Computer Underground Digest--Thu Aug 1, 1991 (Vol #3.28)
>> SPECIAL ISSUE: RESPONSE TO FORESTER ARTICLE <<
Moderators: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (
[email protected])
Contents, #3.28 (August 1, 1991)
Subject: File 1--SPECIAL ISSUE: THE TOM FORESTER ARTICLE
Subject: File 2--CuD Review of _Computer Ethics_ (Reprint)
Subject: File 3--Re: Hackers - Clamp Down NOW!
Subject: File 4--Reply to Tom Forester Article
Administratia:
ARCHIVISTS: BRENDAN KEHOE
BOB KUSUMOTO
SCANMEISTER: BOB KRAUSE
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: July 31, 1991
From: "The Moderators" <
[email protected]>
Subject: File 1--SPECIAL ISSUE: THE TOM FORESTER ARTICLE
A recently publicly posted reprint of a letter in an Australian
newspaper, apparently originally done for the letter's author for the
purpose of generating discussion on the nets, has provoked
considerable discussion on usenet. The author of the letter, Tom
Forester, has written several books on computers, including _Computer
Ethics: Cautionary Tales and Ethical Dilemmas in Computing_; _High
Tech Society: The Story of the Information Technology Revolution_; and
(as editor) _Computers in the Human Context: Information Technology,
Productivity, and People_.
Because of the stature of the author in some circles, and because of
his gross inaccuracies, simplistic generalizations, flawed logic, and
inflammatory call for "get-tough" measures against "hackers," we
devote this issue to the letter and invite responses that we will
print in a second special issue.
Because Forester's comments deviate so wildly from his book _Computer
Ethics_, we thought the post might be a hoax, but upon checking were
assured that it was indeed the same Tom Forester and that the post was
legitimate. Despite the criticisms of the post on Usenet's
comp.org.eff.talk, and despite the fact that the article was
originally reported to be posted at his request as a way of generated
discussion, he has not participated in the discussion.
Below, we first reprint the CuD review of _Computer Ethics_, which we
liked, then a response to selected aspects of the public post by Mike
Godwin, and finally a detailed reply by Jim Thomas, writing wearing
his "professor of criminology" hat rather than CuD editor.
------------------------------
Date: July 31, 1991
From: "The Moderators" <
[email protected]>
Subject: File 2--CuD Review of _Computer Ethics_ (Reprint)
<Moderators' note: CuD reviewed _Computer Ethics_ in March. The review
was intended for a general rather than technical audience, and did not
dig deeply into the technical issues, and the review was quite
positive. Neither the review nor the contents of the book foreshadowed
what seems to be either a total turn-about in thinking, or an
intellectually dishonest letter by a scholar whose public opinions
seem to have little correspondence to his scholarly research. As a
basis of comparison between the book and the letter, we reprint the
original review here.>
Date: March 8, 1991
********************************************************************
*** CuD #3.07: File 5 of 6: Book Review: Computer Ethics ***
********************************************************************
Review of COMPUTER ETHICS: CAUTIONARY TALES AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN
COMPUTING, by Tom Forester and Perry Morrison. 1990. Oxford (Eng.): Basil
Blackwell. 193 pp. (np). (Reviewed by Jim Thomas, Northern Illinois
University).
The questions raised in the U.S. by Secret Service procedures in so-called
"computer crime" investigations such as Operation Sun Devil, the growth in
public computer literacy, and the general public recognition that computers
are moving from the periphery to the center of social control and
organizational operations make COMPUTER ETHICS a timely and worthwhile
tome. Although both authors resided in Australia when the book was written
(Tom Forester remains at Griffith University in Queensland and Perry
Morrison is now at the University of Singapore), the work focuses primarily
on the U.S. for examples, but draws as well from international data to
argue that society has yet to confront the twin dilemmas of hardware and
software malfunctions and misuse by humans.
In some ways, the book is misnamed. The themes are not restricted to those
of ethics, but include as well risks to society by over-reliance on
computer technology (especially when it fails) and to thornier social
issues, such as privacy, the social implications of artificial
intelligence, and the potential problems of the increasingly computerized
workplace. The authors organize each of the eight chapters around a specific
issue (Our Computerized Society, Computer Crime, Software Theft, Hacking
and Viruses, Unreliable Computers, The Invasion of Privacy, AI and Expert
System, and Computerizing the Workplace), summarize the problems by drawing
from an impressive wealth of data from conventional and other media, and
conclude each chapter with a hypothetical example and set of questions that
enhance the value of the work for college graduate and undergraduate
classes.
