3779 [RFC3779], "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS
  Identifiers", as appropriate.

  The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.

4.1.2.  Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

  The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS
  for each CA.  An entity that desires one or more certificates should
  contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.

4.2.  Certificate Application Processing

  CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate application
  processing.  Section 6 of the Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]
  defines the standard certificate request formats that MUST be
  supported.

  Each CA MUST define via its CPS, the certificate request/response
  standards that it employs.

4.2.1.  Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

  Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
  authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for
  issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  It is important to
  note that the Resource PKI SHOULD NOT be used to authenticate the
  identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the
  INRs they hold.  Because identity is not being vouched for by this
  PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal
  organization names, etc.

4.2.2.  Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

  Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal
  business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
  records of INR holders.  Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified



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  in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key
  corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
  the CA issues to the requester.  The details of how certificate
  applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS for the CA in
  question.

4.2.3.  Time to Process Certificate Applications

  No stipulation.  As part of its CPS, each CA MUST declare its
  expected time frame to process (approve, issue, and publish) a
  certificate application.

4.3.  Certificate Issuance

4.3.1.  CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

  If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the
  corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
  repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
  repository publication point.

4.3.2.  Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

  The CA MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
  The means by which a subscriber is notified MUST be defined by each
  CA in its CPS.

4.4.  Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1.  Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

  Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA MUST place the
  certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber.  This MAY be
  done without subscriber review and acceptance.  Each CA MUST state in
  its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate
  and notification to the subscriber.

4.4.2.  Publication of the Certificate by the CA

  Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
  system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
  publication point as per the conduct described in Section 4.4.1.  The
  procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.

4.4.3.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  The CPS of each CA MUST indicate whether any other entities will be
  notified when a certificate is issued.



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4.5.  Key Pair and Certificate Usage

  A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1.  Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

  Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 [X.509] CA
  certificate containing appropriate RFC 3779 extensions.  Holders of
  CA resource certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves
  to enable verification of RPKI signed objects that they generate.

4.5.2.  Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

  Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances.
  If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the
  relying party must obtain such assurances in order for such reliance
  to be deemed reasonable.

  Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1)
  verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose
  that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see
  Section 1.4), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all
  the certificates in the chain (terminating at a trust anchor (TA)
  accepted by the RP) that issued the certificates relevant to the
  certificate in question.  If any of the certificates in the
  certificate chain have been revoked or have expired, the relying
  party is solely responsible for determining whether reliance on a
  digital signature to be verified by the certificate in question is
  acceptable.  Any such reliance is made solely at the risk of the
  relying party.

  If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
  appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
  and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
  condition of relying on the certificate.  Moreover, the relying party
  MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI
  Certificate Profile [RFC6487], which specifies the extended
  validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.

4.6.  Certificate Renewal

  This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
  Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
  an old one prior to its expiration.  Only the validity dates and the
  serial number (the field in the certificate, not the DN attribute)
  are changed.  The public key and all other information remain the
  same.




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4.6.1.  Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

  A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration
  date or a renewal request from the subscriber.  Prior to the
  expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the
  responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to maintain
  continuity of certificate usage.  If the issuing CA initiates the
  renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that
  CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal process.  The
  validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate SHOULD overlap
  that of the previous certificate to ensure continuity of certificate
  usage.  It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed certificate be issued and
  published at least 1 week prior to the expiration of the certificate
  it replaces.

  Certificate renewal SHOULD incorporate the same public key as the
  previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
  compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
  Section 4.7 apply.

4.6.2.  Who May Request Renewal

  Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the
  renewal process.  The certificate holder MAY request an early
  renewal, for example, if it expects to be unavailable to support the
  renewal process during the normal expiration period.  An issuing CA
  MAY initiate the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
  date.

4.6.3.  Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

  Renewal procedures MUST ensure that the person or organization
  seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or
  authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate
  holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate.  Renewal
  processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been
  revoked.

4.6.4.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.

4.6.5.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.






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4.6.6.  Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.

4.6.7.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.

4.7.  Certificate Re-Key

  This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key.
  Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an
  old one because the key needs to be replaced.  Unlike with
  certificate renewal, the public key is changed.

4.7.1.  Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key

  Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when required, based
  on:

  1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
     private key, or

  2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
     pair

  A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, requiring the
  reissuance of all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity.  So it
  should be performed only when necessary and in a way that preserves
  the ability of relying parties to validate certificates whose
  validation path includes the re-keyed entity.  CA key rollover MUST
  follow the procedures defined in "CA Key Rollover in the RPKI"
  [RFC6489].

  Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779
  extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
  public key rather than a new key.  This applies when one is adding
  INRs (revocation not required) and when one is removing INRs
  (revocation required (see Section 4.8.1)).

  If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
  certificate MUST be revoked.

4.7.2.  Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

  The holder of the certificate may request a re-key.  In addition, the
  CA that issued the certificate MAY choose to initiate a re-key based
  on a verified compromise report.



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4.7.3.  Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

  The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
  generation as defined in Section 4.3.

4.7.4.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.

4.7.5.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.

4.7.6.  Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.

4.7.7.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.

4.8.  Certificate Modification

4.8.1.  Circumstance for Certificate Modification

  Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to selected
  attribute values in a certificate.  In the context of the RPKI, the
  only changes that are accommodated by certificate modification are
  changes to the INR holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension(s)
  and changes to the SIA extension.

  When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
  issued.  If no INR holdings are removed from the certificate, the new
  certificate MUST contain the same public key and the same expiration
  date as the original certificate, but with the SIA extension and/or
  the INR set expanded.  In this case, revocation of the previous
  certificate is not required.

  When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate, then
  the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate MUST be
  issued, reflecting the changed INR holdings.  (The SIA extension in
  the new certificate will be unchanged, unless the affected INR holder
  supplies a new SIA value.)

4.8.2.  Who May Request Certificate Modification

  Either the certificate holder or the issuer may initiate the
  certificate modification process.



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4.8.3.  Processing Certificate Modification Requests

  The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate
  and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
  followed (see Section 4.3).

4.8.4.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.

4.8.5.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.

4.8.6.  Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.

4.8.7.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.

4.9.  Certificate Revocation and Suspension

4.9.1.  Circumstances for Revocation

  A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is
  reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's
  private key.  A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data
  object signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
  Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate MAY be
  specified in a CA's CPS.

  Note:  If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing
  distribution, the old certificate need not be revoked.  Instead, a
  new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new resources
  and the old key.  If INRs are being removed or if there has been a
  key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and a
  re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise).

4.9.2.  Who Can Request Revocation

  This MUST be defined in the CPS of the organization that issued the
  certificate.







