Computer underground Digest Sun Jul 23, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 62

Computer underground Digest Sun Jul 23, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 62
ISSN 1004-042X

Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer ([email protected]
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson

CONTENTS, #7.62 (Sun, Jul 23, 1995)

File 1--Cincinnati BBS Raids Indictment
File 2--Kyl and Leahy to Introduce Anti-Hacker Bill
File 3--Computer Porn Conviction: New Thought Control (fwd)
File 4--"Computer Privacy Handbook" by Bacard
File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995)

CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat, 22 Jul 1995 09:23:01 PDT
From: Paul J. Ste. Marie <[email protected]>
Subject: File 1--Cincinnati BBS Raids Indictment

((MODERATORS' NOTE: The Cincinnati BBS raids strike us a witch hunts.
The following document gives us no reason to change our minds. The
raids seem consistent with the current mood of some prosecutors,
politicians, and others, to ride the "anti-porn" hysteria).

0024573
Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

BOB EMERSON
d/b/a, Cincinnati Computer CASE NO.
Connection,
4466 Dogwood Drive
Batavia, Ohio 45103,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SIMON L. LEIS, JR.
Hamilton County Justice Center
1000 Sycamore
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

HAMILTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT COMPLAINT AND
Hamilton County Justice Center JURY DEMAND
1000 Sycamore
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

HAMILTON COUNTY REGIONAL
COMPUTER CRIMES TASK FORCE
Hamilton County Justice Center
1000 Sycamore
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

UNION TOWNSHIP POLICE
DEPARTMENT, A Division Of The
Public Safety Department Of Union
Township, Ohio
4312 Gleneste-Withamsville Road
Cincinnati, Ohio 45245

CINCINNATI POLICE
DEPARTMENT, A Division Of The
Public Safety Department Of The
City Of Cincinnati
c/o Division 5
1012 Ludlow Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

MICHAEL BURNS
4312 Gleneste-Withamsville Road
Cincinnati, Ohio 45245

MICHAEL SNOWDEN
c/o Division 5
1012 Ludlow Avenue
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

DALE MENKAUS
Hamilton County Justice Center
1000 Sycamore
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

DETECTIVE SWISSHELM
Hamilton County Justice Center
1000 Sycamore
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

JANE/JOHN DOES
Law Enforcement Officers
Addresses Currently Unknown

Defendants.

Now comes plaintiff, Bob Emerson, d/b/a Cincinnati Computer
Connection who for its complaint against defendants, states as
follows

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This is an action under the laws and Constitution of
the United States alleging that state law enforcement officials
from various jurisdictions in Southwest Ohio and Northern Ken
tucky acting in concert as part of a "Regional Computer Crimes
Task Force," unlawfully and unconstitutionally seized computer
equipment, files, and communications in furtherance of a campaign
to impose a prior restraint on the computer transmission of non-
obscene adult oriented forms of expression presumptively
protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

JURISDICTION

1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 18 U.S.C.
2707, 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 1343, 28 U.S.C. 2201, 28
U.S.C. 2202, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1985, 42 U.S.C
1988, and 42 U.S.C. 2000aa.

2. This is a suit authorized by law to redress
deprivations under color of state law of rights, privileges, and
immunities secured by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, the First Amendment Privacy
Protection Act, and Title II of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act.

3. Venue in this Court is appropriate as the various acts
complained of occurred within the Western Division of the
Southern District of Ohio.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Bob Emerson, an individual who resides at
4466 Dogwood Drive, Batavia, Ohio 45103, owns and operates a for-
profit electronic computer bulletin board system known as
Cincinnati Computer Connection (hereinafter "CCC").

5. Defendant, Simon L. Leis, Jr., is and was at all times
referred to herein the Sheriff of Hamilton County, Ohio. He is
sued in both his personal and official capacities.

6. Defendant, Hamilton County Sheriff's Department, is a
sheriff's department organized under the laws of the State of
Ohio.