About one third of the book directly confronts computer crime and "computer
underground" activities, such as piracy and hacking. There is no obvious
ax-grinding, and especially with piracy the authors raise issues in a
generally non-judgmental manner. They observe that an increasing number of
software authors have recognized the general ineffectiveness of
program-protecting their products and have increasingly moved away from the
practice. However, the focus of the discussion avoids the type of "warez
sharing" that occurs on pirate BBSs and begs the issue of swapping
copyright programs without purchasing them. The discussion example focuses
on the ethical issue of copy-protecting programs with a disk-wiping virus
rather than using an example that teases out the nuances of using
unpurchased software. I am also a bit troubled by the cursory attention
given to the different types of piracy. Participants enmeshed in the
"pirate culture" on BBSs would agree that theft of proprietary source code
for profit or reselling copied programs is clearly wrong. Further, even
within the computer underground, pirates range from "kids" who crack and
swap games to older and more sophisticated users who simply enjoy
collecting and examining various types of programs. Without teasing out the
complexity of the pirate culture, many of the important issues are glossed
over, such as the ethics of "fair use" to pre-test a program, the harm (or
lack of it) in using a program that would not have been purchased, but
whose use expands a product's visibility and reputation (thereby expanding
the market), and the problem of an increasing array of available software
that if purchased would be exceed the resources of all but the most
affluent computerists. In fairness, not all relevant ideas can be
addressed in a single chapter, and the authors satisfactorily provoked
enough questions to make this an interesting and useful section.
The most troublesome chapter, "Hacking and Viruses," simplifies the
phreak/hacking community and alludes to studies that do not accurately
reflect the computer underground. Although a relatively short and seemingly
innocuous discussion, the section "why do hackers 'hack'?" cites studies
suggesting that "severe social inadequacy" typifies many hackers. The
authors do make it clear that there is no simple answer to explain
motivation, they tend to ignore the primary reasons cited by most hackers:
The challenge, the excitement, and the satisfaction of success and
increased knowledge. Granted, these reasons, too, are simplistic as a
satisfactory explanation but they provide an antidote to the general
imagery portrayed by law enforcement officials that hackers are dangerous
social misfits and criminals who should be prosecuted to the full extent of
the law.
Also troublesome is the inclusion of virus writers and spreaders with
hacking activity. Hackers are as vehemently opposed to spreading viruses as
law enforcement. In fact, hackers, because of their use of networks and
reliance on smoothly functioning hardware, have far more to lose than the
average computer user by their spread. Nonetheless, the authors do raise a
few questions about the differences in the various types of activity,
asking, for example, whether system-browsing should be criminalized in the
same way as other predatory behavior. The degree to which this chapter
provokes disagreement and challenge to some of the claims (or vehement
responses to some of the questions) is simply an indicator of the utility
of this work both for stimulating thought and for generating discussion.
Although the remainder of the book is not as directly relevant to the CU
community, it nonetheless provides interesting reading. The authors
continually remind the reader that despite their benefits, computers
possess numerous demonstrable dangers. The value of the work is not simply
the admonition of the risks of computer misuse, but more importantly, that
social attitudes, ethical issues, governmental policies, and social control
strategies have lagged far behind in the need to be aware of how computers
change our lives and how these changes may usher in new forms of social
interaction for which we are unprepared as we cross into the
cyber-frontier.
The authors' scholarship and documentation, although impressive, does not
tempt them to fall back into academicese. The volume reads like a novel
and--even where one might disagree with claims or conclusions--the
provocations are stimulating rather than combatative. In short, Computer
Ethics is fun and worth reading.
------------------------------
From:
[email protected] (Mike Godwin)
Subject: File 3--Re: Hackers - Clamp Down NOW!
Date: 16 Jul 91 23:41:11 GMT
I am astonished both at the moral simplicity and the factual inaccuracy
of Tom Forester's newspaper column. For details, see below.
In article <
[email protected]>
[email protected] (George Bray)
writes [posting for Tom Forester]:
>It's about time we got tough with hackers and exposed them for
>the irresponsible electronic vandals they really are.
It certainly is time we got tough on "vandals." But it is
well-established, in Tom Forester's own book COMPUTER ETHICS among
other places, that there is more than one motivation for computer
trespass. A "vandal," according to my dictionary at hand, is one who
"willfully or maliciously defaces or destroys public or private
property." Few if any of the particular cases Forester cites below are
cases that a native speaker of the English language would normally
call "vandalism" ... unless his intent were to provoke an emotional
reaction rather than a reasoned assessment of a problem.
But the use of this term is among the smallest of the faults in
Forester's piece.
>Breaking into a computer is no different from breaking into your
>neighbour's house. It is burglary plain and simple - though often
>accompanied by malicious damage and theft of information.
Nothing is "plain" or "simple" about analogizing computer trespass
to burglary. The English common law that informs the British,
American, and Australian legal systems has always treated burglary
harshly, primarily because it involves a threat to the victim's
*residence* and to his *person*.
But computer intrusion in general, and the cases Forester discusses
in particular, pose neither threat. A mainframe computer at a
university or business, while it clearly ought to be protected
"space" under the law, is not a house "plain and simple." The kind
of invasion and the potential threat to traditional property interests
is not the same.
Consider this: anyone who has your phone number can dial your home--
can cause an electronic event to happen *inside your house*. That
"intruder" can even learn things about you from the attempt (especially
if you happen to answer, in which case he learns your whereabouts).
Do we call this attempted burglary? Do we call it spying or information
theft? Of course not--because we're so comfortable with telephone
technology that we no longer rely on metaphors to do our thinking
for us.