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4.9.3.  Procedure for Revocation Request

  A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
  revocation.  This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked
  and MUST be authenticated.  The procedures for making the request
  MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.  The RPKI provisioning
  document [RFC6492] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make
  revocation requests.

  A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a
  certificate.  The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL
  publication.  The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the
  CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.

4.9.4.  Revocation Request Grace Period

  A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the
  need for revocation has been identified.  There is no specified grace
  period for the subscriber in this process.

4.9.5.  Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

  No stipulation.  Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation
  processing time in its CPS.

4.9.6.  Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

  A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled CRL
  from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party
  validates a certificate.

4.9.7.  CRL Issuance Frequency

  The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated
  in its CPS.  Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value, and a new
  CRL MUST be published at or before that time.  A CA MUST set the
  nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL to signal when the next
  scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8.  Maximum Latency for CRLs

  The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with
  posting its CRL to the repository system.








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4.10.  Certificate Status Services

  This PKI does not make provision for use of the Online Certificate
  Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560] or Server-Based Certificate
  Validation Protocol (SCVP) [RFC5055].  This is because it is
  anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate
  certificates for all participating resource holders.  These protocols
  are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status
  checking.  RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily.  It is
  RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but no
  more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository
  accesses).

5.  Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1.  Physical Controls

  Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation
  that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
  management of INR distribution.  The physical controls employed for
  CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS.  Possible topics to be
  covered in the CPS are shown below.  (These sections are taken from
  [RFC3647].)

5.1.1.  Site Location and Construction

5.1.2.  Physical Access

5.1.3.  Power and Air Conditioning

5.1.4.  Water Exposures

5.1.5.  Fire Prevention and Protection

5.1.6.  Media Storage

5.1.7.  Waste Disposal

5.1.8.  Off-Site Backup

5.2.  Procedural Controls

  Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are
  commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
  management of INR distribution.  The procedural security controls
  employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS.  Possible
  topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below.  (These sections are
  taken from [RFC3647].)



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5.2.1.  Trusted Roles

5.2.2.  Number of Persons Required per Task

5.2.3.  Identification and Authentication for Each Role

5.2.4.  Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

5.3.  Personnel Controls

  Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are
  commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
  management of INR distribution.  The details for each CA MUST be
  specified in its CPS.

5.4.  Audit Logging Procedures

  Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in
  Sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.8 MUST be addressed in its CPS.

5.4.1.  Types of Events Recorded

  Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the
  certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records MUST
  include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
  content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

  o  Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

  o  Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
     requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
     notifications)

  o  Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

  o  Posting of any material to a repository

  o  Any attempts to change or delete audit data

  o  Key generation

  o  Software and/or configuration updates to the CA

  o  Clock adjustments

5.4.2.  Frequency of Processing Log

  Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.



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5.4.3.  Retention Period for Audit Log

  Each CA MUST establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.

5.4.4.  Protection of Audit Log

  The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry
  standards.

5.4.5.  Audit Log Backup Procedures

  The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry
  standards.

5.4.8.  Vulnerability Assessments

  The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any
  vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
  their normal business practice.

5.6.  Key Changeover

  When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate
  containing its new public key.  See [RFC6489] for a description of
  how key changeover is effected in the RPKI.

5.7.  CA or RA Termination

  In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA for the specified INRs that
  were distributed to that entity.  Procedures associated with the
  termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS for that CA.  These
  procedures MUST include a provision to notify each entity that issued
  a certificate to the organization that is operating the CA that is
  terminating.

  Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating
  as the CA (see Section 1.3.2), there are no separate stipulations for
  RAs.

6.  Technical Security Controls

  The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are
  authoritative for these distributions.  This PKI is designed to
  enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the
  holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them.  Accordingly,
  the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need
  only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for
  administering the distribution of INR data by the extant



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  organizations.  Details of each CA's security controls MUST be
  described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.1.  Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1.  Key Pair Generation

  In most instances, public key pairs will be generated by the subject,
  i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs.  However,
  some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects
  at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who
  do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure
  fashion.  (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only if it
  generates them; see Section 6.1.6.)  Since the keys used in this PKI
  are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs
  does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI.  Each CA MUST
  describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.

6.1.2.  Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

  If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
  CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
  subscribers in a secure fashion.

6.1.3.  Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

  When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified,
  it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public key
  has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses
  the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.

6.1.4.  CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

  CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
  contained in certificates issued by other CAs.  These certificates
  MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system.  Relying
  parties download these certificates from the repositories.  Public
  key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are
  distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis
  of locally defined criteria.

6.1.5.  Key Sizes

  The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in "A
  Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
  Key Infrastructure" [RFC6485].





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6.1.6.  Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

  The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in
  [RFC6485].  Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
  the quality of its key pair.  A CA is not responsible for performing
  such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA generates
  the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.

6.1.7.  Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

  The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in
  RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487].

6.2.  Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
     Controls

6.2.1.  Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

  The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
  MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA.

6.2.2.  Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control

  CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their
  private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI.
  The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person
  controls it employs.

6.2.3.  Private Key Escrow

  No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.

6.2.4.  Private Key Backup

  Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
  loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a
  secure means to back up its private keys.  The details of the
  procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in the
  CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.5.  Private Key Archival

  The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's
  private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.







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6.2.6.  Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

  The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's
  private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in
  the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.7.  Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

  The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's
  private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from
  unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.8.  Method of Activating a Private Key

  The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's
  private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.9.  Method of Deactivating a Private Key

  The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the CA's
  private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.10.  Method of Destroying a Private Key

  The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's
  private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.11.  Cryptographic Module Rating

  The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in
  the CPS issued by the CA.

6.3.  Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1.  Public Key Archival

  Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
  to archive public keys.

6.3.2.  Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

  The INRs held by a CA may periodically change when it receives new
  distributions.  To minimize disruption, the CA key pair MUST NOT
  change when INRs are added to its certificate.

  If ISP and network-subscriber certificates are tied to the duration
  of service agreements, these certificates should have validity
  periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements.  In any



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  case, the validity period for certificates MUST be chosen by the
  issuing CA and described in its CPS.

6.4.  Activation Data

  Each CA MUST document in its CPS how it will generate, install, and
  protect its activation data.

6.5.  Computer Security Controls

  Each CA MUST document the technical security requirements it employs
  for CA computer operation in its CPS.

6.6.  Life-Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1.  System Development Controls

  The CPS for each CA MUST document any system development controls
  required by that CA, if applicable.

6.6.2.  Security Management Controls

  The CPS for each CA MUST document the security controls applied to
  the software and equipment used for this PKI.  These controls MUST be
  commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for
  managing the INRs.

6.6.3.  Life-Cycle Security Controls

  The CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and
  software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained,
  and updated.  This MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the
  way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is
  handled.