7. Defendant, Hamilton County Regional Computer Crimes
Task Force, is a branch of the Hamilton County Sheriff's
Department organized under the laws of the State of Ohio to
utilize special skills and expertise in investigating computer
crimes.

8. Defendant, Union Township Police Department, is a
division of the Public Safety Department of Union Township Ohio,
organized under the laws of the State of Ohio.

9. Defendant, Cincinnati Police Department, is a division
of the Public Safety Department of the City of Cincinnati,
organized under the laws of the State of Ohio.

10. Defendant, Michael Burns, is and was at all times
referred to herein the Acting Chief of the Union Township Police
Department in Clermont County, Ohio. He is sued in both his
personal and official capacities.

11. Defendant, Michael Snowden, is and was at all times
referred to herein the Chief of the Cincinnati Police Department.
He is sued in both his personal and official capacities.

12. Defendant, Dale Menkaus, is and was at all times
referred to herein the Commander of the Regional Computer Crimes
Task Force. He is sued in both his personal and official
capacities.

13. Defendant, Detective Swisshelm, is and was at all times
referred to herein a member of the Regional Computer Crimes Task
Force. He is sued in both his personal and official capacities.

14. Jane/John Doe, are individuals from the Regional
Computer Crimes Task Force and/or other police departments from
various jurisdictions whose names are currently unknown whom
plaintiff believes conspired with defendants and participated in
the acts against plaintiff complained of herein. Such
individuals are sued in both their personal and official
capacities.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

15. A computer bulletin board system, like CCC, stores
information in a central computer and allows subscribers to
access that information via telephone lines and personal computer
equipment. By means of a computer bulletin board, subscribers
can converse, communicate and exchange various types of
information with each other as well as retrieve information
stored on the bulletin board itself.

16. Plaintiff has been operating CCC since 1982 and has
developed a list of monthly subscribers numbering in the
thousands, who pay a set fee for access to the bulletin board.
CCC offers its subscribers the ability to send and receive
electronic mail (hereinafter "e-mail"), to participate in on-line
discussion groups, to utilize and download software, to engage in
computer games, and to receive newspapers and periodicals of
general as well as highly specialized interest. Included among
the various information and service options offered to
subscribers of CCC is non-obscene adult oriented material. This
category of material represents approximately three (3) percent
of the total informational material and resources offered by CCC
to its subscribers. Access to the non-obscene adult oriented
material on the CCC bulletin board is restricted to a limited
number of adult subscribers who requested such access.
17. Commencing sometime prior to June 16, 1995, defendants,
under color of state law and pursuant to and in their official
capacities for and on behalf of their respective jurisdictions,
conspired together and with others unknown, and therefore not
named as defendants, to violate plaintiff's rights and privileges
guaranteed to him by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution, the First Amendment Privacy
Protection Act, and Title II of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act by designing and implementing a campaign
characterized by harassment, express and implied threats of
criminal prosecution, and mass seizures of computer equipment and
information. This campaign was initiated by defendants for the
purpose of causing plaintiff, and others, to cease transmitting
and/or receiving non-obscene adult oriented material via computer
technology.

18. Sometime on or about June 16, 1995, pursuant to and
part of this campaign, defendants, under color of state law,
sought a search warrant authorizing the search of all computer
equipment and accessories necessary for the operation of CCC and
authorizing the wholesale and indiscriminate review of all
computer electronic communications transmitted to and from
plaintiff and CCC's subscribers including, but not limited to, e-
mail and personal correspondence that was stored in or exchanged
in electronic form by means of CCC's equipment and software. At
the time defendants made application for the aforementioned
search warrant, defendants knew or should have known that no
reasonable grounds existed to believe that the contents of the e-
mail and personal correspondence sought were relevant or material
to any on-going criminal investigation.
19. On June 16, 1995, pursuant to and part of this
campaign, defendants, under color of state law, obtained and
executed a search warrant providing for the search of plaintiff's
personal residence for all computer equipment and accessories
necessary for the operation of CCC as well as for all electronic
communications transmitted to and from CCC's subscribers
including, but not limited to, e-mail and personal correspondence
that was stored in or exchanged in electronic form by means of
CCC's equipment and software.

