Computer underground Digest Tue Jun 8, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 47

Computer underground Digest Tue Jun 8, 1995 Volume 7 : Issue 47
ISSN 1004-042X

Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer ([email protected]
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Triviata: How many bytes in a nibble?

CONTENTS, #7.47 (Thu, Jun 8, 1995)

File 1--Thebes
File 2--A Seduction In Cyberspace (Update from CuD 7.46)
File 3--Letter to AOL in response to "Damien Starr" incident
File 4--adult only
File 5--Can Parents prevent Web page viewing? (Re: CuD 7.46)
File 6--THE COMPUTER LAW REPORT - June '95 (fwd)
File 7--CDT POLICY POST #16 -- SEN. DOLE TO INTRODUCE SWEEPING INTERNET
File 8--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995)

CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 07 Jun 1995 06:12:51 -0700 (MST)
From: Waiting for the summer to hit hard <[email protected]>
Subject: File 1--Thebes

((MODERATORS' NOTE: Joel Snyder, a Latin undergrad, came the
closest. The (politically) correct answer was: THE WORKERS!))

Amphion and Zethus built the walls around Cadmus' city.

------------------------------

Date: 07 Jun 95 21:06:54 EDT
To: [email protected]
Subject: File 2--A Seduction In Cyberspace (Update from CuD 7.46)

On May 18, 1995, Daniel Montgomery -- a 15-year-old teenager
living in a Seattle area community known as Maple Valley -- left home
using a bus ticket provided by someone else. Early in June,
Montgomery's disappearance became a hot item for the local press.
Details were not clear, and changed radically with each passing day.
Through a period of less than one week since the news media picked up
the story, this case may have come to some form of final resolution.
Here is where things stand.

Montgomery, who was 15 at the time but turned 16 on 6-4-95, met
someone calling himself "Damien Starr" in a gay & lesbian chat room on
America Online. Starr suggested that Montgomery join him in San
Francisco. Starr eventually sent Montgomery a bus ticket. Upon
receiving the bus ticket by mail, Montgomery left Seattle. Thus, Bill
and Ruth Montgomery -- Daniel Montgomery's parents -- notified
authorities and began a search for their son. By the time news media
coverage had transformed the situation into a major Seattle news
story, Montgomery's parents were asserting that Daniel had probably
been seduced to run away by someone Daniel met on America Online. Bill
and Ruth Montgomery only knew that Daniel had been communicating with
"Damien Starr" online and offline prior to leaving Seattle, and that
both Starr and Daniel had contacted the Montgomerys a short time after
Daniel arrived in San Francisco.

A user profile for Starr had indicated he was 18 and gay. This
apparently, in part, led the Montgomerys to believe their son was the
potential future victim of some gay sex group. Between 5-18-95 and
6-2-95, Daniel Montgomery had contacted his parents via E-Mail twice,
and Starr had called to assure Daniel's parents that Daniel was ok no
less than four times. It was also on 6-2-95 that the Montgomery
run-away story became so prominent that Seattle area TV stations were
interviewing Bill Montgomery. With little doubt, Bill Montgomery
voiced his fears as to a theory that Daniel was being "groomed" for
sex. However, only two days later, Daniel was found in a San Francisco
airport. His parents flew down to San Francisco to meet Daniel. At
that time, Daniel returned to Seattle. Approximately two days later,
the news media of Settle was reporting that America Online had
released information concerning Starr to the FBI. Upon investigating
Starr, the FBI found that Starr is 16, not 18. They also learned that
"Damien Starr" was NOT an alias. With these discoveries, all thought
of possibly charging Starr for violation of the Mann Act evaporated.

In a Previous posting to CuD (See CuD 7.46, File 1), I reported
that this case was not finished. I now believe it may indeed be closed
as of today, 6-7-95. But, of course, a new specter seems to have taken
its place in the form of another run-away case involving a 13-year-old
Louisville, Kentucky girl -- Tara Noble. And so, it seems the
Merry-go-round has not stopped; it has only taken new riders. Perhaps
someone in Louisville can tell us what's going on there.

------------------------------

Date: 09 Jun 1995 01:00:06 -0000
From: [email protected](Larry Moser)
Subject: File 3--Letter to AOL in response to "Damien Starr" incident

To: [email protected] (I hope this address works.)