Whenever anyone glibly asserts that computer intrusion is just
like burglary ("plain and simple"), he is showing that he knows
very little, if anything, about the history and character of the
concept of burglary.
This is not a semantic quibble. It is a dispute about metaphors.
The metaphor you choose dictates your emotional response. Is
computer intrusion *truly* like burglary "plain and simple"?
Or is it like trespass--the kind in which the neighborhood kid
leaps your fence to swim in your private pool at midnight. Both
acts should be illegal, but one is taken far more seriously than
the other.
This is not to say that all computer intrusion is innocuous.
Some of it is quite harmful--as when a true "vandal" runs programs
that damage or delete important information. But it is important
to continue to make moral and legal distinctions, based on the
intent of the actor and the character of the damage.
Tom Forester seems to want to turn his back on making such
distinctions. This, to me, is a shameful position to take.
So much for the moral argument--let's look at Forester's
factual errors. There are many egregious ones.
>Last year, the so-called 'Legion of Doom' managed to completely
>stuff up the 911 emergency phone system in nine US states, thus
>endangering human life. They were also later charged with trading
>in stolen credit card numbers, long-distance phone card numbers
>and information about how to break into computers.
Only a person who is willfully ignorant of the record could
make these statements. The so-called Legion of Doom never
damaged or threatened to damage the E911 system. If Forester
had done even minimal research, he could have discovered this.
What they did, of course, was copy a bureaucratic memo from
an insecure Bell South computer and show it to each other.
At the trial of Craig Neidorf, who was charged along with
Legion of Doom members, it was revealed that the information
in that memo was publicly available in print.
Thus, there was no proprietary information involved, much
less a threat to the E911 system. Forester is simply inventing
facts in order to support his thesis. For an academic, this
is the gravest of sins.
>Leonard Rose Jr. was charged with selling illegal
>copies of a US $77,000 AT&T operating system.
Len Rose was never charged with "selling" anything.
>Robert Morris, who launched the disastrous Internet worm, got a
>mere slap on the wrist in the form of a US $10,000 fine and 400
>hours' community service.
If Forester had investigated the case, he might have discovered
an explanation for the lightness of Robert Morris Jr.'s sentence:
that Morris never intended to cause any damage to the networks.
In any case, Morris hardly qualifies as a "hacker" in the sense
that Forester uses the word; by all accounts, he was interested neither
in "theft" nor "burglary" nor "vandalism." The interference with the
functioning of the network was (again, by all accounts) accidental.
Of course, making such subtle distinctions would only blunt
the force of Forester's thesis, so he chooses to ignore them.
>Instead, he tends to spend his time with the computer, rising at
>2pm, then working right through to 6am,, consuming mountains of
>delivered pizza and gallons of soft drink.
This is the kind of stereotyping that Forester should be embarrassed
to parrot in a public forum.
>Some suffer from what Danish doctors are now calling "computer
>psychosis" - an inability to distinguish between the real world
>and the world inside the screen.
>
>For the hacker, the machine becomes a substitute for human
>contact, because it responds in rational manner, uncomplicated by
>feelings and emotions.
And here Forester diagnoses people whom he has never met.
One is forced to wonder where Forester acquired his medical
or psychiatric training. Of the people whose names he blithely
cites above, I have met or spoken to half a dozen. None of them
has been confused about the difference between computers and
reality, although it may be understandable that they prefer
working with computers to working with people who prejudge
them out of hatred, ignorance, or fear.
>One day, these meddlers will hack into a vital military, utility
>or comms system and cause a human and social catastrophe. It's
>time we put a stop to their adolescent games right now.
History suggests that we have far more to fear from badly
designed or overcomplex software than from hackers. Recent
failures of phone networks in the United States, for example,
have been traced to software failures.
Even if we grant that there are some hackers with the ability
to damage critical systems, the question Forester fails to
ask is this: Why hasn't it happened already? The answer seems
to be that few hackers want to damage or destroy the very
thing they are interested in exploring.
Of course, there are some "vandals" out there, and they should
be dealt with harshly. But there are far more "hackers" interested
in exploring and understanding systems. While they may well
violate the law now and then, the punishments they earn should
take into account both their intentions and their youth.
It has been noted many times that each generation faces the
challenge of socializing a wave of barbarians--its own
children. We will do our society little good if we decide
to classify all our half-socialized children into criminals.
For an ethicist, Forester seems to have given little thought
to the ethics of lumping all computer trespass into one
category of serious crime.
Mike Godwin is staff counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation
and has written on the topic of law and cyberspace.
------------------------------
Date: July 31, 1991
From:
[email protected]
Subject: File 4--Reply to Tom Forester Article
The post by Tom Forester is surprising both for its strident tone and
ill-conceived agenda. Normally, there will be consistency between
scholars' findings and the pronouncements they make derived from such
findings. This is not simply an intellectually ethical practice, but
responsible discourse as well. We all succumb to occasional
hyperbole, factual faux pas, or miswordings that create ambiguity or
misunderstandings--a gap between what we intend to say and what we
actually do say. However, the Forester article is recklessly flawed
and is compounded by the fact that his errors are in an area in which
he claims special expertise. His claims require a detailed response
lest his readers grant the post more credibility than is justified.