6.7.  Network Security Controls

  The CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls
  employed for CA operation.  These MUST be commensurate with the
  protection it employs for the computers used for managing
  distribution of INRs.

6.8.  Timestamping

  The RPKI does not make use of timestamping.






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7.  Certificate and CRL Profiles

  Please refer to the RPKI Certificate and CRL Profile [RFC6487].

8.  Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

  The certificate policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria against
  which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes requirements that
  they must meet.  In this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for
  the management of INRs, and the PKI simply supports verification of
  the distribution of these resources to network subscribers.
  Accordingly, whatever audit and other assessments are already used to
  ensure the security of the management of INRs is sufficient for this
  PKI.  The CPS for each CA MUST describe what audits and other
  assessments are used.

9.  Other Business and Legal Matters

  As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
  managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles as
  managers of this data.  They MUST operate this PKI to allow the
  holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to
  these distributions.  Therefore, the manner in which the
  organizations in question manage their business and legal matters for
  this PKI MUST be commensurate with the way in which they already
  manage business and legal matters in their existing roles.  Since
  there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply
  to all organizations, the topics listed in Sections 4.9.1 to 4.9.11
  and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued
  by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these
  topics.  Please note that the topics in the above sections of RFC
  3647 become sections 9.1 to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.17 in the CPS.

9.12.  Amendments

9.12.1.  Procedure for Amendment

  The procedure for amending this CP is via written notice from the
  IESG in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this
  document.

9.12.2.  Notification Mechanism and Period

  Successive versions of the CP will be published with the following
  statement:

     This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY.




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  MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum of 6 months from the date of
  publication.

9.12.3.  Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed

  If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce
  the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there
  will be no change to the CP OID.  If the IESG judges that changes to
  the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for
  RPKI purposes, then there MUST be a new CP OID.

10.  Security Considerations

  According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
  rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
  particular community and/or class of applications with common
  security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
  in deciding whether a certificate and the binding therein are
  sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
  application.  This document describes the CP for the Resource Public
  Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  There are separate documents (CPSs) that
  cover the factors that determine the degree to which a relying party
  can trust the binding embodied in a certificate.  The degree to which
  such a binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the
  practices followed by the CA in authenticating the subject; the CA's
  operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
  including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
  example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
  responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
  example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
  liability).

  Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is
  a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and
  CRLs under the same issuer name.  Path validation implementations
  that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm
  (see [RFC6487]) verify that the same key was used to sign both the
  target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL.  So, a
  name collision will not change the result.  Use of the basic X.509
  path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could
  result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid
  certificate being rejected as revoked.  Relying parties must ensure
  that the software they use to validate certificates issued under this
  policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the
  certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [RFC6487].






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11.  Acknowledgments

  The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei
  Robachevsky, and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing
  this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

  [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [RFC2026]   Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
              3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.

  [RFC3779]   Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

  [RFC6481]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile
              for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              February 2012.

  [RFC6485]   Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
              Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
              RFC 6485, February 2012.

  [RFC6487]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile
              for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February
              2012.

  [RFC6489]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover
              in the RPKI", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012.

12.2.  Informative References

  [RFC2560]   Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
              Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
              Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.

  [RFC3647]   Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
              Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
              November 2003.

  [RFC5055]   Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
              Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
              (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.



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  [RFC5736]   Huston, G., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IANA IPv4 Special
              Purpose Address Registry", RFC 5736, January 2010.

  [RFC6480]   Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.

  [RFC6482]   Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.

  [RFC6486]   Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.

  [RFC6492]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A
              Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", RFC
              6492, February 2012.

  [X.509]     ITU-T Recommendation X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8, "Information
              technology -- Open systems interconnection -- The
              Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
              frameworks", November 2008.






























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Authors' Addresses

  Stephen Kent
  BBN Technologies
  10 Moulton Street
  Cambridge MA 02138
  USA

  Phone: +1 617 873 3988
  EMail: [email protected]


  Derrick Kong
  BBN Technologies
  Moulton Street
  Cambridge MA 02138
  USA

  Phone: +1 617 873 1951
  EMail: [email protected]


  Karen Seo
  BBN Technologies
  10 Moulton Street
  Cambridge MA 02138
  USA

  Phone: +1 617 873 3152
  EMail: [email protected]


  Ronald Watro
  BBN Technologies
  10 Moulton Street
  Cambridge MA 02138
  USA

  Phone: +1 617 873 2551
  EMail: [email protected]











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=========================================================================





Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           S. Kent
Request for Comments: 7382                                       D. Kong
BCP: 173                                                          K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice                         BBN Technologies
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               April 2015


        Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
                     for the Resource PKI (RPKI)

Abstract

  This document contains a template to be used for creating a
  Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is
  part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), e.g., a
  resource allocation registry or an ISP.

Status of This Memo

  This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.

  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
  (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
  received public review and has been approved for publication by the
  Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
  BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.

  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
  include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
  the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
  described in the Simplified BSD License.






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Table of Contents

  Preface ............................................................8
  1. Introduction ....................................................9
     1.1. Overview ..................................................10
     1.2. Document Name and Identification ..........................10
     1.3. PKI Participants ..........................................11
          1.3.1. Certification Authorities ..........................11
          1.3.2. Registration Authorities ...........................11
          1.3.3. Subscribers ........................................11
          1.3.4. Relying Parties ....................................11
          1.3.5. Other Participants .................................12
     1.4. Certificate Usage .........................................12
          1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses .......................12
          1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ........................12
     1.5. Policy Administration .....................................12
          1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document ............12
          1.5.2. Contact Person .....................................12
          1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy ..12
          1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ............................13
     1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................13
  2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................14
     2.1. Repositories ..............................................14
     2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................14
     2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................14
     2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................15
  3. Identification and Authentication ..............................15
     3.1. Naming ....................................................15
          3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................15
          3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................15
          3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........15
          3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........15
          3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................16
          3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of
                 Trademarks .........................................16
     3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................16
          3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ..........16
          3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............16
          3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............17
          3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ................17
          3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................17
          3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................17









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     3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....18
          3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
                 Routine Re-key .....................................18
          3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
                 Re-key after Revocation ............................18
     3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..18
  4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements ................18
     4.1. Certificate Application ...................................18
          4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........18
          4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............19
     4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................19
          4.2.1. Performing Identification and
                 Authentication Functions ...........................19
          4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..19
          4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........19
     4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................19
          4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............19
          4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
                 Issuance of Certificate ............................20
          4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................20
     4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................20
          4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........20
          4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........20
          4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................20
     4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................20
          4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......20
          4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....21
     4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................21
          4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............21
          4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................21
          4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............22
          4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                 Subscriber .........................................22
          4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                 Renewal Certificate ................................22
          4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...22
          4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................22
     4.7. Certificate Re-key ........................................22
          4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ................22
          4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..23
          4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ..........23
          4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                 Subscriber .........................................23