Found in a recent listserv posting:

>In the past two days, some news media organizations have
>statedAOL was under some pressure to reveal information on a
>subscriberusing the alias "Damien Starr." However, other news
>mediaorganizations were stating that AOL was resolute in its
>policy not toreveal information about subscribers. Even so,
>today, [6-6-95] severalbroadcast organizations (KING-TV, KIRO-TV,
>KIRO radio, and KOMO radio)now report that AOL has terminated the
>person who used the DamienStarr alias. KOMO radio broadcast the
>following in a news program thismorning. America Online says
>it's complying with a subpoena and giving investigators
>information about the account of Damien Starr. That's the name
>used by a man suspected of luring a teenaged boy to San
>Francisco. The computer service has also terminated the man's
>account.

I'm not gay and I don't proposition anyone on the net, but if it's
true that you were so easily intimitdated by The Law and the media
hype concerning the above, I will recommend to everyone I meet NOT to
subscribe to your service.

Sent via FirstClass (R) UUCP Gateway of Persatuan Komputer Brunei
Darussalam (Brunei Computer Society).

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 08 Jun 1995 00:10:46 -0400
From: [email protected](Joseph Christie)
Subject: File 4--adult only

In CUD 7.46 [email protected] is quoted

In the next version of the Web navigators, just introduce a new HTML
tag <adult_only>. If a WWW browser encounters this tag enclosed inside
the <head> </head> part of a HTML document, then the browser will
simply refuse to load or render the document. The author of a Web page
should put that tag in all of his pages containing materials that he
does not want to be seen by young children.

This makes it incumbent on everyone who maintains a page to not only
police their own page. What if I'm not sure about the standards for
which I am being held liable. Not necessarily pornography but adult
discussions of current events which may include occasional referrences
to things many parents would not want their children exposed to like
the sexual escapades of sports or movie idole or rock musicians.

I think it makes more sense to have "children OK" sites rather than
"adult only" sites. This way you are not individually excluding
specific sites with a large group of sites being included for access
by accident, ignorance or laziness. If you forgot to label it "adult
only" it might be an honest mistake, but if you specifically label it
"kids OK" and it's contains offensive material you can't plead
accidental oversight.

It just seems that "kids OK" is more enforceable and easier to
implement and manage than "adults only"

This brings to mind a second question.

What if I link to Happy Harry's cartoon page because he has great
Disney images. So I label it as a great site for the kiddies. Next
week Harry decides to put up a Fritz the Cat section. Am I liable for
pointing the kiddies to an X rated site if Harry doesn't protect his
site or is it strictly his problem?

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 7 Jun 1995 16:03:12 -0500
From: Gerald Anderson <[email protected]>
Subject: File 5--Can Parents prevent Web page viewing? (Re: CuD 7.46)

I would like to respond to the text in issue 7.46 re: Can the
parents prevent their children from viewing unwanted Web pages?

I think that the idea put forth is quite a good example of how we
should all be facing this problem. It is well known that if we, the
net.community, don't fix our own problems, the government(s) will fix
them for us. This, to me anyway, is terrifying. Therefore we must be
putting every effort in to reasonably solving these problems before it
is too late.

The solution this person (Author is unknown :-( ) presented, is a
spirit of cooperation between providers of 'controversial materials'
and the publishers of Web browsing software. He/She (Will use He in
the future, no offense.) suggested that the producers of Web browsers
institute (in HTML 3.0?) a a standard header tag that tells the Web
client that this document is adult in nature. (The tag he suggested
was <Adult_Only>) When a family member installs the Web client on
their home machine it would ask for a password and this password would
be required to access any pages with the above tag. This is a pretty
good idea, a good place to start at least.

In his text he stated (truly) that we can't guarantee %100
effectiveness of any procedure as there are kids out there who will
find ways to get what they want, we DO indeed have to focus on the one
we CAN control. (Note: Even government legislation is not going to
control the kids that want it. There will always be someone to
provide, and someone to receive if they are both interested enough)

I, at one time was one of these kids. If I would have been in a
situation where my parents password protected a program I would have
gotten out debug and found out what it was. I think a few EASY steps
can be made to insure better security and greater flexibility.

