| Return Create A Forum - Home | |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Classical Theism | |
| https://classicaltheism.createaforum.com | |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | |
| ***************************************************** | |
| Return to: Philosophy | |
| ***************************************************** | |
| #Post#: 243-------------------------------------------------- | |
| Atomism and unactualized actualizer | |
| By: TiCatho Date: October 16, 2020, 9:42 am | |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | |
| Hello, | |
| What's a good argument against atomism? I mean, sure, we have | |
| the potential-actual distinction, but if we look at it through | |
| the lens of atoms, everything can be studied as small particles | |
| moving (with a discretization of space if needed), and we have | |
| ample evidence of "things moving". Atoms are unchanging in | |
| themselves (partially actual?), and voil�... No need for an | |
| unactualized actualizer. :( | |
| I fail to see how I can refute that. Help? What do I have wrong? | |
| Thanks in advance. :) | |
| tiCatho | |
| #Post#: 244-------------------------------------------------- | |
| Re: Atomism and unactualized actualizer | |
| By: ClassicalLiberal.Theist Date: October 28, 2020, 5:56 pm | |
| --------------------------------------------------------- | |
| The physical is by definition always divisible. For example, if | |
| I take a stick and cut it in half, I can then cut one of those | |
| in half, and then one of those in half, ad infinitum. Because | |
| physical things are the way they are, there can always in | |
| principle be a division between it. Therefore, every physical | |
| thing, just in terms of being physical, is composite. What this | |
| means then is that each physical whole is only in existence | |
| insofar as each one of its constituents continues to hold it in | |
| existence or cause it to be. Metaphysically, the potential for | |
| the whole is actualized by its parts. Therefore, you must appeal | |
| to something ontologically prior in order to explain its | |
| existence or we end up with a "brute fact" you might say. | |
| A really important distinction to make when speaking of act and | |
| potency is the potential for accidental changes lets say (this | |
| involves moving up or down, left to right, etc. Any change | |
| something undergoes that is not a change in the thing itself), | |
| and the "potential for existence". There are things of | |
| derivative existence (books, particles, angels, atoms, etc), and | |
| things of underived existence (this is God). Given the analysis | |
| above, an atom is strictly speaking something of derivative | |
| existence because it must causally apeal to its structure. In | |
| order to satisfy the causal principle, you must at some point in | |
| the chain of continued actualization end up with something of | |
| underived existence. Sure, you can posit that in some way a | |
| physical thing can have no potentiality. There is nothing, as | |
| far as I can tell, logically wrong with that; however, given the | |
| reasons already stated, you will still need something causal | |
| prior to it in order to explain its existence as such. | |
| Another classic thomistic appraoch, even though I am not a huge | |
| fan of it, would be to appeal to its metaphysical composition | |
| (technically, a composition of act and potency is a metaphysical | |
| composition, but that isn't what I am talking about). That is, | |
| to state that every physical thing is composed of matter and | |
| form (it has material existence, and has a physical/formal | |
| structure) or to state that every physical thing is composed of | |
| essence and existence (it exists, and it has a nature). In | |
| either case, you cannot appeal to one or the other to explain a | |
| physical things existence because you will end up with something | |
| circular: the form causes the matter to exist, which causes the | |
| form to exist, which causes the matter to exist, etc; its | |
| existence is caused by its essence, which is caused by its | |
| existence, which is caused by its essence, etc. You must then | |
| appeal to something which is not composed of form or matter, or | |
| of essence and existence. This is what we call, God. | |
| It is important when talking about the argument from change to | |
| understand why change is spoken about at all. As I see it, | |
| change is simply talked about in order to establish the | |
| existence of act and potency. It is not the change itself which | |
| is important to the deduction, it is the metaphysical principles | |
| it demonstrates. When Feser (I am assuming you've read some of | |
| his work. If you haven't, you really should) talks about change, | |
| he doesn't really deduce God existence from that change, even if | |
| it seems like he is doing so. Rather, he deduces God existence | |
| using the metaphysical principles change proves, and uses them | |
| in a way to show that everything but God is only potentially in | |
| existence, whereas He is actually in existence; He is pure act. | |
| Sorry for the long winded answer. This is something I struggled | |
| with for awhile and I feel a very thorough explanation is | |
| required. If you have any further questions or would like me to | |
| clarify something, I will be happy to respond. | |
| ***************************************************** |