* Copyright (c) 2011 Rustam Kovhaev. All rights reserved.

/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Rustam Kovhaev. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2021 Eivind Næss. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission.
*
* THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
* THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
* AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
* AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*
* NOTES:
*
* PEAP has 2 phases,
* 1 - Outer EAP, where TLS session gets established
* 2 - Inner EAP, where inside TLS session with EAP MSCHAPV2 auth, or any other auth
*
* And so protocols encapsulation looks like this:
* Outer EAP -> TLS -> Inner EAP -> MSCHAPV2
* PEAP can compress an inner EAP packet prior to encapsulating it within
* the Data field of a PEAP packet by removing its Code, Identifier,
* and Length fields, and Microsoft PEAP server/client always does that
*
* Current implementation does not support:
* a) Fast reconnect
* b) Inner EAP fragmentation
* c) Any other auth other than MSCHAPV2
*
* For details on the PEAP protocol, look to Microsoft:
* https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap
*/

#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include "config.h"
#endif

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>

#include "pppd-private.h"
#include "eap.h"
#include "tls.h"
#include "chap.h"
#include "chap_ms.h"
#include "mppe.h"
#include "peap.h"

#ifdef UNIT_TEST
#define novm(x)
#endif

struct peap_state {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
BIO *in_bio;
BIO *out_bio;

int phase;
int written, read;
u_char *in_buf;
u_char *out_buf;

u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN];
u_char tk[PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN];
u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN];
struct tls_info *info;
#ifdef PPP_WITH_CHAPMS
struct chap_digest_type *chap;
#endif
};

/*
* K = Key, S = Seed, LEN = output length
* PRF+(K, S, LEN) = T1 | T2 | ... |Tn
* Where:
* T1 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, S | 0x01 | 0x00 | 0x00)
* T2 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T1 | S | 0x02 | 0x00 | 0x00)
* ...
* Tn = HMAC-SHA1 (K, Tn-1 | S | n | 0x00 | 0x00)
* As shown, PRF+ is computed in iterations. The number of iterations (n)
* depends on the output length (LEN).
*/
static void peap_prfplus(u_char *seed, size_t seed_len, u_char *key, size_t key_len, u_char *out_buf, size_t pfr_len)
{
int pos;
u_char *buf, *hash;
size_t max_iter, i, j, k;
u_int len;

max_iter = (pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) / SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
buf = malloc(seed_len + max_iter * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (!buf)
novm("pfr buffer");
hash = malloc(pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (!hash)
novm("hash buffer");

for (i = 0; i < max_iter; i++) {
j = 0;
k = 0;

if (i > 0)
j = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
for (k = 0; k < seed_len; k++)
buf[j + k] = seed[k];
pos = j + k;
buf[pos] = i + 1;
pos++;
buf[pos] = 0x00;
pos++;
buf[pos] = 0x00;
pos++;
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, key_len, buf, pos, (hash + i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH), &len))
fatal("HMAC() failed");
for (j = 0; j < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; j++)
buf[j] = hash[i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + j];
}
BCOPY(hash, out_buf, pfr_len);
free(hash);
free(buf);
}

static void generate_cmk(u_char *ipmk, u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_out, int client)
{
const char *label = PEAP_TLV_IPMK_SEED_LABEL;
u_char data_tlv[PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN] = {0};
u_char isk[PEAP_TLV_ISK_LEN] = {0};
u_char ipmkseed[PEAP_TLV_IPMKSEED_LEN] = {0};
u_char cmk[PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN] = {0};
u_char buf[PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN] = {0};
u_char compound_mac[PEAP_TLV_COMP_MAC_LEN] = {0};
u_int len;

/* format outgoing CB TLV response packet */
data_tlv[1] = PEAP_TLV_TYPE;
data_tlv[3] = PEAP_TLV_LENGTH_FIELD;
if (client)
data_tlv[7] = PEAP_TLV_SUBTYPE_RESPONSE;
else
data_tlv[7] = PEAP_TLV_SUBTYPE_REQUEST;
BCOPY(nonce, (data_tlv + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN), PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
data_tlv[60] = EAPT_PEAP;