1) Upon install have option of protecting or not.
2) Upon deciding to protect when installing, the password will be
automatically sent to the server of the Client publisher
to be stored with the hostname. (This may present
problems with dynamic slip though) An easy CGI program could
handle this. I don't think this would be much more
of an issue than we are already discussing.
3) When accessing a protected document, go to the old
3 strikes your out password scheme. At the third
failure the client locks up and needs a secondary
password GIVEN to the INSTALLER at install time
(A crypto based on the installer provided password?)
to unlock the client again. IF this type of security
is enabled it could allow for parents to track or
audit what their children are seeing (request logs from
provider, or whatever). If the installer decides NOT
to use this protection his privacy is as thorough as it
is today.

This is a pretty off the top idea, but at least should give those
interested in thinking about it a few ideas. These ideas keep the
children away who can be kept away and protects the privacy of those
adults who are viewing these sites. If anybody can think of anyway to
simplify this or to make it even more secure, feel free to email me.
Also, I would consider putting together an open mailing list for the
discussion of such techniques for all forms of Internet tools. If
you're interested in this type of mailing list or have any comments
email: [email protected].

Gerald D. Anderson

P.S. Perhaps a Content-Type could also be used. (sorry, I'll stop now ;-)

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 4 Jun 1995 13:09:25 -0500 (CDT)
From: David Smith <[email protected]>
Subject: File 6--THE COMPUTER LAW REPORT - June '95 (fwd)

---------- Forwarded message ----------

**********************************************
THE COMPUTER LAW REPORT
JUNE, 1995
PREPARED BY WILLIAM S. GALKIN, ESQ.
[email protected]
**********************************************
ARTICLES CONTAINED IN THIS ISSUE:

(1) E-MAIL CONFESSIONS IN COURT
(2) LICENSE RESTRICTIONS CAN BACKFIRE
(3) RAIDING EMPLOYEES

* PLEASE READ *: If you have any questions about the material
contained in The Computer Law Report, or would like to discuss issues
related to computer or technology law, please contact William S.
Galkin, Esq.: e-mail ([email protected]), telephone (410-356-8853), fax
(410-356-8804), or mail (10451 Mill Run Circle, Suite 400, Owings
Mills, MD 21117). The Computer Law Report is distributed free, and
designed for the non-lawyer. To subscribe, please respond via e-mail.
All information contained in The Computer Law Report is for the
benefit of the recipients, and should not be relied on or considered
as legal advice. When necessary, proper professionals should be
consulted.

++++++++++++E-MAIL CONFESSIONS IN COURT++++++++++++++

E-mail is the most efficient means of communication
available today. However, this efficiency and ease of use can become a
huge liability in the future.
A case in point involves a recent trade secrets suit by
Vermont Microsystems, Inc. (located in Winooski, Vermont) against
Autodesk, Inc. (located in Sausalito, California). Microsystems
argued that Autodesk had reason to know that trade secrets known by a
former Microsystems software engineer were incorporated into an
Autodesk software product.
In court Microsystems introduced internal e-mail
records of Autodesk which evidenced knowledge by Autodesk management
of the trade secrets. There was also evidence that computer files had
been deleted from the software engineer's computer, suggesting foul
play. The judge awarded Microsystems $25 million. The judgment has
been appealed.
However this case ultimately turns out, it highlights
the use (and danger) of e-mail and other records in court actions.
Usually, e-mail goes unmonitored in companies. For one thing,
employees do not feel comfortable having their communications
monitored. Additionally, monitoring e-mail is a complicated and time
consuming task.
Paper records are usually subject to a much higher
level of control. Paper is either filed (which provides a control
process), or is destroyed through normal disposal means or shredding.
However, e-mail is much easier to maintain, and then be forgotten
about. Additionally, the volume of information that e-mail contains is
much greater than with paper information because of its ease of use.
What's more, e-mail is difficult to permanently destroy, because once
deleted, it can still be recovered.
We can anticipate that e-mail and other computer
records will provide at least some portion of evidence in a majority
of business-related litigation from now on. Employment discrimination
and sexual harassments suits quickly come to mind as likely
candidates. Imagine if all conversations in a company were recorded,
and available to be produced in court. To a lesser extent, this is
what e-mail records provide - threads of communications on virtually
all subjects relating to the inner workings of a company.
The problem lies in the fact that companies are not
aware of what information is being maintained. What should a company
do? First, an information policy should be developed and disseminated
to employees, regularly, as to what type of communications are to be
communicated over e-mail. Furthermore, the policy should categorize
different types of information and require that different categories
are subject to deletion after given time periods. Lastly, the company
should conduct periodic house-cleaning of the entire system in order
to monitor compliance with the information policy, and also to get an
idea what type of information is on the system.
There is no advice being given in this article to
intentionally destroy evidence of wrongdoing. However, the true enemy
to be confronted is the uncontrolled accumulation of vast amounts of
information, which does not need to be maintained, and which may be
used against a company in the future.