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          4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                 Re-keyed Certificate ...............................23
          4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA ..23
          4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................23
     4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................23
          4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........23
          4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........24
          4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......24
          4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate
                 Issuance to Subscriber .............................24
          4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
                 Certificate ........................................24
          4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..24
          4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                 CA to Other Entities ...............................24
     4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................25
          4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................25
          4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................25
          4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................25
          4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................25
          4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the
                 Revocation Request .................................25
          4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
                 Parties ............................................25
          4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................26
          4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................26
     4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................26
  5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................26
     5.1. Physical Controls .........................................26
          5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................26
          5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................26
          5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................26
          5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................26
          5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................26
          5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................26
          5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................26
          5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................26
     5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................27
          5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................27
          5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................27
          5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....27
          5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............27








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     5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................27
          5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
                 Requirements .......................................27
          5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ........................27
          5.3.3. Training Requirements ..............................27
          5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements ..............27
          5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................27
          5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .................27
          5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................27
          5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel ................27
     5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................28
          5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................28
          5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................28
          5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................28
          5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................28
          5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................28
          5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs.
                 External) [OMITTED] ................................29
          5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] ....29
          5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................29
     5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] ................................29
     5.6. Key Changeover ............................................29
     5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..........................29
     5.8. CA or RA Termination ......................................29
  6. Technical Security Controls ....................................29
     6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................29
          6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................29
          6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................30
          6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........30
          6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........30
          6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................30
          6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality
                 Checking ...........................................30
          6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
                 Usage Field) .......................................30
     6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
          Engineering Controls ......................................31
          6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........31
          6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control ......31
          6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................31
          6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................31
          6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................31
          6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
                 Cryptographic Module ...............................31
          6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........31
          6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ...................32





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          6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key .................32
          6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key ..................32
          6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................32
     6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................32
          6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................32
          6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
                 Pair Usage Periods .................................32
     6.4. Activation Data ...........................................32
          6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation ........32
          6.4.2. Activation Data Protection .........................32
          6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data ...................33
     6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................33
     6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls .............................33
          6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................33
          6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................33
          6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .......................33
     6.7. Network Security Controls .................................33
     6.8. Time-Stamping .............................................33
  7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................33
  8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................34
  9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................34
     9.1. Fees ......................................................34
          9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ...............34
          9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] ..................34
          9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access
                 Fees [OMITTED] .....................................34
          9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) ............34
          9.1.5. Refund Policy ......................................34
     9.2. Financial Responsibility ..................................34
          9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .................................34
          9.2.2. Other Assets .......................................34
          9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ....34
     9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information ...................34
          9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ..................34
          9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of
                 Confidential Information ...........................34
          9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential
                 Information ........................................34
     9.4. Privacy of Personal Information ...........................34
          9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................34
          9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .....................35
          9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private .....................35
          9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......35
          9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ......35
          9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or
                 Administrative Process .............................35
          9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances .........35




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     9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) ..............35
     9.6. Representations and Warranties ............................35
          9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................35
          9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ..........35
          9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties .......35
     9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties .................................35
     9.8. Limitations of Liability ..................................35
     9.9. Indemnities ...............................................35
     9.10. Term and Termination .....................................35
          9.10.1. Term ..............................................35
          9.10.2. Termination .......................................35
          9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival ................35
     9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ..35
     9.12. Amendments ...............................................35
          9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................35
          9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................35
     9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions ............................35
     9.14. Governing Law ............................................35
     9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ...........................36
     9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions .................................36
          9.16.1. Entire Agreement ..................................36
          9.16.2. Assignment ........................................36
          9.16.3. Severability ......................................36
          9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of
                  Rights) ...........................................36
          9.16.5. Force Majeure .....................................36
  10. Security Considerations .......................................36
  11. References ....................................................37
     11.1. Normative References .....................................37
     11.2. Informative References ...................................37
  Acknowledgments ...................................................38
  Authors' Addresses ................................................38



















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Preface

  This RFC contains text intended for use as a template as designated
  below by the markers <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT>.
  Such Template Text is subject to the provisions of Section 9(b) of
  the Trust Legal Provisions.

  This document contains a template to be used for creating a
  Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is
  part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  (Throughout
  this document, the term "organization" is used broadly, e.g., the
  entity in question might be a business unit of a larger
  organization.)

  There is no expectation that a CPS will be published as an RFC.  An
  organization will publish the CPS in a manner appropriate for access
  by the users of the RPKI, e.g., on the organization's web site.  As a
  best current practice, organizations are expected to use this
  template instead of creating one from scratch.  This template
  contains both text that SHOULD appear in all Certification Practice
  Statements and places for text specific to the organization in
  question (indicated by <text in angle brackets>).

  The user of this document should:

  1. Extract the text between the <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and
     <END TEMPLATE TEXT> delimiters.

  2. Replace the instructions between the angle brackets with the
     required information.

  This document has been generated to complement the Certificate Policy
  (CP) for the RPKI [RFC6484].  Like RFC 6484, it is based on the
  template specified in RFC 3647 [RFC3647].  A number of sections
  contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did
  not apply to this PKI.  However, we have retained the section
  numbering scheme employed in that RFC to facilitate comparison with
  the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC and in RFC 6484.

  Conventions Used in This Document:

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].







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<BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT>

  <Create a title page saying, e.g., "<Name of organization>
  Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
  Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.>

  <Create a table of contents.>

1.  Introduction

  This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <name
  of organization>.  It describes the practices employed by the <name
  of organization> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public
  Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  These practices are defined in accordance
  with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] for
  the RPKI.

  The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
  holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs) (Section 1.6) in
  accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in
  this PKI.  The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring
  the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources.

  This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy.  These
  resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
  (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).  In some regions,
  National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy
  below the RIRs for INR distribution.  Internet Service Providers
  (ISPs) and network subscribers form additional tiers below
  registries.

  Conventions Used in This Document:

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
  document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].















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1.1.  Overview

  This CPS describes:

  o  Participants

  o  Publication of the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists
     (CRLs)

  o  How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed, and
     revoked

  o  Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

  o  Key management

  o  Audit procedures

  o  Business and legal issues

  This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6480] for
  more details):

  o  CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
     each subscriber INR holder.

  o  End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate
     digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in
     Section 1.6).

  o  In the future, the PKI also may include end-entity certificates in
     support of access control for the repository system as described
     in Section 2.4.