#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE
mppe_get_send_key(isk, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
mppe_get_recv_key(isk + MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
#endif

BCOPY(label, ipmkseed, strlen(label));
BCOPY(isk, ipmkseed + strlen(label), PEAP_TLV_ISK_LEN);
peap_prfplus(ipmkseed, PEAP_TLV_IPMKSEED_LEN,
tempkey, PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN, buf, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);

BCOPY(buf, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
BCOPY(buf + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN);
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN, data_tlv, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN, compound_mac, &len))
fatal("HMAC() failed");
BCOPY(compound_mac, data_tlv + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN, PEAP_TLV_COMP_MAC_LEN);
/* do not copy last byte to response packet */
BCOPY(data_tlv, tlv_response_out, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN - 1);
}

static void verify_compound_mac(struct peap_state *psm, u_char *in_buf)
{
u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
u_char out_buf[PEAP_TLV_LEN] = {0};

BCOPY(in_buf, nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, nonce, out_buf, 0);
if (memcmp((in_buf + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), (out_buf + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN))
fatal("server's CMK does not match client's CMK, potential MiTM");
}

#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE
#define PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN 32

static void generate_mppe_keys(u_char *ipmk, int client)
{
const char *label = PEAP_TLV_CSK_SEED_LABEL;
u_char csk[PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN] = {0};
size_t len;

dbglog("PEAP CB: generate mppe keys");
len = strlen(label);
len++; /* CSK requires NULL byte in seed */
peap_prfplus((u_char *)label, len, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, csk, PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN);

/*
* The first 64 bytes of the CSK are split into two MPPE keys, as follows.
*
* +-----------------------+------------------------+
* | First 32 bytes of CSK | Second 32 bytes of CSK |
* +-----------------------+------------------------+
* | MS-MPPE-Send-Key | MS-MPPE-Recv-Key |
* +-----------------------+------------------------+
*/
if (client) {
mppe_set_keys(csk, csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
} else {
mppe_set_keys(csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, csk, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
}
}

#endif

#ifndef UNIT_TEST

static void peap_ack(eap_state *esp, u_char id)
{
u_char *outp;

outp = outpacket_buf;
MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP);
PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
esp->es_client.ea_id = id;
PUTSHORT(PEAP_HEADERLEN, outp);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_PEAP, outp);
PUTCHAR(PEAP_FLAGS_ACK, outp);
output(esp->es_unit, outpacket_buf, PPP_HDRLEN + PEAP_HEADERLEN);
}

static void peap_response(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *buf, int len)
{
struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
u_char *outp;
int peap_len;

outp = outpacket_buf;
MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP);
PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
esp->es_client.ea_id = id;

if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1)
peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + len;
else
peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + len;

PUTSHORT(peap_len, outp);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_PEAP, outp);

if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
PUTCHAR(PEAP_L_FLAG_SET, outp);
PUTLONG(len, outp);
} else
PUTCHAR(PEAP_NO_FLAGS, outp);

BCOPY(buf, outp, len);
output(esp->es_unit, outpacket_buf, PPP_HDRLEN + peap_len);
}

static void peap_do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
u_char *out_buf, int *out_len)
{
struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
int used = 0;
int typenum;
int secret_len;
char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1];
char rhostname[MAXWORDLEN];
u_char *outp = out_buf;

dbglog("PEAP: EAP (in): %.*B", in_len, in_buf);

if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_CAPABILITIES_TYPE &&
in_len == (EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN)) {
/* use original packet as template for response */
BCOPY(in_buf, outp, EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN);
PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
/* change last byte to 0 to disable fragmentation */
*(outp + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN + 1) = 0x00;
used = EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN;
goto done;
}
if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_TLV_TYPE &&
in_len == PEAP_TLV_LEN) {
/* PEAP TLV message, do cryptobinding */
SSL_export_keying_material(psm->ssl, psm->tk, PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN,
PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL, strlen(PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL), NULL, 0, 0);
/* verify server's CMK */
verify_compound_mac(psm, in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN);
/* generate client's CMK with new nonce */
PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
PUTSHORT(PEAP_TLV_LEN, outp);
BCOPY(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN, outp, PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN);
outp = outp + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN;
RAND_bytes(psm->nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, psm->nonce, outp, 1);
#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE
/* set mppe keys */
generate_mppe_keys(psm->ipmk, 1);
#endif
used = PEAP_TLV_LEN;
goto done;
}