20. As a further part of this campaign, following the
execution of the aforementioned search warrant, defendants seized
and physically removed from plaintiff's residence virtually the
entire inventory of computer equipment and accessories owned by
plaintiff and necessary for the operation of CCC. Included among
the numerous equipment and accessories seized by defendants were
computer hardware, video display units, printers, software, data
drives, and internal or external information storage units. As a
consequence of defendants' actions in removing the aforementioned
computer equipment and accessories, defendants necessarily seized
information transmitted to and from CCC and its subscribers,
including, but not limited to, e-mail and correspondence stored
or exchanged in electronic form. As a further consequence of
these actions defendants seized plaintiff's entire inventory of
non-obscene adult related material as well as all other forms of
expressive material.

21. At the time defendants sought, obtained, and executed
the aforementioned search warrant and seized all of the computer
equipment and accessories related to the operation of CCC, as
well as much of the information provided by CCC to its
subscribers which was contained in such equipment, defendants
knew or should have known

i. that items seized included work product and
documentary material containing mental impressions, conclusions
or theories of individuals who authored or created such materials
for the purpose of disseminating same to the public;

ii. that the information seized included e-mail and
personal correspondence transmitted to and from plaintiff and
CCC's subscribers;
iii. that the information seized included expressive
material protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution that cannot be seized without a
prior judicial determination of probable obscenity;

iv. that the mass seizure of this computer equipment and
information would have a devastating impact on the plaintiff's
business;

v. that the mass seizure of this computer equipment and
information would prevent plaintiff from transmitting any
information, including expressive material protected under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution;

vi. that the search warrant under which authority
defendants ostensibly based their actions did not by its terms
authorize the seizure of any materials or information;

vii. that there were less intrusive means of obtaining the
information defendants sought to inspect for potential violations
of state law, and that such means, if utilized, would have
permitted plaintiff to continue to use and derive the economic
benefit of his computer equipment;

viii. that there were less intrusive means of obtaining
the information defendants sought to inspect for potential
violations of state law, and that such means, if utilized, would
have permitted plaintiff to continue to receive and transmit
constitutionally protected speech;

ix. that there were less intrusive means of obtaining the
information defendants sought to inspect for potential violations
of state law, and that such means, if utilized, would have
preserved the privacy interests of plaintiff and his subscribers
in the e-mail and personal correspondence that was stored in or
exchanged in electronic form via CCC's equipment and software;
and

x. that it was not necessary to physically seize and
remove the information sought or any of the computer equipment
owned by plaintiff because defendants at all times were capable
of retrieving or "downloading" information exchanged or stored in
plaintiff's computer equipment and by such means preserving said
information for any legitimate law enforcement purpose determined
by defendants.
22. Defendants' activities were conducted purposefully, in
bad faith, in conscious and reckless disregard of plaintiff's
federal and constitutional rights to privacy, to free speech, and
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and with the
intention to intimidate plaintiff from his continued exercise of
free expression and to impose a prior restraint on the
transmission of presumptively protected forms of expression by
plaintiff and others by permanently removing from circulation non-
obscene adult oriented and other forms of expression and by
physically removing and retaining the computer equipment and
software by which computer-generated forms of expression are
transmitted.

23. As a direct and proximate result of defendants'
actions, as previously described, plaintiff has suffered and will
continue to suffer damage to his business and professional
reputation in the following regards

i. plaintiff has lost the use of computer equipment
valued at approximately $45,000.00;

ii. plaintiff has been forced to replace computer equipment
at the cost of approximately $45,000.00;

iii. plaintiff has lost revenue from subscribers in the
amount of approximately $28,000.00 per month;

iv. plaintiff has suffered a temporary and permanent loss
of a portion of his subscriber base;

v. plaintiff has lost good will associated with the
operation of a legitimate and lawful computer service; and
vi. plaintiff has been prevented from transmitting
presumptively protected material to his subscribers.