It appears that the letter is quite at odds with his book,
(co-authored with Perry Morrison). It is always possible that the
co-author wrote the passages cited below, but when any work
is co-authored, the norm is to assume joint responsibility for
the entirety unless otherwise indicated. There is no indication
that Tom Forester detached himself from any of the book's contents.
What is troublesome is not that Forester seems to disassociate
himself from passages in the work, but that he actually seems
unaware of arguments that bear his name.
The post, as it appeared publicly in several sources on the net,
began as follows:
>A colleague recently published this article in the computer section
>of 'The Australian' newspaper last week. He thought it might interest
>newspaper form.
>
>George Bray [posting for Tom Forester]
>
>
>
>Opinion: "Hackers: 'Clamp Down Now' "
>
>The Australian, 2 July 1991, page 34.
>
Forester's point is quite clear:
>It's about time we got tough with hackers and exposed them for
>the irresponsible electronic vandals they really are.
>
>Jailing a few of these malicious meddlers would set an example to
>other would-be data thieves and help stem the tide of
>computerized anarchism which is threatening to engulf the IT
>industry.
In the space of a few sentences, Forester categorically reduces the
meaning of the term "hacker" to one denoting "vandals," "meddlers,"
"data thieves," and "anarchism." "Hackers" is a broad term referring
on one hand to what Bob Bickford describes as "any person who derives
joy from discovering ways to circumvent limitations" to, on the other,
the cybervandals who trash systems. The broad use of the term to
define any computer behavior that displeases us contributes to public
misunderstanding and to law-enforcement excesses by expanding
categories of people eligible for prosecution. For example, if I have
committed no violation of law, but publicly call myself a "hacker" in
Bob Bickford's sense, such a claim could be adduced as evidence
against me in the event I were to come under investigation.
No definitions are written in stone. However, words have meanings, and
meanings connote images and metaphors. Forester's metaphors reinforce
the ill-considered images reflected in the most abusive search
warrants in several 1990 raids in the U.S. (e.g., Craig Neidorf, Steve
Jackson Games, Len Rose, Ripco BBS). The hacker imagery painted by
Forester has no hues or shades--only black and white icons reflecting
the ancient battle between the forces of light and darkness.
Most hackers aren't "meddlers" or data thieves. Like most crimes,
there is a continuum ranging from simple curiosity to harmful intrusion.
Forester also fails to mention that, whatever the excesses of even the
most malicious intruders, "hackers" are not responsible for the bulk
of computer crime. According to virtually all studies, most "computer
crime" is done from the inside (estimates range from 60-80 pct). A
significant proportion of the remainder is done by computer literate
rip-off artists whose purpose is larceny rather than exploratory
curiosity or illicit--but still relatively benign--behavior. One need
not approve of intrusions to recognize that there are differences
between types of abuse and methods of responding to these different
types.
In his article, Forester makes no distinctions between categories of
"hacker" or types of hacks. He refers simply to "electronic vandals,"
hardly a value-neutral (or accurate) label. This is a radical
departure from _Computer Ethics_ (pp 40-44), in which clear distinctions
are made, an even-handed treatment of the risks and problems is
presented, and "hacking is explicitly distinguished from computer
crime, something not done in his article.
>Breaking into a computer is no different from breaking into your
>neighbour's house. It is burglary plain and simple--though often
>accompanied by malicious damage and theft of information.
>Sometimes--as in the case of stolen credit card numbers--it is
>followed by fraud.
>
>The essence of hacking is that it is about gaining unauthorized
>access to other peoples' systems. It is an activity which has not
>been sanctioned by or approved of by the system's owner, be they
>private or public.
The phrase "plain and simple" usually reflects an attempt to silence
differing views by rejecting at the outset any possibility of
alternative meanings or points of view. The complexity of computer
abuse and the failure of law to catch up with rapidly changing
technology and the problems this creates for law enforcement and
others is plainly obvious but hardly simply resolved by crude
categories and retributionist thinking. Forester forces extreme
examples of disparate behavior into neat bundles, forces a metaphor
(breaking and entering) onto them, and then argues from the metaphor,
not the original behavior. This is legitimate when metaphors are used
to make something unfamiliar more understandable, but when the
metaphor is flawed, or when the metaphor becomes the thing itself,
distortion results. Computer invasion, even in the worst case, is not
analogous to home invasion. Physical presence of an offender and the
corresponding dangers it poses is absent.
A better analogy would be a kid setting up a lemonade stand on
your yard when you weren't looking, or somebody peeking through your
window from their own property across the street with binoculars. The
problem with viewing all inappropriate computer behavior as of the same
magnitude is that it leads to silly analogies. Consider "automotive
technology." We don't have a general category of crime called "auto
crime" and argue that we should lock "auto offenders up." There are
many "auto offenses," ranging from parking tickets, moving violations,
auto-theft, burglarizing autos, using autos in the commission of
another crime, stealing the trade-secrets of auto manufacturers, and
as most teenaged minors know, getting it on in the back seats of them.