++++++++++++LICENSE RESTRICTIONS CAN BACKFIRE+++++++

Licensors of software usually dictate the terms of the
license agreement under which they will license their software. For
example, the license agreement may require the licensee to only use
the software for internal use (i.e., may not act as a service bureau),
or to only use the software on a specified computer.
In the Fourth Circuit case of Lasercomb America, Inc.
v. Reynolds, Lasercomb developed and licensed a CAD/CAM
(computer-assisted design/computer-assisted manufacture) software
program known as Interact, which is used for making steel dies which
cut and score paper and cardboard for folding into boxes and cartons.
Lasercomb's standard license agreement included the following
provision: "Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it
will not permit or suffer its directors, officers and employees,
directly or indirectly, to write, develop, produce or sell
computer-assisted die-making software."
The license also prohibited the licensee from assisting
others to do any of the prohibited activities. The term of the
agreement was 99 years.
In clear violation of Lasercomb's copyright, one
licensee, Holiday Steel Rule Die Corporation, made unauthorized copies
of the software and began marketing it. Lasercomb sued Holiday for
copyright infringement.
The court held that the terms of Lasercomb's license
agreement amounted to a misuse of the copyright in the software by
Lasercomb and, based on a copyright misuse defense, the court denied
Lasercomb's infringement claim -- even though copyright infringement
did occur.
The court reasoned that Lasercomb attempted to use its
copyright to inhibit competition in a manner that exceeded the
protection provided under the copyright laws. The license agreement
prohibited licensees from developing or selling computer-assisted
die-making software during the ninety-nine year term of the license
agreement. This extension, beyond the copyright protection, to
restrict licensees from all competitive efforts relating to
computer-assisted die making was determined to be misuse, because such
protection extended into the "idea" of CAD/CAM for making rule dies,
and "ideas" are not protectable under the copyright laws.
The copyright misuse defense is likely to be followed
in other circuits and will certainly be raised by defendants in
copyright suits.
Therefore, the lesson is clear: examine your current license
agreements for any noncompetitive provisions, otherwise you run the
risk of not being able to enforce your copyright against infringers.

++++++++++++RAIDING EMPLOYEES+++++++++++++++++

The computer industry, more than other industries,
often sees companies luring away key personnel from competitors. This
competition for employees stems from the great value to a computer
company of the personal skills of its employees.
Generally, a company may freely attempt to hire away
its competitor's employees. Accordingly, "raiding" other companies'
employees is permissible, though it may be viewed as unfair by the
victim-company.
Although raiding is permissible, restrictions on
misappropriation of trade secrets still apply. Encouraging an
employee to join a company with the tacit understanding that part of
the job will require disclosure of trade secrets is an actionable
wrong.
It is difficult to prove an intent to lure away
employees for the purpose of disclosing trade secrets, because there
is a fine line between hiring a competitor's employee because of his
or her learned expertise (which is permissible) or for the purpose of
making use of and disclosing trade secrets (which is not permissible).
While employees may compete with a former employer,
during the time that the employee is still working for the employer,
the employee may not divert or attempt to solicit any customers to a
competitor. Such solicitation, if known by a competitor, might result
in the competitor being enjoined from doing business with the
solicited customer.
There are three important protections that an employer
concerned about being raided can put in place. The first is to have
key employees sign employment agreements. A company is not permitted
to attempt to lure a competitor's employee if leaving would cause the
employee to be in breach of the employment agreement. However, an
employment agreement will also limit the ability of the employer to
fire the employee.
The second protection is having the employee enter into
a confidentiality agreement. Such an agreement may be incorporated
into an employment agreement and sets forth the type of information
that the employer considers confidential. Such an agreement is an
invaluable piece of evidence when claiming a former employee is
revealing trade secrets.
The third and most powerful protection is a
noncompetition agreement, which also can be incorporated into an
employment agreement. Such an agreement restricts an employee from
competing with the employer for a specified term (e.g., two or three
years) and within a specified area (e.g., Maryland). Such term and
area restrictions must be reasonable in scope, or will not be
enforceable.