24. Further, unless defendants are preliminarily and
permanently enjoined from continuing to engage in a campaign to
intimidate plaintiff, to chill the exercise of his constitutional
rights, and to impose a prior restraint upon the distribution of
presumptively protected forms of expression, plaintiff will
continue to suffer violations of his constitutional rights,
thereby incurring irreparable injury for which plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law.

STATEMENT OF THE CLAIM

COUNT ONE

25. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are
realleged as if fully rewritten.

26. The actions of defendants, as described herein,
deprived plaintiff of his right to free speech secured by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution in violation of
42 U.S.C. 1983.

COUNT TWO

27. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are
realleged as if fully rewritten.

28. The actions of defendants, as described herein,
deprived plaintiff of his right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures secured by the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

COUNT THREE

29. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are
realleged as if fully rewritten.

30. The actions of defendants, as described herein,
deprived plaintiff of his right to privacy secured by the United
States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

COUNT FOUR

31. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are
realleged as if fully rewritten.

32. The actions of defendants, as described herein,
deprived plaintiff of the right to be free from deprivations of
property without due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in
violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

COUNT FIVE

33. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are
realleged as if fully rewritten.

34. The actions of defendants, as described herein,
deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the First Amendment
Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000aa.

COUNT SIX

35. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are
realleged as if fully rewritten.

36. The actions of defendants, as described herein,
deprived plaintiff of rights secured by Title II of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701.

COUNT SEVEN

37. Paragraphs one (1) through twenty-six (26) are
realleged as if fully rewritten.

38. The actions of defendants, as described herein,
constituted an illegal conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Bob Emerson, d/b/a/ Cincinnati Computer
Connection, hereby demands judgment as follows

_ 1. A declaration that the actions of the defendants
constitute a prior restraint in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;

1. A preliminary and permanent injunction restraining,
enjoining and prohibiting the defendants from undertaking,
enforcing, maintaining, or adopting any policies, procedures,
practices, campaigns, or acts against or towards plaintiff which
constitute a prior restraint upon plaintiff's transmission of
protected forms of expressive non-obscene adult oriented
materials;

2. An order requiring defendants to return to plaintiff
all computer equipment, accessories and material seized from
plaintiff;

3. An order awarding plaintiff compensatory damages for
his economic injuries in an amount not less than $250,000.00;

4. Liquidated damages under 42 U.S.C. 2000aa;

5. An award of plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred herein pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; and

6. An award of such other relief in law and equity that
this Court deems just and proper in the premises.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands the within facts be tried to a jury.

Respectfully submitted,

SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ

H. LOUIS SIRKIN
Ohio Bar No. 0024573

MARC D. MEZIBOV
Ohio Bar No. 0019316

LAURA A. ABRAMS
Ohio Bar No. 0056183
920 Fourth & Race Tower
105 West Fourth Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Telephone (513) 721-4876
Telecopier (513) 721-0876

Attorneys for Plaintiff

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 21 Jul 1995 09:38:59 -0400 (CDT)
From: Bob Izenberg <[email protected]>
Subject: File 2--Kyl and Leahy to Introduce Anti-Hacker Bill

This came from volume 15 issue 311 of TELECOM Digest:

Date--Thu, 20 Jul 95 07:52:59 MST
From--John Shaver <[email protected]>

Forwarded to TELECOM Digest, FYI.

[email protected] at WOODY
Date--7/11/95 1:41PM

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Liz Hickey
Wednesday, June 21, 1995 (202) 224-4521

KYL AND LEAHY TO INTRODUCE ANTI-HACKER BILL

(Washington, D.C.) -- Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Senator Patrick
Leahy (D-VT) will introduce a bill next week that responds to the
rapidly increasing sophistication of computer crime by criminalizing
and toughening penalties for a host of computer security violations.