1.2.  Document Name and Identification

  The name of this document is "<Name of organization> Certification
  Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
  (RPKI)".  <If this document is available via the Internet, the CA can
  provide the URI for the CPS here.  It SHOULD be the same URI as the
  URI that appears as a policy qualifier in the CA certificate for the
  CA, if the CA elects to make use of that feature.>









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1.3.  PKI Participants

  Note that in a PKI the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
  organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA.  The
  term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
  qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
  the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
  service from an ISP.  In such cases, the term "network subscriber"
  will be used.  Also note that, for brevity, this document always
  refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
  some of them are individuals.

1.3.1.  Certification Authorities

  <Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI.  One approach
  is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" and the other
  designated "production".  The offline CA is the top-level CA for the
  <name of organization> portion of the RPKI.  It provides a secure
  revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is
  compromised or becomes unavailable.  Thus, the offline CA issues
  certificates only to instances of the production CA, and the CRLs it
  issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production
  CA.  The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <name of
  organization> members, to whom INRs have been distributed.>

1.3.2.  Registration Authorities

  <Describe how the Registration Authority (RA) function is handled for
  the CA(s) that you operate.  The RPKI does not require establishment
  or use of a separate Registration Authority in addition to the CA
  function.  The RA function MUST be provided by the same entity
  operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1.  An entity
  acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with
  each organization to which it distributes INRs.  These organizations
  already perform the RA function implicitly, since they already assume
  responsibility for distributing INRs.>

1.3.3.  Subscribers

  Organizations receiving INR allocations from this CA are subscribers
  in the RPKI.

1.3.4.  Relying Parties

  Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or
  RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.
  Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI.
  (See Section 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)



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1.3.5.  Other Participants

  <Specify one or more entities that operate a repository holding
  certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects issued by this
  organization, and provide a URL for the repository.>

1.4.  Certificate Usage

1.4.1.  Appropriate Certificate Uses

  The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
  support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.

  Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
  cited above, are also permitted under RFC 6484.

  Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
  used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
  control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4.  Such
  uses also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.

1.4.2.  Prohibited Certificate Uses

  Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5.  Policy Administration

1.5.1.  Organization Administering the Document

  This CPS is administered by <name of organization>.  <Include the
  mailing address, email address, and similar contact info here.>

1.5.2.  Contact Person

  <Insert organization contact info here.>

1.5.3.  Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

  Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
  is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
  key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  The issuing
  organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
  distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the
  accuracy of this binding.







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1.5.4.  CPS Approval Procedures

  Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
  is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
  key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  The issuing
  organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
  distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the
  accuracy of this binding.

1.6.  Definitions and Acronyms

  BPKI   Business PKI.  A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
         organization to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can
         be issued.  If a BPKI is employed by a CA, it may have its own
         CP, separate from the RPKI CP.

  CP     Certificate Policy.  A CP is a named set of rules that
         indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
         community and/or class of applications with common security
         requirements.  The CP for the RPKI is [RFC6484].

  CPS    Certification Practice Statement.  A CPS is a document that
         specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
         in issuing certificates.

  Distribution of INRs   A process of distribution of the INRs along
         the respective number hierarchy.  IANA distributes blocks of
         IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five
         Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).  RIRs distribute smaller
         address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations
         within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP
         addresses to their customers.

  IANA   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.  IANA is responsible for
         global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
         systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic.  IANA
         distributes INRs to RIRs.

  INRs   Internet Number Resources.  INRs are number values for three
         protocol parameter sets, namely:

         o  IP version 4 addresses,

         o  IP version 6 addresses, and

         o  Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
            currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 ASNs.




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  ISP    Internet Service Provider.  An ISP is an organization managing
         and selling Internet services to other organizations.

  NIR    National Internet Registry.  An NIR is an organization that
         manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
         geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry.
         NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to
         manage INR distribution.

  RIR    Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
         manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.

  RPKI-signed object   An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
         object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such
         an object by a Standards Track RFC.  An RPKI-signed object can
         be validated using certificates issued under this PKI.  The
         content and format of these data constructs depend on the
         context in which validation of claims of current holdings of
         INRs takes place.  Examples of these objects are repository
         manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
         [RFC6482].

2.  Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1.  Repositories

  As per the CP, certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
  made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them
  to validate this data.

  The <name of organization> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs,
  and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via
  <insert IETF-designated protocol name here> at <insert URL here>.
  This repository will conform to the structure described in [RFC6481].

2.2.  Publication of Certification Information

  <Name of organization> will publish certificates, CRLs, and
  RPKI-signed objects issued by it to a repository that operates as
  part of a worldwide distributed system of RPKI repositories.

2.3.  Time or Frequency of Publication

  <Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
  repository system) of the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects
  that you issue.  If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data,
  you still need to provide this information for relying parties.  This
  MUST include the period of time within which a certificate will be



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  published after the CA issues the certificate, and the period of time
  within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
  certificate, after the CA revokes that certificate.>

  The <name of organization> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
  nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.

2.4.  Access Controls on Repositories

  <Describe the access controls used by the organization to ensure that
  only authorized parties can modify repository data, and any controls
  used to mitigate denial-of-service attacks against the repository.
  If the organization offers repository services to its subscribers,
  then describe here the protocol(s) that it supports for publishing
  signed objects from subscribers.>

3.  Identification and Authentication

3.1.  Naming

3.1.1.  Types of Names

  The subject of each certificate issued by this organization is
  identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN).  The distinguished
  name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value
  generated by <name of organization>.  Optionally, the serialNumber
  attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a
  terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among
  successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.

3.1.2.  Need for Names to Be Meaningful

  The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful", in
  the conventional, human-readable sense.  The rationale here is that
  these certificates are used for authorization in support of
  applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings.  They are
  not used to identify subjects.

3.1.3.  Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

  Although Subject names in certificates issued by this organization
  SHOULD NOT be meaningful and may appear "random", anonymity is not a
  function of this PKI; thus, no explicit support for this feature is
  provided.

3.1.4.  Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

  None



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3.1.5.  Uniqueness of Names

  <Name of organization> certifies Subject names that are unique among
  the certificates that it issues.  Although it is desirable that these
  Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
  path discovery, such uniqueness is not required, nor is it enforced
  through technical means.  <Name of organization> generates Subject
  names to minimize the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
  assigned the same name.  Specifically, <insert Subject name
  generation description here, or cite RFC 6487>.

3.1.6.  Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

  Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, <name of
  organization> makes no provision either to recognize or to
  authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc.

3.2.  Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1.  Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

  <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
  demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
  corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to
  certificate issuance.>

3.2.2.  Authentication of Organization Identity

  Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
  organizational identity of subscribers.  However, certificates are
  issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of
  distributions of INRs as represented in <name of organization>
  records.