GETCHAR(typenum, in_buf);
in_len--;

switch (typenum) {
case EAPT_IDENTITY:
/* Respond with our identity to the peer */
PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp);
BCOPY(esp->es_client.ea_name, outp,
esp->es_client.ea_namelen);
used += (esp->es_client.ea_namelen + 1);
break;

case EAPT_TLS:
/* Send NAK to EAP_TLS request */
PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
used += 2;
break;

#if PPP_WITH_CHAPMS
case EAPT_MSCHAPV2: {

// Must have at least 4 more bytes to process CHAP header
if (in_len < 4) {
error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, too short");
break;
}

u_char opcode;
GETCHAR(opcode, in_buf);

u_char chap_id;
GETCHAR(chap_id, in_buf);

short mssize;
GETSHORT(mssize, in_buf);

// Validate the CHAP packet (including header)
if (in_len != mssize) {
error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid length");
break;
}
in_len -= 4;

switch (opcode) {
case CHAP_CHALLENGE: {

u_char *challenge = in_buf; // VLEN + VALUE
u_char vsize;

GETCHAR(vsize, in_buf);
in_len -= 1;

if (vsize != MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN || in_len < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN) {
error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid value-length: %d", vsize);
goto done;
}

INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN, in_buf);
in_len -= MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN;

// Copy the provided remote host name
rhostname[0] = '\0';
if (in_len > 0) {
if (in_len >= sizeof(rhostname)) {
dbglog("PEAP: trimming really long peer name down");
in_len = sizeof(rhostname) - 1;
}
BCOPY(in_buf, rhostname, in_len);
rhostname[in_len] = '\0';
}

// In case the remote doesn't give us his name, or user explictly specified remotename is config
if (explicit_remote || (remote_name[0] != '\0' && in_len == 0))
strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, sizeof(rhostname));

// Get the scrert for authenticating ourselves with the specified host
if (get_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_client.ea_name,
rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) {

u_char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1];
u_char user_len = esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
char *user = esp->es_client.ea_name;

psm->chap->make_response(response, chap_id, user,
challenge, secret, secret_len, NULL);

PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
PUTCHAR(CHAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(chap_id, outp);
PUTCHAR(0, outp);
PUTCHAR(5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp);
BCOPY(response, outp, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1); // VLEN + VALUE
INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1, outp);
BCOPY(user, outp, user_len);
used = 5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN + 1;

} else {
dbglog("PEAP: no CHAP secret for auth to %q", rhostname);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
++used;
}
break;
}
case CHAP_SUCCESS: {

u_char status = CHAP_FAILURE;
if (psm->chap->check_success(chap_id, in_buf, in_len)) {
info("Chap authentication succeeded! %.*v", in_len, in_buf);
status = CHAP_SUCCESS;
}

PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
PUTCHAR(status, outp);
used += 2;
break;
}
case CHAP_FAILURE: {

u_char status = CHAP_FAILURE;
psm->chap->handle_failure(in_buf, in_len);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
PUTCHAR(status, outp);
used += 2;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
break;
} // EAPT_MSCHAPv2
#endif
default:

/* send compressed EAP NAK for any unknown packet */
PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
++used;
}

done:

dbglog("PEAP: EAP (out): %.*B", used, psm->out_buf);
*out_len = used;
}

int peap_init(struct peap_state **ctx, const char *rhostname)
{
const SSL_METHOD *method;

if (!ctx)
return -1;

tls_init();

struct peap_state *psm = malloc(sizeof(*psm));
if (!psm)
novm("peap psm struct");
psm->in_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
if (!psm->in_buf)
novm("peap tls buffer");
psm->out_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
if (!psm->out_buf)
novm("peap tls buffer");
method = tls_method();
if (!method)
novm("TLS_method() failed");
psm->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
if (!psm->ctx)
novm("SSL_CTX_new() failed");

/* Configure the default options */
tls_set_opts(psm->ctx);

/* Configure the max TLS version */
tls_set_version(psm->ctx, max_tls_version);

/* Configure the peer certificate callback */
tls_set_verify(psm->ctx, 5);

/* Configure CA locations */
if (tls_set_ca(psm->ctx, ca_path, cacert_file)) {
fatal("Could not set CA verify locations");
}

/* Configure CRL check (if any) */
if (tls_set_crl(psm->ctx, crl_dir, crl_file)) {
fatal("Could not set CRL verify locations");
}

psm->out_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
psm->in_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(psm->out_bio, -1);
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(psm->in_bio, -1);
psm->ssl = SSL_new(psm->ctx);
SSL_set_bio(psm->ssl, psm->in_bio, psm->out_bio);
SSL_set_connect_state(psm->ssl);
psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_1;
tls_set_verify_info(psm->ssl, explicit_remote ? rhostname : NULL, NULL, 1, &psm->info);
psm->chap = chap_find_digest(CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2);
*ctx = psm;
return 0;
}

void peap_finish(struct peap_state **psm) {

if (psm && *psm) {
struct peap_state *tmp = *psm;

if (tmp->ssl)
SSL_free(tmp->ssl);

if (tmp->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(tmp->ctx);

if (tmp->info)
tls_free_verify_info(&tmp->info);

// NOTE: BIO and memory is freed as a part of SSL_free()

free(*psm);
*psm = NULL;
}
}

int peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len)
{
int ret;
int out_len;

struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;

if (esp->es_client.ea_id == id) {
info("PEAP: retransmits are not supported..");
return -1;
}

switch (*inp) {
case PEAP_S_FLAG_SET:
dbglog("PEAP: S bit is set, starting PEAP phase 1");
ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
if (ret != 1) {
ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ && ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
fatal("SSL_do_handshake(): %s", ERR_error_string(ret, NULL));

}
psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf, TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
break;

case PEAP_LM_FLAG_SET:
dbglog("PEAP TLS: LM bits are set, need to get more TLS fragments");
inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
peap_ack(esp, id);
break;

case PEAP_M_FLAG_SET:
dbglog("PEAP TLS: M bit is set, need to get more TLS fragments");
inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
peap_ack(esp, id);
break;

case PEAP_L_FLAG_SET:
case PEAP_NO_FLAGS:
if (*inp == PEAP_L_FLAG_SET) {
dbglog("PEAP TLS: L bit is set");
inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
} else {
dbglog("PEAP TLS: all bits are off");
inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
}

if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
dbglog("PEAP TLS: continue handshake");
ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
if (ret != 1) {
ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ && ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
fatal("SSL_do_handshake(): %s", ERR_error_string(ret, NULL));
}
if (SSL_is_init_finished(psm->ssl))
psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_2;
if (BIO_ctrl_pending(psm->out_bio) == 0) {
peap_ack(esp, id);
break;
}
psm->read = 0;
psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
break;
}
psm->read = SSL_read(psm->ssl, psm->in_buf,
TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
out_len = TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE;
peap_do_inner_eap(psm->in_buf, psm->read, esp, id,
psm->out_buf, &out_len);
if (out_len > 0) {
psm->written = SSL_write(psm->ssl, psm->out_buf, out_len);
psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
}
break;
}
return 0;
}

#else

u_char outpacket_buf[255];
int debug = 1;
int error_count = 0;
int unsuccess = 0;