The bill makes it a felony for a hacker to inflict reckless damage
on a computer system. It also makes it a felony for an authorized user
to inflict intentional damage on a computer system. And it criminalizes
cases where individuals threaten to crash a computer system unless
access and an account are granted.

"Our national infrastructure, the information that bonds all
Americans, is not adequately protected," Kyl said. "This bill will
make criminals think twice before illegally gaining access to computer
files.

"We have a national anti-stalking law to protect citizens from
harrassment, but it doesn't cover the equivalent of stalking on the
communications network. We should not treat these criminals differently
simply because they injure us in other ways."

Reports demonstrate that computer crime is on the rise. The
Computer Emergency and Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie-Mellon
University found computer intrusions have increased from 132 in 1989
to 2,341 in 1994.

A report commissioned last year by the Department of Defense and
the CIA states "[a]ttacks against information systems are becoming
more aggressive, not only seeking access to confidential information,
but also stealing and degrading service and destroying data."

Current law punishes only those who trespass AND adversely affect
the use of a government computer. The bill treats viewing information,
even when no theft or damage occurs, as a criminal offense. In this
situation, privacy and security have been breached.

"The system administrator in these cases must spend time, money,
and resources to restore security," Kyl said. "We can no longer accept
trespassing into computers and viewing information as incidental just
because the information isn't stolen or damaged."

The "Kyl/Leahy National Information Infrastructure Protection Act
of 1995" adds a statute to allow prosecutors to fight interstate and
foreign transportation of stolen computer files. And it ensures that
repeat computer crime offenders are subject to harsher penalties.

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 22 Jul 1995 21:49:28 -0500 (CDT)
From: David Smith <[email protected]>
Subject: File 3--Computer Porn Conviction: New Thought Control (fwd)

---------- Forwarded message ----------
[email protected] (Marcus Shields)
Subject--Computer Porn Conviction--New Thought Control

Internet users- particularly those in Canada- concerned about government
attempts to "crack down on Internet perverts" should take careful note of
the following article exerpted from the Toronto Star newspaper:

COMPUTER PORN CONVICTION A FIRST

A 20-year old Mississauga man will be sentenced July 20 for
creating and distributing child pornography on a computer
bulletin board.

It is the first reported conviction under Canada's two-year-old
kiddie porn law involving computer production and distribution.

"The materials are pretty disgusting, _but_at_this_stage_they're_
_all_his_fantasy,_all_the_workings_of_his_perverted_mind",
(emphasis added) assistant crown attorney Philip Enright said of
Joseph Pecchiarich, 20.

<snip>

.."What he would do is take his scanner and run the scan over a
totally innocent picture of a child, say a 5-year old girl
modelling a bathing suit," Enright explained.

"Then, when it was transposed on to his screen, with the software
that he had on his computer he was able to remove the clothing
and add genitalia and then he would put the child in a sexually
provocative position."

<snip>

So, there we have it, fellow Canadian computer users; merely
harbouring thoughts of having sex with children is now an offense
that will be zealously tracked down by the police and prosecuted
to the fullest extent of the law.

Now, the fascinating thing about the Pecchiarich case, in eerie
similarity to the recent Eli Langer "obscene art" prosecution in
Toronto, is that in both these cases of alleged "child pornography",
there is one rather minor (pun intended) missing element. To wit,
CHILDREN. If you will cast your mind back to the situation several
years ago when the Mulroney government passed the "child pornography"
law (over the bitter objections of the civil liberties lobby, and
virtually without serious debate in Parliament, partly because it
was near the end of the session but mainly because even the NDP had
been cowed into silence by overwhelmingly conservative public
opinion), the entire premise upon which this law was passed was, "to
protect children from sexual abuse".