  <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each RPKI
  certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with
  regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or
  sub-distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate.  For
  example, a BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a
  certificate request that serves as a link to the <name of
  organization> subscriber database that maintains the INR distribution
  records.  The certificate request could be matched against the
  database record for the subscriber in question, and an RPKI
  certificate would be issued only if the INRs requested were a subset
  of those held by the subscriber.  The specific procedures employed
  for this purpose should be commensurate with any you already employ
  in the maintenance of INR distribution.>




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3.2.3.  Authentication of Individual Identity

  Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
  identity of a subscriber.  However, <name of organization> maintains
  contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate
  renewal, re-key, and revocation.

  <Describe the procedures that are used to identify at least one
  individual as a representative of each subscriber.  This is done in
  support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
  issued to the organization.  For example, one might say "The <name of
  organization> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST
  be used to identify individuals who represent <name of organization>
  subscribers."  The procedures should be commensurate with those you
  already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
  INR holders.  Note that this authentication is solely for use by you
  in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or
  sub-distribute) INRs and thus MUST NOT be relied upon outside of this
  CA/subscriber relationship.>

3.2.4.  Non-verified Subscriber Information

  No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
  under this certificate policy except for Subject Information Access
  (SIA) extensions [RFC6487].

3.2.5.  Validation of Authority

  <Describe the procedures used to verify that an individual claiming
  to represent a subscriber is authorized to represent that subscriber
  in this context.  For example, one could say "Only an individual to
  whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may
  request issuance of an RPKI certificate.  Each certificate issuance
  request is verified using the BPKI."  The procedures should be
  commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating
  individuals as representatives of subscribers.>

3.2.6.  Criteria for Interoperation

  The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
  other PKI.  <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
  purposes, e.g., a BPKI, then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is
  used to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their
  resource distributions.>







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3.3.  Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

3.3.1.  Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

  <Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
  the manner by which it is requested.  Describe the procedures that
  are used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the
  legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed.  State the
  approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the
  new public key.  If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is
  used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>

3.3.2.  Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation

  <Describe the procedures used to ensure that an organization
  requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the
  INRs in the certificate being re-keyed.  This MUST also include the
  method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to
  the new public key.  If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is
  used to authenticate re-key requests.  With respect to authentication
  of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those
  you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>

3.4.  Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

  <Describe the procedures used by an RPKI subscriber to make a
  revocation request.  Describe the manner by which it is ensured that
  the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of the
  certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked.
  Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
  legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
  opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.  These
  procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
  the maintenance of subscriber records.>

4.  Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1.  Certificate Application

4.1.1.  Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

  Any subscriber in good standing who holds INRs distributed by <name
  of organization> may submit a certificate application to this CA.
  (The exact meaning of "in good standing" is in accordance with the
  policy of <name of organization>.)






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4.1.2.  Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

  <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
  initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process.  Note that
  most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your
  normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
  thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
  necessary.  If so, reference should be made to where these practices
  are documented.>

4.2.  Certificate Application Processing

  <Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will
  employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate
  application processing (see [RFC6487]).>

4.2.1.  Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

  <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
  certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you to
  identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for
  issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be made
  to documentation of such existing practices.>

4.2.2.  Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

  <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications,
  and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
  this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
  applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
  of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of
  subscribers.  The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedure
  specified in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the
  private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the
  certificate the CA issues to the requester.>

4.2.3.  Time to Process Certificate Applications

  <Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
  applications.>

4.3.  Certificate Issuance

4.3.1.  CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

  <Describe your procedures for issuance and publication of a
  certificate.>




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4.3.2.  Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

  <Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the
  certificate is published.  <Describe here your procedures for
  notifying a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>

4.3.3.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  <Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a
  certificate is published.>

4.4.  Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1.  Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

  When a certificate is issued, the <name of organization> CA will
  publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber.  <This may be
  done without subscriber review and acceptance.  State your policy
  with respect to subscriber certificate acceptance here.>

4.4.2.  Publication of the Certificate by the CA

  Certificates will be published at <insert repository URL here> once
  issued, following the conduct described in Section 4.4.1.  This will
  be done within <specify the time frame within which the certificate
  will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will be
  notified>.  <Describe any additional procedures with respect to
  publication of the certificate here.>

4.4.3.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  <Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a
  certificate is published.>

4.5.  Key Pair and Certificate Usage

  A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1.  Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

  The certificates issued by <name of organization> to subordinate INR
  holders are CA certificates.  The private key associated with each of
  these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE)
  certificates and CRLs.







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4.5.2.  Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

  The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations that use
  RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects.  Relying parties
  are referred to Section 4.5.2 of [RFC6484] for additional guidance
  with respect to acts of reliance on RPKI certificates.

4.6.  Certificate Renewal

4.6.1.  Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

  As per RFC 6484, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
  its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
  Subject.  The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing a
  resource holding agreement, or explicit.  If <name of organization>
  initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
  date, then <name of organization> will notify the subscriber <insert
  the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in advance of the
  expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in conjunction with
  notification of service expiration">.  The validity interval of the
  new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous
  certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to
  ensure uninterrupted coverage.

  Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
  previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
  compromised (see Section 4.9.1).  If a new key pair is being used,
  the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2.  Who May Request Renewal

  The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the renewal
  process.  <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures
  that will be used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate
  holder of the INRs in the certificate being renewed.  This MUST also
  include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key
  corresponding to the public key in the certificate being renewed or
  the new public key if the public key is being changed.  With respect
  to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be
  commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR
  distribution records.  If you operate a BPKI for this, describe how
  that business-based PKI is used to authenticate renewal requests, and
  refer to Section 3.2.6.>








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4.6.3.  Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

  <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
  Describe how you verify that the requester is the subscriber or is
  authorized by the subscriber, and that the certificate in question
  has not been revoked.>

4.6.4.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

  <Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the
  certificate is published.  <Describe your procedure for notification
  of new certificate issuance to the subscriber.  This should be
  consistent with Section 4.3.2.>

4.6.5.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

  See Section 4.4.1.  <If you employ a different policy from that
  specified in Section 4.4.1, describe it here.>

4.6.6.  Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

  See Section 4.4.2.

4.6.7.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  See Section 4.4.3.

4.7.  Certificate Re-key

4.7.1.  Circumstance for Certificate Re-key

  As per RFC 6484, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
  required, based on:

  1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
     private key, or

  2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
     pair

  If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
  replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
  new key.

  If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
  certificate will be revoked.





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4.7.2.  Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

  Only the holder of a certificate may request a re-key.  In addition,
  <name of organization> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
  compromise report.  <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests
  the re-key, describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the
  <name of registry> BPKI.  Describe how a compromise report received
  from other than a subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3.  Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests

  <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the
  RPKI CP, this should be consistent with the process described in
  Section 4.3, so reference can be made to that section.>

4.7.4.  Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

  <Describe your policy for notifying the subscriber regarding
  availability of the new re-keyed certificate.  This should be
  consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
  issuance (see Section 4.3.2).>

4.7.5.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate

  When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the
  repository and notify the subscriber.  See Section 4.4.1.