/**
* Using the example in MS-PEAP, section 4.4.1.
* see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap/5308642b-90c9-4cc4-beec-fb367325c0f9
*/
int test_cmk(u_char *ipmk) {
u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {
0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9
};

u_char tmpkey[PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN] = {
0x73, 0x8B, 0xB5, 0xF4, 0x62, 0xD5, 0x8E, 0x7E,
0xD8, 0x44, 0xE1, 0xF0, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0xBE, 0x50,
0xC5, 0x0A, 0x20, 0x50, 0xDE, 0x11, 0x99, 0x77,
0x10, 0xD6, 0x5F, 0x45, 0xFB, 0x5F, 0xBA, 0xB7,
0xE3, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x92, 0x4F, 0x42, 0x97, 0x38,
// 0xDE, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x46, 0xCD, 0xF5, 0x0B, 0xCB,
// 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x1D, 0x22, 0x52,
// 0x45, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0x63
};

u_char expected[60] = {
0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9,
0x42, 0xE0, 0x86, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0x8B, 0x8C,
0x8E, 0x45, 0x8F, 0x70, 0x21, 0xF0, 0x6A, 0x6E,
0xAB, 0x16, 0xB6, 0x46
};

u_char inner_mppe_keys[32] = {
0x67, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x14, 0x01, 0xBE, 0xFB, 0xA5,
0x60, 0x71, 0x7B, 0x3B, 0x5D, 0xDD, 0x40, 0x38,
0x65, 0x67, 0xF9, 0xF4, 0x16, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x9D,
0xFC, 0x71, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0xF2, 0xFA, 0x95
};

u_char response[60] = {};

// Set the inner MPPE keys (e.g. from CHAPv2)
mppe_set_keys(inner_mppe_keys, inner_mppe_keys + 16, 16);

// Generate and compare the response
generate_cmk(ipmk, tmpkey, nonce, response, 1);
if (memcmp(expected, response, sizeof(response)) != 0) {
dbglog("Failed CMK key generation\n");
dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(response), response);
dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(expected), expected);
return -1;
}

return 0;
}

int test_mppe(u_char *ipmk) {
u_char outer_mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
0x6A, 0x02, 0xD7, 0x82, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xC7, 0x13,
0x8B, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xB4, 0x96, 0x97,
0x0D, 0x7C, 0xAB, 0x30, 0x0A, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x72,
0x78, 0xE1, 0xDD, 0xD5, 0xAE, 0xF7, 0x66, 0x97
};

u_char outer_mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
0x17, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xE5, 0x84, 0xA1, 0xC8, 0x95,
0x03, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x05, 0xE3, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x84,
0x84, 0xDD, 0xC2, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0x62,
0x76, 0x5C, 0x40, 0x68, 0xBF, 0xF6, 0x5A, 0x45
};

u_char result[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
int len;

mppe_clear_keys();

generate_mppe_keys(ipmk, 1);

len = mppe_get_recv_key(result, sizeof(result));
if (len != sizeof(result)) {
dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE recv key");
return -1;
}

if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_recv_key, len) != 0) {
dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe recv key");
return -1;
}

len = mppe_get_send_key(result, sizeof(result));
if (len != sizeof(result)) {
dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE send key");
return -1;
}

if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_send_key, len) != 0) {
dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe send key");
return -1;
}

return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN] = {
0x3A, 0x91, 0x1C, 0x25, 0x54, 0x73, 0xE8, 0x3E,
0x9A, 0x0C, 0xC3, 0x33, 0xAE, 0x1F, 0x8A, 0x35,
0xCD, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x63, 0xE7, 0xF6, 0x0F, 0x6C,
0x65, 0xEF, 0x71, 0xC2, 0x64, 0x42, 0xAA, 0xAC,
0xA2, 0xB6, 0xF1, 0xEB, 0x4F, 0x25, 0xEC, 0xA3,
};
int ret = -1;

ret = test_cmk(ipmk);
if (ret != 0) {
return -1;
}

ret = test_mppe(ipmk);
if (ret != 0) {
return -1;
}

return 0;
}

#endif