Some of these auto-related acts are simply nuisances, others are quite
serious. We distinguish between them and don't call for "setting
examples" by jailing young lovers in a back seat *as well as* drunk
drivers or auto thieves.
Instead of the term "hacker," Forester's argument would be better
served by term "computer intruder," which would allow him to make
distinctions between kinds of intrusion. In law, there are similar
distinctions, and there is nothing *PLAIN AND SIMPLE* about such acts.
Computer intrusion is *NOT* burglarly, even if information is copied.
Forester's inaccurate analogy reflects either the incompetence of one
ignorant of law--rather strange for a self-styled expert on "computer
ethics"--or a cavalier disregard for accuracy which is anathema to
responsible scholarship.
Forester again seems to ignore his own book, which explicitly
challenges such a "plain and simple" analogy:
"Unfortunately, the legal basis of system break-ins
languishes in the dark ages of real locks and doors and
physical forms of information such as blueprints and
contracts. Equally, the law as it applies to breaking and
entering--the destruction of physical locks--and the theft
of information a it exists in paper form, IS A POOR ANALOGY
WHEN APPLIED TO THE ELECTRONIC LOCKS THAT MODEMS AND
PASSWORD SYSTEMS PROVIDE AND THE HIGHLY MUTABLE FORMS OF
INFORMATION THAT COMPUTER FILES REPRESENT <emphasis
added--jt >. After all, when one 'breaks' into a system,
nothing has been broken at all--hence there is no obvious
intent to cause harm (p. 60)."
Forester's intent here is hardly to justify hacking, but in context,
he is attempting to raise questions by showing the complexity of
computer intrusion and the gap between law and new technology. By
contrast, his letter reflects the reverse. Which Tom Forester should
we take seriously? The one who writes thoughtfully for academics, or
the one who incites the public with supercilious rhetoric that is
totally at odds with his scholarly discourse?
>Hackers are often portrayed as 'brilliant' or glamourized in the
>media as 'whiz-kids,' but often they are only mediocre
>programmers. Most 'great' hacks have in fact involved very little
>in the way of intellectual ability--you don't have to be an
>expert to work an autodialler and Unix systems--a favourite
>target of the hacker--have notoriously poor security.
>
>Far from being budding computer geniuses, hackers are often so
>incompetent and clumsy that they frequently cause more
>unintentional damage than intentional damage when blundering
>around inside someone else's system.
>
>Far from being heroes of the computer revolution, hackers are
>little more than common thieves. Their modus operandi involves
>stealing log-in names and passwords and then stealing information
>expensively collected by the victim.
The author confuses the term "hacker" with "phreaks," those who
attempt to avoid toll charges. The author displays no knowledge of his
topic or of the diversity of hacker activities, and seems totally
unaware that "hackers" who explore systems generally oppose predatory
behavior of any kind. Further, in his book, Forester does not equate
"great hacks" with auto-dialing or mundane incidents, as he does in
his letter. By "great hack" he seems to mean "publicized hacks,"
because the examples of "great hacks" in the book (p. 51-52) refer to
Marcus Hess and the Chaos Computer Club, and a group of British
hackers who penetrated a license centre. These would hardly be
described as "great hacks" by most observers, although they did
captivate media attention. I can recall no media story in the U.S. in
recent years that has portrayed hackers, as a category, as uniformally
"brilliant" or as "whiz kids." This claim is simply a straw icon
Forester sets up for purposes of hacker-bashing. Further, Forester is
as guilty as those he criticizes for alluding to the "brilliance" of
hackers. In his book, he attempts to account for the shift from licit
to illicit computer activity by "THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST" (p. 43)
and suggests the emergence of value conflict that the current breed of
hacker as made more sinister. Granted, Forester was alluding to a
different crop of computerists with his term, but so to are most
others who have used that description in the past. Forester seems to
want to hold others responsible for past laudatory language, but is
unwilling to hold himself to that same standard.
With the expansion of computer users, some hackers, like some
scholars, will be bright, principled, and imaginative. Others won't.
As in any distribution of valued characteristics, there will be far
more of the latter than the former. If Forester's point is that we
should not romanticize predators, then he should be willing to provide
examples and examine his own role in perpetuating those images he
criticizes. If, however, he merely intends to say that most "hackers"
possess modest talent, then this is a truism that few would dispute
and one wonders: So what?
>Some hackers have even become infamous by betraying their
>country. Members of the Chaos Computer Club of Hamburg, in then
>West Germany,were caught selling United States military secrets
>to the KGB--the charred body of one of their number, Karl Koch,
>was later found in a forest outside Hanover.
If Forester refers here to Pengo, Hess, and the others, this claim is
false. Despite the espionage element, there was no evidence that this
group betrayed its country, Germany, by selling German military
secrets. Nor is there evidence that they sold U.S. military secrets.