4.7.6.  Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA

  <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
  This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
  certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>

4.7.7.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  See Section 4.4.3.

4.8.  Certificate Modification

4.8.1.  Circumstance for Certificate Modification

  As per RFC 6484, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
  changes to the RFC 3779 extension values or the SIA extension in a
  certificate.  A subscriber can request a certificate modification
  when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed,
  as a result of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber, or as a
  result of change of the repository publication point data.




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  If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a
  current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a
  new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then
  this is accomplished through a certificate modification.  When a
  certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued.
  The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same
  expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental
  information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded.  When
  previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate,
  then the old certificate will be revoked and a new certificate
  (reflecting the new distribution) issued.

4.8.2.  Who May Request Certificate Modification

  The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the certificate
  modification process.  <For the case of the subscriber, state here
  what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
  the entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3.  Processing Certificate Modification Requests

  <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
  request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These
  should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
  and 4.3.1.>

4.8.4.  Notification of Modified Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

  <Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
  issuance of a modified certificate.  This should be consistent
  with the notification process for any new certificate (see
  Section 4.3.2).>

4.8.5.  Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

  When a modified certificate is issued, <name of organization> will
  publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber.  See
  Section 4.4.1.

4.8.6.  Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

  <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
  This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
  certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>

4.8.7.  Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

  See Section 4.4.3.



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4.9.  Certificate Revocation and Suspension

4.9.1.  Circumstances for Revocation

  As per RFC 6484, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
  Either <name of organization> or the subject may choose to end the
  relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
  revoke the certificate.  If one or more of the INRs bound to the
  public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
  subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
  also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
  corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a
  certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
  private key associated with that certificate.

4.9.2.  Who Can Request Revocation

  The subscriber or <name of organization> may request a revocation.
  <For the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to
  verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
  revocation.>

4.9.3.  Procedure for Revocation Request

  <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
  This should include:

  o  Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation.

  o  Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
     is initiated by <name of organization>.>

4.9.4.  Revocation Request Grace Period

  A subscriber is required to request revocation as soon as possible
  after the need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5.  Time within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

  <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
  process a revocation request.>

4.9.6.  Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

  As per RFC 6484, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
  checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
  certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.




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4.9.7.  CRL Issuance Frequency

  <State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.>
  Each CRL contains a nextUpdate value, and a new CRL will be published
  at or before that time.  <Name of organization> will set the
  nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next
  scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8.  Maximum Latency for CRLs

  A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the
  maximum latency> after generation.

4.10.  Certificate Status Services

  <Name of organization> does not support the Online Certificate Status
  Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
  (SCVP).  <Name of organization> issues CRLs.

5.  Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1.  Physical Controls

  <As per RFC 6484, describe the physical controls that you employ for
  certificate management.  These should be commensurate with those used
  in the management of INR distribution.>

5.1.1.  Site Location and Construction

5.1.2.  Physical Access

5.1.3.  Power and Air Conditioning

5.1.4.  Water Exposures

5.1.5.  Fire Prevention and Protection

5.1.6.  Media Storage

5.1.7.  Waste Disposal

5.1.8.  Off-Site Backup









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5.2.  Procedural Controls

  <As per RFC 6484, describe the procedural security controls that you
  employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate with
  those used in the management of INR distribution.>

5.2.1.  Trusted Roles

5.2.2.  Number of Persons Required per Task

5.2.3.  Identification and Authentication for Each Role

5.2.4.  Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

5.3.  Personnel Controls

  <As per RFC 6484, describe the personnel security controls that you
  employ for individuals associated with certificate management.  These
  should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR
  distribution.>

5.3.1.  Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

5.3.2.  Background Check Procedures

5.3.3.  Training Requirements

5.3.4.  Retraining Frequency and Requirements

5.3.5.  Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

5.3.6.  Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

5.3.7.  Independent Contractor Requirements

5.3.8.  Documentation Supplied to Personnel















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5.4.  Audit Logging Procedures

  <As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how
  you implement audit logging.>

5.4.1.  Types of Events Recorded

  Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
  Certification Authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
  include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
  content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

  o  Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

  o  Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
     requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
     notifications)

  o  Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

  o  Posting of any material to a repository

  o  Any attempts to change or delete audit data

  o  Key generation

  o  Software and/or configuration updates to the CA

  o  Clock adjustments

  <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2.  Frequency of Processing Log

  <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>

5.4.3.  Retention Period for Audit Log

  <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>

5.4.4.  Protection of Audit Log

  <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

5.4.5.  Audit Log Backup Procedures

  <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>




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5.4.6.  Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External) [OMITTED]

5.4.7.  Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8.  Vulnerability Assessments

  <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
  already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
  such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
  perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5.  Records Archival [OMITTED]

5.6.  Key Changeover

  The <name of organization> CA certificate will contain a validity
  period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being
  issued under that certificate.  When <name of organization> CA
  changes keys, it will follow the procedures described in [RFC6489].

5.7.  Compromise and Disaster Recovery

  <Describe your plans for dealing with CA key compromise and how you
  plan to continue/restore operation of your RPKI CA in the event of a
  disaster.>

5.8.  CA or RA Termination

  <Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions
  in case of its own termination.>

6.  Technical Security Controls

  This section describes the security controls used by <name of
  organization>.

6.1.  Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1.  Key Pair Generation

  <Describe the procedures used to generate the CA key pair and, if
  applicable, key pairs for subscribers.  In most instances, public-key
  pairs will be generated by the subscriber, i.e., the organization
  receiving the distribution of INRs.  However, your procedures may
  include one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if
  they so request.>





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6.1.2.  Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

  <If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include providing key pair
  generation services for subscribers, describe the means by which
  private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion.
  Otherwise, say this is not applicable.>

6.1.3.  Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

  <Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
  public keys to the <name of organization> RPKI CA.  These procedures
  MUST ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit
  and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to
  the transferred public key.>  See RFC 6487 for details.

6.1.4.  CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

  CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
  contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published
  to the RPKI repository system.  Relying parties will download these
  certificates from this system.  Public key values and associated data
  for (putative) trust anchors will be distributed out of band and
  accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally defined criteria,
  e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
  available to the Internet community.

6.1.5.  Key Sizes

  The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485].

6.1.6.  Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality Checking

  The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as
  specified in [RFC6485].

  <If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair
  generation, EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is
  responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and
  saying that <name of organization> is not responsible for performing
  such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA
  for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7.  Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

  The KeyUsage extension bit values employed in RPKI certificates are
  specified in [RFC6487].





