commit 4571b5f4243c93d897873bf58b1f9a5c8d724f88
Author: Paul Jakma <
[email protected]>
Date: Mon Oct 17 11:57:21 2016 +0100
release: Bump version to 1.0.20161017
commit ba3859c5121608437116bcc24d475bff95224aff
Author: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Date: Tue Jun 14 20:07:06 2016 +0200
isisd: Fix size of malloc
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Acked-by: Donald Sharp <
[email protected]>
commit f7144b2d404476e294a61bfa5a364ab0581939f7
Author: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Date: Tue Jun 14 20:07:05 2016 +0200
isisd: fix an error that was probably a result of copypasting
The code should check for the existance of the correct list prior to
accessing it.
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Acked-by: Donald Sharp <
[email protected]>
commit 21dd85d4db7ea4e9e716f0f662c35f0f5b745dc6
Author: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Date: Tue Jun 14 20:07:04 2016 +0200
ospf6d: fix off-by-one on display of spf reasons
The loop should only iterate to array_size - 1.
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Acked-by: Donald Sharp <
[email protected]>
commit 85e822164aeaffb9b102628c10996d776f97be80
Author: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Date: Tue Jun 14 20:07:03 2016 +0200
ospf6d: don't access nexthops out of bounds
Given that the && is evaluated lazily from left to right,
i < OSPF6_MULTI_PATH_LIMIT should be checked prior to calling
ospf6_nexthop_is_set on the array element, not the other way around.
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Acked-by: Donald Sharp <
[email protected]>
commit 7df96b19b976c99966f7f9669e09c2a240278b88
Author: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Date: Tue Jun 14 20:07:00 2016 +0200
bgpd: fix off-by-one in attribute flags handling
bgp_attr_flag_invalid can access beyond the last element of attr_flags_values.
Fix this by initializing attr_flags_values_max to the correct value.
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <
[email protected]>
Acked-by: Donald Sharp <
[email protected]>
commit 23ed2c2fb49b8a15ad125b16278e535719d64e7d
Author: David Lamparter <
[email protected]>
Date: Wed Aug 31 13:31:16 2016 +0200
zebra: stack overrun in IPv6 RA receive code (CVE-2016-1245)
The IPv6 RA code also receives ICMPv6 RS and RA messages.
Unfortunately, by bad coding practice, the buffer size specified on
receiving such messages mixed up 2 constants that in fact have
different values.
The code itself has:
#define RTADV_MSG_SIZE 4096
While BUFSIZ is system-dependent, in my case (x86_64 glibc):
/usr/include/_G_config.h:#define _G_BUFSIZ 8192
/usr/include/libio.h:#define _IO_BUFSIZ _G_BUFSIZ
/usr/include/stdio.h:# define BUFSIZ _IO_BUFSIZ
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD and Illumos are not affected, since all of them
have BUFSIZ == 1024.
As the latter is passed to the kernel on recvmsg(), it's possible to
overwrite 4kB of stack -- with ICMPv6 packets that can be globally sent
to any of the system's addresses (using fragmentation to get to 8k).
(The socket has filters installed limiting this to RS and RA packets,
but does not have a filter for source address or TTL.)
Issue discovered by trying to test other stuff, which randomly caused
the stack to be smaller than 8kB in that code location, which then
causes the kernel to report EFAULT (Bad address).
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <
[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Donald Sharp <
[email protected]>
commit 7da28be5bafb31af75f796abb04aa1d09276d66d
Author: Evgeny Uskov <
[email protected]>
Date: Wed Jan 13 13:58:00 2016 +0300
bgpd: Fix buffer overflow error in bgp_dump_routes_func
Now if the number of entries for some prefix is too large, multiple
TABLE_DUMP_V2 records are created. In the previous version in such
situation bgpd crashed with SIGABRT.