In fact, I can think of no "hacker" known to have sold military
secrets in the U.S. According to the Hafner and Markoff book,
_Cyberpunk_, the Soviets received commercial software and some
relatively inconsequential other files, and according to one source
they cited, the Soviets "got rooked." The author's statement is pure
hyperbole. While it is fully appropriate to identify the dangers of
computer intrusion to national security, to raise it as a way of
stigmatizing all forms of intrusion and to justify a "crackdown" by
incarcerating a few examples moves from reasonable concern to
unthinking hysteria. And, what is the point of mentioning Hagbard's
charred body? Is this apparent suicide supposed to show that hacking
leads to violence? To murder? Hagbard, according to all accounts, was
a psychologically unstable substance abuser. Images of violence make
good copy, no matter how irrelevant, and perhaps charred bodies just
go with the territory. Forester's swipe at Chaos Computer Club also
seems at odds with his book (p. 49), in which he, with seeming
approval, observes:
Indeed, we now know that at the time of the Chernobyl nuclear
power station disaster in the Soviet Union, hackers from the
Chaos COmputer Club released more information to the public
about developments than did the West German government
itself. All of this information was gained by illegal
break-ins carried out in government computer installations.
>Other hackers, such as the group that infiltrated six London
>banks in 1989, have swiftly turned to blackmail. Yet some
>misguided persons have sought to justify this despicable crime by
>claiming hackers are really only helping 'test system security.'
Can Forester name anybody who claims that blackmail, ripping of money
from banks, or similar kinds of behavior is justifiable as a security
test? I have never heard a single instance of such a justification of
this type of predatory behavior, other than, perhaps, by the culprits
as a defense during trial. But, then, I've also heard murderers claim
that junkfood made them kill, a defense hardly supported
by "some misguided persons". Some may attempt to justify computer
intrusion by appealing to "security interests," "freedom of
information," or other grounds. But there is near universal loathing
for predators of this type. Forester moves from justifying computer
intrusion to justifying bank robbery quite easily, proving that the
shallower the water, the quicker the pace.
>A second justification of hacking is that hackers safeguard our
>civil liberties by keeping a check on the activities of
>governments. I know of no cases where revealing the contents of a
>state database has done good rather than harm.
Is this the *same* Tom Forester who wrote:
"We might therefore ask ourselves whether, for the sake of
balance, a truly democratic society should possess a core of
technically gifted but recalcitrant people. Given that more and
more information about individuals is now being stored on
computers, often without our knowledge or consent, is it not
reassuring that some citizens are able to penetrate
these databases to find out what is going on? Thus it
could be argued that hackers represent one way in which we
can help avoid the creation of a more centralized, even
totalitarian government (p. 49).
. . .
Given this background and the possibility of terrorist acts
becoming more and more technologically sophisticated,
perhaps we can look to hackers as a resource to be used to
foil such acts and to improve our existing security
arrangements. TO SOME EXTENT, THIS IS ALREADY HAPPENING:
<emphasis added> (p. 49).
Poor Tom. He doesn't seem to be able to figure out what position he
wants to take. The danger is not that he selects one over the other,
but that he seems to continually contradict himself. The
contradictions lead to public statements that do no service to
clarifying the issues in ways that result in resolving the risks of
computer intruders in a just, yet effective way.
>If hacking cannot be defended, then virus creation is wholly
>unforgivable. Enormous time and effort has been spent in recent
>years making good the damage caused by the pranksters who gave us
>the 'Stoned,' 'Bouncing Ball,' 'Pakistani Brain' and 'Israeli'
>viruses, to name but a few.
>
>Such computer anarchists have caused mayhem in recent years in
>the US. The famous Internet worm let loose by Cornell University
>student Robert Morris in late 1988 infected no less than 6,000
>systems and cost thousands of dollars to contain.
In his book, Forester offers a defense of hackers as well as posing
some of their dangers. As a consequence, his "if-then" logic seems
odd. Has he recanted? Has he elsewhere offered a reasoned treatise
defending the "if" premise? Nobody defends viruses, a very special and
destructive form of computer intrusion. His statement is analogous to
saying, "If trespassing cannot be defended, then arson is
unforgivable." Trespassing can be forgiven (if we are in metaphysical,
rather than legal mode), but arson cannot be. Whether hacking is
defensible or not, it has no bearing on the claim that computer
viruses are indefensible. To say that we should jail hackers because
those who spread computer viruses are highly destructive is a major
non sequitor. They are different sorts of acts with different
consequences. Viruses are made for one purpose only: To disrupt or
destroy. The Morris worm, although disruptive and totally
irresponsible, was not so-intended, and it was hardly the result of a
"computer anarchist." Forester seems to be grabbing any and all
examples to justify his claim that hackers should be jailed. No
matter that these examples reflect behaviors ranging from benign
innocence to conscious malice. Just lump 'em all together in a barrel
and chuck 'em into the fire.
>Last year, the so-called 'Legion of Doom' managed to completely
>stuff up the 911 emergency phone system in nine US states, thus
>endangering human life. They were also later charged with trading
>in stolen credit card numbers, long-distance phone card numbers
>
>In another case, Leonard DeCicco was charged with stealing US $1
>million worth of security software from Digital Equipment
>Corporation. Leonard Rose Jr. was charged with selling illegal
>copies of a US $77,000 AT&T operating system.