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6.2.  Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
     Controls

6.2.1.  Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

  <Describe the standards and controls employed for the CA
  cryptographic module, e.g., it was evaluated under FIPS 140-2/3, at
  level 2 or 3.  See [FIPS] for details.>

6.2.2.  Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control

  <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
  your CA's private keys, then insert the following text.  "There will
  be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
  control.">

6.2.3.  Private Key Escrow

  <No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI, but if
  the CA chooses to employ escrow, state so here.>

6.2.4.  Private Key Backup

  <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
  The following aspects should be included.  (1) The copying should be
  done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
  the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
  off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>

6.2.5.  Private Key Archival

  See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.

6.2.6.  Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

  The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if
  appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs">
  will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in
  Section 6.2.1.  The private keys will never leave the module except
  in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7.  Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

  The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if
  appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs">
  will be stored in the cryptographic module.  It will be protected
  from unauthorized use <say how here>.




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6.2.8.  Method of Activating Private Key

  <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
  key.>

6.2.9.  Method of Deactivating Private Key

  <Describe the process and procedure for private key deactivation
  here.>

6.2.10.  Method of Destroying Private Key

  <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
  when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular module.>

6.2.11.  Cryptographic Module Rating

  <Describe the rating of the cryptographic module used by the CA, if
  applicable.>

6.3.  Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1.  Public Key Archival

  <Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
  to archive public keys.  If keys are not archived, say so.  If they
  are, describe the archive processes and procedures.>

6.3.2.  Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

  The <name of organization> CA's key pair will have a validity
  interval of <insert number of years>.  <These key pairs and
  certificates should have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g.,
  10 years, to minimize the disruption caused by key changeover.  Note
  that the CA's key lifetime is under the control of its issuer, so the
  CPS MUST reflect the key lifetime imposed by the issuer.>

6.4.  Activation Data

6.4.1.  Activation Data Generation and Installation

  <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

6.4.2.  Activation Data Protection

  Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <describe
  your procedures here>.




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6.4.3.  Other Aspects of Activation Data

  <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
  activation data for your CA.  If there are none, say "None".>

6.5.  Computer Security Controls

  <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
  support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
  capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
  those used for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>

6.6.  Life Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1.  System Development Controls

  <Describe any system development controls that apply to the PKI
  systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology (TSDM).>

6.6.2.  Security Management Controls

  <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
  RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security
  measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
  by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>

6.6.3.  Life Cycle Security Controls

  <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI
  functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.  This
  should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
  equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled.>

6.7.  Network Security Controls

  <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
  operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
  controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution of
  INRs.>

6.8.  Time-Stamping

  The RPKI does not make use of time-stamping.

7.  Certificate and CRL Profiles

  See [RFC6487].




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8.  Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

  <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
  security of the administration of INRs.  These are sufficient for the
  RPKI systems.  However, additional forms of security assessments are
  a good idea and should be listed if performed.>

9.  Other Business and Legal Matters

  <The sections below are optional.  Fill them in as appropriate for
  your organization.  The CP says that CAs should cover Sections 9.1
  to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.16, although not every CA will choose to do so.
  Note that the manner in which you manage your business and legal
  matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you
  manage business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>

9.1.  Fees

9.1.1.  Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

9.1.2.  Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED]

9.1.3.  Revocation or Status Information Access Fees [OMITTED]

9.1.4.  Fees for Other Services (if Applicable)

9.1.5.  Refund Policy

9.2.  Financial Responsibility

9.2.1.  Insurance Coverage

9.2.2.  Other Assets

9.2.3.  Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

9.3.  Confidentiality of Business Information

9.3.1.  Scope of Confidential Information

9.3.2.  Information Not within the Scope of Confidential Information

9.3.3.  Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

9.4.  Privacy of Personal Information

9.4.1.  Privacy Plan




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9.4.2.  Information Treated as Private

9.4.3.  Information Not Deemed Private

9.4.4.  Responsibility to Protect Private Information

9.4.5.  Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

9.4.6.  Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

9.4.7.  Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

9.5.  Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable)

9.6.  Representations and Warranties

9.6.1.  CA Representations and Warranties

9.6.2.  Subscriber Representations and Warranties

9.6.3.  Relying Party Representations and Warranties

9.7.  Disclaimers of Warranties

9.8.  Limitations of Liability

9.9.  Indemnities

9.10.  Term and Termination

9.10.1.  Term

9.10.2.  Termination

9.10.3.  Effect of Termination and Survival

9.11.  Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

9.12.  Amendments

9.12.1.  Procedure for Amendment

9.12.2.  Notification Mechanism and Period

9.13.  Dispute Resolution Provisions

9.14.  Governing Law




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9.15.  Compliance with Applicable Law

9.16.  Miscellaneous Provisions

9.16.1.  Entire Agreement

9.16.2.  Assignment

9.16.3.  Severability

9.16.4.  Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)

9.16.5.  Force Majeure

<END TEMPLATE TEXT>

10.  Security Considerations

  The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
  a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can include

  o  the practices followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in
     authenticating the subject

  o  the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security
     controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities
     (for example, in protecting the private key)

  o  the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of
     the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and
     limitations of liability)

  This document provides a framework to address the technical,
  procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification
  Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and
  relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the
  certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and
  revocation are done in a secure manner.  Specifically, the following
  sections are oriented towards ensuring the secure operation of the
  PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
  relying party systems:

     Section 3 ("Identification and Authentication" (I&A))
     Section 4 ("Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements")
     Section 5 ("Facility, Management, and Operational Controls")
     Section 6 ("Technical Security Controls")
     Section 7 ("Certificate and CRL Profiles")
     Section 8 ("Compliance Audit and Other Assessments")



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11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

  [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

  [RFC6484]  Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
             Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.

  [RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
             Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
             RFC 6485, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/
             info/rfc6485>.

  [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
             X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
             February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

11.2.  Informative References

  [FIPS]     Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
             (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
             Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
             Institute of Standards and Technology, Work in Progress.

  [RFC3647]  Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
             Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
             Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
             November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.

  [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
             Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

  [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
             Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
             February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

  [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
             Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.






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  [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
             "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

  [RFC6489]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification
             Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key
             Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>.

Acknowledgments

  The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for help with the
  formatting, Ron Watro for assistance with the editing, and other
  members of the SIDR working group for reviewing this document.

Authors' Addresses

  Stephen Kent
  BBN Technologies
  10 Moulton Street
  Cambridge, MA  02138
  United States

  Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
  EMail: [email protected]


  Derrick Kong
  BBN Technologies
  10 Moulton Street
  Cambridge, MA  02138
  United States

  Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
  EMail: [email protected]


  Karen Seo
  BBN Technologies
  10 Moulton Street
  Cambridge, MA  02138
  United States

  Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
  EMail: [email protected]





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