------------------------------

Date: 6 Jun 1995 17:11:03 -0500
From: [email protected] (Jonah Seiger)
Subject: File 7--CDT POLICY POST #16 -- SEN. DOLE TO INTRODUCE SWEEPING INTERNET

CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY Jun 6, 1995 / #16
---------------------------------------------------------------
A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online
---------------------------------------------------------------

CONTENTS: (1) Sens. Dole & Grassley to introduce sweeping anti-indecency
Internet censorship bill
(2) Sen. Lott To offer amendment to strike 'Defenses' section
of Exon CDA
(3) Legislative Update -- Status of Exon CDA
(4) Text of the Grassley/Dole proposal
(5) Petition Update -- 20,000 + signaures in the first two weeks
(6) About CDT/Contacting Us

This document may be re-distributed freely provided it remains in its
entirety.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) SENS DOLE (R-KS) & GRASSLEY (R-IA) TO INTRODUCE SWEEPING ANTI-INDECENCY
INTERNET CENSORSHIP BILL

OVERVIEW
--------

Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) is expected to up the ante on Internet censorship
tomorrow by co-sponsoring legislation with Senator Charles Grassley
(R-IA). The proposal to be offered by the Senate Majority leader and
Republican Presidental candidate is more sweeping than the Exon
Communicatons Decency Act, and comes on the heals of his recent attack
on "sex and violence" in the entertainment industry.

The Dole/Grassley proposal represents an even greater threat to the
First Amendment and the free flow of information in cyberspace than
the Exon Communications Decency Act, now pending before the Senate (a
vote on the CDA is expected as early as tomorrow, 6/7/95). The Dole
proposal will likely be offered as a substitute to the CDA. Senator
Dole is expected to announce his support for the bill at a 6/7 lunch
hosted by the anti-pornography group Enough Is Enough. The text of the
proposal is attached below.

The introduction of Dole/Grassley creates an even greater need for
support of Senator Leahy's alternative (S. 714). If the Senate rejects
Senator Leahy's alternative, it will pass either the Exon bill or the
even more draconian Dole/Grassley proposal, and the net as we know it
will never be the same again. To find out what you can do to help,
contact the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) by sending a message
to [email protected] with a subject "send alert". Please also sign the
petition (URL and instructions at the end of this post)

SUMMARY OF DOLE/GRASSLEY PROPOSAL
---------------------------------

The Dole/Grassley bill would create new penalties in Title 18 for all
operators of electronic communications services who knowingly transmit
indecent material to anyone under 18 years of age. The bill would also
create criminal liability for system operators who willfully permit minors
to use an electronic communications service in order to obtain indecent
material from another service.

The Dole/Grassley bill would impose criminal liability on online service
providers, electronic bulletin board operators, as well as any other entity
that uses computer storage to deliver information to users, including video
dialtone services, cable television video on demand services, etc. The
degree of knowledge required to impose liability is unclear, but it appears
that an entity could be said to have the requisite knowledge if it is
merely informed by a third party that some material on its system is
indecent.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

(2) SEN. LOTT (R-MISS) TO OFFER AMENDMENT TO STRIKE 'DEFENSES' SECTION OF
EXON CDA.

Senator Lott is preparing to offer an amendment to strike the service
provider defenses from the Exon language already approved by the Senate
Commerce committee.

Analysis: Holding service providers such as America Online and Internet
access providers liable for the content on their system over which they
have no control will stifle the free flow of information in cyberspace and
create major business risk for the private companies that are building the
National Information Infrastructure. Furthermore, placing criminal
liability on service providers poses a serious risk to the privacy of
individual users by forcing service providers to monitor communications in
order to limit their own liability.

Status: Lott plans to offer this amendment when the on the Senate floor
when the telecommunications bill is being considered.

----------------------------------------------------------------

(3) LEGISLATIVE UPDATE -- STATUS OF EXON CDA

With the Senate telecommunications reform bill poised to go to the floor
this week, proposals to censor the Internet are proliferating beyond just
the Exon language. The most sweeping and threatening proposals come from
the Senate leadership and other Republicans. The provisions of the Exon
proposal that are already in the telecommunications bill contain
restrictions on indecent communications which would apply to all parts of
the Internet, commercial online services, and all other interactive media
including interactive television, etc. We believe these provisions to be
unconstitutional and continue to oppose them. CDT continues to work with
members of the Interactive Working Group in urging support for the Leahy
study bill as an alternative.