>
>One group of phone hackers was charged with stealing more than US
>$1.6 million worth of free long-distance phone calls, while
>another group was caught manipulating voice-mail boxes and 008
>toll-free numbers to the tune of millions of dollars.
These claims are totally false. As Mike Godwin (above) notes, the
"Atlanta 3" were not charged with "stuffing up" the E911 system,
period. Nor were they charged with the other allegations. Leonard
"DeCicco" presumably refers to Kevin Mitnick's confederate described
in the Hafner/Markoff book who cooperated with the FBI in apprehending
Mitnick. Spokespersons at DEC had no knowledge of any such infraction
by DiCicco. Los Angeles U.S. Attorney's Office spokesperson Carole
Levitzky indicated that there were no such federal charges against
him, and that if he were involved in a subsequent offense of such
magnitude after the Mitnick affair, it would show up in their records.
DiCicco pleaded guilty on Nov. 29, 1989, to one count of aiding and
abetting Mitnick's theft and was sentenced to five years probation,
750 hours of community service, and restitution of $13,000. If
Forester refers to the DiCicco of the Mitnick and DiCicco incident,
this claim is blatantly false. If there is a similarly named "Leonard
DeCicco" who has stolen $1 million from DEC, Forester seems to be the
only one who knows about it.
apprehend Kevin Mitnick and they make no mention of Forester's
charges, nor have such charges been made public. Leonard Rose was not
charged with stealing but with possession of unlicensed UNIX software,
not uncommon among some programmers. Phone phreaks and others have,
indeed, freely utilized illicit means of avoiding long distance
charges. Such acts are wrong, but, as Gail Thackeray, a prosecutor of
computer crime, has convincingly argued, jail is not necessarily the
best sanction for these delinquents.
What's troublesome here is that Forester seems to have no grasp of
facts and is not troubled by generalizations based on inaccuracies. He
nonetheless calls for changes in public policy on the basis of his
errors. If Forester were a common citizen, these flaws would be
understandable. But, because he claims to be knowledgeable in the area
of computer ethics and crime, his misinformation borders on
professional negligence. These are not just small matters of detail:
His errors reflect consistent lack of knowledge of the most basic
information accessible in media and across the nets.
>Unfortunately, attempts by US authorities to nail these delinquent
>nerds have not always been successful. This is because the law is
>unclear, and police lack the expertise in dealing with the
>crimes.
>
>For example, last year's Operation Sun Devil, which involved
>raids in 14 cities and the seizure of 42 systems and 23, 000
>disks, has yet to result in any major prosecutions.
>
>Robert Morris, who launched the disastrous Internet worm, got a
>mere slap on the wrist in the form of a US $10,000 fine and 400
>hours' community service Only in Britain--where the
>Computer Misuse Act became law in 1990--do the authorities seem
>to winning the war against hackers: 'mad' hacker Nicholas
>Whiteley was recently jailed for four months for a series of
>malicious attacks on university computers.
Perhaps in Forester's logic a single example of a four month sentence
for attacks on university computers signifies "winning a war" in a
country with a much smaller population and proportionately fewer
personal computers. Perhaps he actually believes in the power of such
a superficial example, or perhaps he is just an Anglophile who is too
lazy to ferret out the successful intervention of law enforcement and
others in responding to "hacking" related crimes in the U.S. That
quibble aside, Mike Godwin (above) addressed the Morris sentence.
Operation Sun Devil was not successful largely because it was
ill-conceived, poorly executed and misdirected. By contrast,
prosecutors such as Gail Thackeray, Ken Rosenblatt, and Don Ingraham
have all had considerable success prosecuting computer crime.
Forester also fails to explain how a single example of a four month
jail sentence, relatively short, reflects more success than the
sentences of imprisonment given to Riggs, Darden, Grant, Rose, Zinn, and
others, the imprisonment of non-hacking computer criminals, and the
substantial probations given to many, many others (including Mitnick,
Majette, DiCicco, Morris, Goldman, and countless others). Whether we
agree with each individual indictment or sentence, the fact is that U.S.
law enforcement is prosecuting and prosecuting successfully in most
cases. The trend also seems to be that U.S. law enforcement, thanks
largely to the efforts of EFF and prosecutors such as Don Ingraham,
Gail Thackeray, and others, are--despite whatever other criticisms
some may have--demonstrating an explicit willingness to move away from
the Draconian measurese espoused by Forester and balance the needs of
law enforcement and security with those of Constitutional protections
against First and Fourth Amendment abuses and "justice as fairness."
It is true that law enforcement is not particularly knowledgeable and
that laws are vague, but they are vague on the side of
over-criminalization. Nonetheless, the primary answer to resolving the
problem of computer abuse does not lie in strengthening law
enforcement, but rather in expanding public education and awareness.