But in both the Peccharich and Langer cases, no children- indeed, no
living beings of any kind- were involved at any stage of the process.
What these individuals WERE prosecuted for, is publicly expressing
thoughts that conservative society abhors- to wit, child sexuality.
Now, I'm strongly against the PRACTICE of children being involved in
sexual conduct, too- but, if we accept the idea that merely
communicating an idea that society doesn't like can be subject to
criminal prosecution, where do we draw the line? Suppose Peccharich
had used his computer to retouch a picture of Mila Mulroney so she
appeared to be in bondage? What if he doctored a picture of Jean
Chretien or Bill Clinton so it appeared that Bill or Jean had been
assassinated? Why is it OK for society to punish someone for
publishing thoughts of deviant sex, but not OK to punish someone for
imaginary depictions of murder? (Time to pull _True_Lies_ from the
video store, I guess.)

Well, you might want to discuss this issue with your fellow Net
users.

As long as doing so is still legal in the eyes of the police.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 28 Jun 1995 18:23:51 EST
From: "Rob Slade, Social Convener to the Net" <[email protected]>
Subject: File 4--"Computer Privacy Handbook" by Bacard

BKCMPRHB.RVW 950418

%A Andre Bacard [email protected]
%C 2414 6th St., Berkeley, CA 94710
%D 1995
%G 1-56609-171-3
%I Peachpit Press
%O U$24.95/C$31.95 510-548-4393 fax: 510-548-5991 800-283-9444
%O [email protected] [email protected]
%P 274
%T "Computer Privacy Handbook"
"Computer Privacy Handbook", Andre Bacard, 1995, 1-56609-171-3, U$24.95/C$31.95

After the three prior works on PGP and related issues, Bacard's book
reads like a popular magazine article. Unfortunately, this is not
necessarily an advantage.

Part (chapter?) one is a general overview of privacy as related to
computers. The examples and arguments used, though, are chosen from
such a broad spectrum that they actually weaken the position in favour
of privacy and confidentiality. Most of the anecdotes relayed in the
book have little to do with computers. The majority have to do with
governmental or corporate activities over which the individual has no
say. None bear on the function of PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) -- to
encrypt local files and, in particular, those sent over public email
channels.

Chapter two discusses encryption in general terms. *Very* general
terms. There is no attempt to grasp or present any technical material
here. This prevents Bacard from noting the silliness of statements
that "high-quality crypto" is "impossible" to break, or that methods
of attack have not been publicly identified. First, this sounds
suspiciously like "security by obscurity". Second, an awful lot of
people *do* know how to break PGP -- and they know exactly how long it
will take. (By the way, it was Ken Follett, not the Germans, who used
"Rebecca" as a code key.) The discussion of ITAR (the International
Traffic in Arms Regulation of the US government) does not provide
enough detail to explain the difficulties Phil Zimmermann faces, nor
the problems in getting PGP overseas. The coverage of Clipper,
however, is excellent.

The overview of PGP given in chapter three is a fair enough
description, but completely avoids touching on Zimmermann's
difficulties with the US federal government or RSA Data Security. The
pointers on how to get PGP are useless unless you want to buy
ViaCrypt's version. The US sites all have limitations, and usually
some form of authentication before you can access the files. The
international versions are illegal in the US because of patent issues.

Chapter four is documentation for the commercial version of PGP.

While the Stallings (cf. BKPRTPRV.RVW), Garfinkel (cf. BKPGPGAR.RVW)
and Schneier (cf. BKEMLSEC.RVW) works are written by technical experts
and contain technical background, they are not impossible for the
layman to understand. This work, therefore, fails in a number of
respects, and brings little to the subject which has not been said
before.

copyright Robert M. Slade, 1995 BKCMPRHB.RVW 950418

======================
[email protected], [email protected], Rob Slade at 1:153/733
[email protected] The Internet interprets censorship as damage and
routes around it - J. Gilmore Author "Robert Slade's Guide to Computer
Viruses" 0-387-94311-0/3-540-94311-0

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 19 Apr 1995 22:51:01 CDT
From: CuD Moderators <[email protected]>
Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995)

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End of Computer Underground Digest #7.62
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