The Exon proposal now part of the Senate telecommunications bill still
poses serious risks to free speech online. The Exon proposal contains
restrictions on "indecent" communications, which could ban all
sexually-explicit communications on the Internet, along with all uses
of the "seven dirty words."

Analysis: CDT continues to argue that the indecency restrictions in the
Exon bill are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

Status: Senator Leahy plans to offer an amendment to strike the Exon
provisions and replace them with his study bill (S.714) as an alternative.

CDT continues to work with members of the Interactive Working Group in
urging support for the Leahy study as an alternative to the Exon bill,
which we still believe to be unconstitutional.

For more information, see CDT's Communications Decency Act Archives:

http://www.cdt.org
ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/policy/freespeech/00-INDEX.FREESPEECH

------------------------------------------------------------------

(4) TEXT OF THE DOLE/GRASSLEY PROPOSAL

104th Congress: First Session.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Grassley introduced the following bill, which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on ______________________________________

A BILL

To amend section 1464 of title 18, United States Code, to punish
transmission by computer of indecent material to minors.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of American in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1: TRANSMISSION BY COMPUTER OF INDECENT MATERIAL TO MINORS.

(a) OFFENSES. -- Section 1464 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended --

(1) in the heading by striking "Broadcasing obscene language"
and inserting "Utterance of indecent or profane language by radio com-
munication; transmission to minor of indecent material from remote
computer facility, electronic communications service, or electronic
bulletin board service";

(2) by striking "Whoever" and inserting "(a) UTTERANCE OF
INDECENT OR PROFANE LANGUAGE BY RADIO COMMUNICA-
TION. -- A person who"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following:

"(b) TRANSMISSION TO MINOR OF INDECENT MATERIAL FROM REMOTE
COMPUTER FACILITY, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE, OR ELECTRONIC
BULLETIN BOARD SERVICE PROVIDER.--

"(1) DEFINITIONS -- As used in this subsection --

"(A) the term 'remote computer facility' means a facility
that --

"(i) provides to the public computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic commu nications system; and

"(ii) permits a computer user to transfer electronic
or digital material from the facility to another computer;

"(B) the term 'electroni communications service' means any wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photo optical, or photo-electronic system for the
transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facility or
related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications, that permits a computer user to transfer electronic or
digital material from the service to another computer; and,

"(C) the term 'electronic bulletin board service' means a computer
system, regardless of whether operated for commercial purposes, that
exists primarily to provide remote or on-site users with digital images
or that exists primarily to permit remote or on-site users to
participatein or create on-line discussion groups or conferences.

"(2) TRANSMISSION BY REMOTE COMPUTER FACILITY
OPERATOR, ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
PROVIDER, OR ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD SERVICE PROVIDER. -- A remote
computer facility operator, electronic commu-
nications service provider, electronic bulletin board service provider
who, with knowledge of the character of the material, knowingly or
recklessly --

"(A) transmits from the remote computer facility, electronic
communications service, or electronic bulletin board service provider a
communication that contains indecent material to a person under 18 years
of age; or

"(B) causes or allows to be transmitted from the remote computer
facility, electronic communications service, or electronic bulletin
board a communication that contains indecent material to a person under
18 years of age,

shall be fined in accordance with this title, imprisoned not more than
5 years, or both.

"(3) PERMITTING ACCESS BY MINOR. -- Any person who
willfully permits a person under 18 years of age to use a remote com-
puting service, electronic communications service, or electronic
bulletin board service to obtain indecent material from another remote
computing service, electronic communications service, or electronic
board service, shall be fined not more than $10,000, imprisoned not
more than 2 years, or both.

"(4) NONAPPLICABILITY TO PARENT OR LEGAL
GUARDIAN. -- This subsection shall not apply to a parent or legal
guardian who provides indecent material to the child of such parent
or legal guardian."

-------------------------------------------------------------------

(5) PETITION UPDATE -- 20,000 SIGNATUES IN TWO WEEKS.

In the first two weeks of the petition effort, we have gathered over 20,000
signatures in support of Senator Leahy's alternative to the Exon
Communications Decency Act.

If you have not yet signed the petition, please visit the petition page

http://www.cdt.org/petition.html

If you do not have access to the Web, send a message to [email protected] with a
suject 'send petition' for instructions on how to sing by email.