There are an overwhelming number of cases in the U.S. in which
computer and telephone abusers have been apprehended, either by law
enforcement or by other officials. Forester's implied claim that
somehow law enforcement needs to be tougher, rather than wiser,
is--like the rest of his article--totally inaccurate.
>To some extent hacking has attracted individuals who are not at
>ease socially--the classic "nerd," if you like. They may relate
>better to machines than other humans.
>
>One image of the hacker is of an adolescent male, who, for
>reasons of shyness or "spots" does not get on with girls.
>
>Instead, he tends to spend his time with the computer, rising at
>2pm, then working right through to 6am,, consuming mountains of
>delivered pizza and gallons of soft drink.
>
>Some suffer from what Danish doctors are now calling "computer
>psychosis"--an inability to distinguish between the real world
>and the world inside the screen.
>
>For the hacker, the machine becomes a substitute for human
>contact, because it responds in rational manner, uncomplicated by
>feelings and emotions.
Again, Forester is at odds with his own work, where he indicates that
there are different types of hackers and motivations. He seems to
draw from Sherry Turkle's _The Second Self_, in his cartoon depiction
of hackers. Turkle's data were limited to MIT students and a few
interviews from Internet users. Turkle's study, published in 1984,
well before the "hacking craze" of the late 1980s, was more a study of
computer enthusiasts rather than "hackers," and her descriptions were
partly ironic and hardly "scientific," although this did not undermine
the value of her book.
The "hackers" depicted in in _Cyberpunk_ range from seemingly normal
(whatever that might mean) to certifiably loony, much as participants
in any other collection of avid enthusiasts, including sports fans or
researchers. From our own (Gordon Meyer and Jim Thomas) studies of
the computer underground, "hackers" are a diverse lot, and Forester's
grotesque imagery is as simplistic as would be dismissing his article
because of Australian inbreeding from the days when it was a penal
colony. Psychological explanations for any behavior can be helpful in
contributing to our understanding, but data-free generalizations that
reduce complex behaviors to simple-minded categories, especially when
done by one who makes a living as a scholar, do a disservice to the
scholarly community.
>In some senses, one can't help but feel sorry for hackers, but by
>taking out their hang-ups on society they do enormous damage and
>we all end up paying for their anarchic antics.
>
>One day, these meddlers will hack into a vital military, utility
>or comms system and cause a human and social catastrophe. It's
>time we put a stop to their adolescent games right now.
>
>TOM FORESTER
>
>
>
>*Tom Forester is co-author, with Perry Morrison, of Computer
>Ethics: Cautionary Tales and Ethical Dilemmas in Computing
>(Blackwell / Allen & Unwin, 1990,).
<end of article >
Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce argued in their 1988 article in
_Criminology_ that legislative testimony leading to anti-computer
abuse law relied heavily on anecdotal evidence, hyperbolic assertions
lacking empirical support, and media accounts. For this reason,
Forester's letter, which fits all three categories, subverts the
problem-solving process and hampers effective legislation and
sanctions intended to address the problem of technologically-created
offenses. Few people justify indiscriminate computer intrusions, so
the question does not center on a defense of computer abuse. The
issue is what do we do about it. Forester argues for increased
criminalization and incarceration. There is little evidence that
incarceration deters crime. It is unlikely that "setting examples"
will resolve anything. Those most likely to be deterred those not
engaged in serious misbehavior and are therefore the least risk to
society. In the US, at least, sentencing is supposed to be
"offense-drive," not "policy-driven." We sanction on the basis of an
act, not on the basis of establishing social a political policy.
"Setting examples" is not justice, but a political policy.
Neither Forester's call for heavier example-setting sanctions nor the
logic of his call serve the debates surrounding the problem of
computer abuse. He muddies the waters, inflames the passions of the
non-computer literate public with false information, and apparently
fails to recognize the lesson of his own writing, which is that
reasoned dialogue rather than strident demagoguery is the ethical
approach to problem solving. This seems a rather glaring lapse for one
who writes on computer ethics.
Former prosecutor Gail Thackeray, in an interview with NEWSBYTES,
offered a sound justification for temperance in incarceration to
explain her reasons for opposing a five year prison sentence for "Doc
Savage:"
"Usually computer hackers who get into trouble for activities of
this nature are kids or young adults who are not the type to be
in trouble for any other criminal activities. The point of
sentencing in these cases should be rehabilitation. If we can
break the pattern of illegal behavior, society will benefit from
Majette's participation. If we simply locked him up for 5 years,
neither he nor society would benefit."
None can doubt her passion for deterring computer abuse, but she also
recognizes the complexity of the problems and the value of social
responses that benefit society, set *productive* examples, and
simultaneously improve the security and harmony of the nets. The
views reflected in the Forester post would return us to the dark ages
of repression based on ignorance. Perhaps somebody should send
Forester a copy of _Computer Ethics_ along with the suggestion that he
read it.
Jim Thomas is a professor of sociology/criminal justice at
Northern Illinois University. With Gordon Meyer, he has conducted
research on the computer underground culture. His specialty is
the culture of the dreadful enclosures that we call prisons, where
some feel hackers belong.
------------------------------
End of Computer Underground Digest #3.28
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