The petition may be Delivered to Senator Leahy sometime this week, but it
will continue to be up to gather signatures until the House of
Representatives votes later this summer. Updates and a final singature
tally will be posted shortly.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

(6) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US

The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest
organization. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public
policies that advance constitutional civil liberties and democratic
values in new computer and communications technologies.

Contacting us:

To subscribe to CDT's news distribution list (to receive future Policy Posts
directly), send email to <[email protected]> with a subject of 'subscribe
policy posts'.

** NOTE TO THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY REQUESTED TO BE ADDED TO CDT's DISTRIBUTION
LIST: We are still working to build our listserv -- you will beging
receiving Policy Posts on this list very soon. We appreciate your patience!

General information on CDT can be obtained by sending mail to
<[email protected]>

CDT has set up the following auto-reply aliases to keep you informed on the
Communications Decency Act issue.

For information on the bill, including
CDT's analysis and the text of Senator
Leahy's alternative proposal and
information on what you can do to
help -- [email protected]

For the current status of the bill,
including scheduled House and
Senate action (updated as events
warrant) -- [email protected]

World-Wide-Web:

http://www.cdt.org/

ftp:

ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/

gopher:

CDT's gopher site is still under construction and should be operational
soon.

snail mail:

Center For Democracy and Technology
1001 G Street, NW Suite 700 East
Washington, DC 20001
voice: +1.202.637.9800
fax: +1.202.637.9800

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 19 Apr 1995 22:51:01 CDT
From: CuD Moderators <[email protected]>
Subject: File 8--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 19 Apr, 1995)

Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
available at no cost electronically.

CuD is available as a Usenet newsgroup: comp.society.cu-digest

Or, to subscribe, send a one-line message: SUB CUDIGEST your name
Send it to [email protected]
The editors may be contacted by voice (815-753-0303), fax (815-753-6302)
or U.S. mail at: Jim Thomas, Department of Sociology, NIU, DeKalb, IL
60115, USA.

To UNSUB, send a one-line message: UNSUB CUDIGEST <your name>
Send it to [email protected]
(NOTE: The address you unsub must correspond to your From: line)

Issues of CuD can also be found in the Usenet comp.society.cu-digest
news group; on CompuServe in DL0 and DL4 of the IBMBBS SIG, DL1 of
LAWSIG, and DL1 of TELECOM; on GEnie in the PF*NPC RT
libraries and in the VIRUS/SECURITY library; from America Online in
the PC Telecom forum under "computing newsletters;"
On Delphi in the General Discussion database of the Internet SIG;
on RIPCO BBS (312) 528-5020 (and via Ripco on internet);
and on Rune Stone BBS (IIRGWHQ) (203) 832-8441.
CuD is also available via Fidonet File Request from
1:11/70; unlisted nodes and points welcome.

EUROPE: In BELGIUM: Virtual Access BBS: +32-69-844-019 (ringdown)
Brussels: STRATOMIC BBS +32-2-5383119 2:291/[email protected]
In ITALY: Bits against the Empire BBS: +39-464-435189
In LUXEMBOURG: ComNet BBS: +352-466893

UNITED STATES: etext.archive.umich.edu (192.131.22.8) in /pub/CuD/
ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/Publications/CuD/
aql.gatech.edu (128.61.10.53) in /pub/eff/cud/
world.std.com in /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
uceng.uc.edu in /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
wuarchive.wustl.edu in /doc/EFF/Publications/CuD/
EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud/ (Finland)
ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud/ (United Kingdom)

JAPAN: ftp.glocom.ac.jp /mirror/ftp.eff.org/Publications/CuD
ftp://www.rcac.tdi.co.jp/pub/mirror/CuD

The most recent issues of CuD can be obtained from the
Cu Digest WWW site at:
URL: http://www.soci.niu.edu:80/~cudigest/

COMPUTER UNDERGROUND DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing
information among computerists and to the presentation and debate of
diverse views. CuD material may be reprinted for non-profit as long
as the source is cited. Authors hold a presumptive copyright, and
they should be contacted for reprint permission. It is assumed that
non-personal mail to the moderators may be reprinted unless otherwise
specified. Readers are encouraged to submit reasoned articles
relating to computer culture and communication. Articles are
preferred to short responses. Please avoid quoting previous posts
unless absolutely necessary.

DISCLAIMER: The views represented herein do not necessarily represent
the views of the moderators. Digest contributors assume all
responsibility for ensuring that articles submitted do not
violate copyright protections.

------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #7.47
************************************