Paul Ford-Hutchinson

Paul Ford-Hutchinson
<draft-murray-auth-ftp-ssl-08.txt> IBM UK Ltd
Martin Carpenter
Verisign Inc
Tim Hudson
INTERNET-DRAFT (draft) RSA Australia Ltd
Eric Murray
Wave Systems Inc
Volker Wiegand
SuSE Linux

3rd October, 2001
This document expires on 3rd April, 2002

Securing FTP with TLS

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.txt

The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

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Index
1. .......... Abstract
2. .......... Introduction
3. .......... Audience
4. .......... Session negotiation on the control port
5. .......... Response to FEAT command
6. .......... Data Connection Behaviour
7. .......... Mechanisms for the AUTH Command
8. .......... SASL Considerations
9. .......... Data Connection Security
10. ......... A discussion of negotiation behaviour
11. ......... Who negotiates what, where and how
12. ......... Timing Diagrams
13. ......... Discussion of the REIN command
14. ......... Security Considerations
15. ......... IANA Considerations
16. ......... Network Management
17. ......... Internationalization
18. ......... Scalability & Limits
19. ......... Applicability
20. ......... Acknowledgements
21. ......... References
22. ......... Authors' Contact Addresses

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1. Abstract

This document describes a mechanism that can be used by FTP clients
and servers to implement security and authentication using the TLS
protocol defined by [RFC-2246] and the extensions to the FTP protocol
defined by [RFC-2228]. It describes the subset of the extensions
that are required and the parameters to be used; discusses some of
the policy issues that clients and servers will need to take;
considers some of the implications of those policies and discusses
some expected behaviours of implementations to allow interoperation.
This document is intended to provide TLS support for FTP in a similar
way to that provided for SMTP in [RFC-2487] and HTTP in [RFC-2817].

TLS is not the only mechanism for securing file transfer, however it
does offer some of the following positive attributes:-

- Flexible security levels. TLS can support confidentiality,
integrity, authentication or some combination of all of these.
This allows clients and servers to dynamically, during a session,
decide on the level of security required for a particular data
transfer,

- It is possible to use X.509 certificates to authenticate client
users and not just client hosts.

- Formalised public key management. By use of X.509 public
certificates during the authentication phase, certificate
management can be built into a central function. Whilst this may
not be desirable for all uses of secured file transfer, it offers
advantages in certain structured environments.

- Co-existence and interoperation with authentication mechanisms
that are already in place for the HTTPS protocol. This allows web
browsers to incorporate secure file transfer using the same
infrastructure that has been set up to allow secure web browsing.

The TLS protocol is a development of the Netscape Communication
Corporation's SSL protocol and this document can be used to allow the
FTP protocol to be used with either SSL or TLS. The actual protocol
used will be decided by the negotiation of the protected session by
the TLS/SSL layer. This document will only refer to the TLS
protocol, however, it is understood that the Client and Server MAY
actually be using SSL if they are so configured.

Note that this specification is in accordance with the FTP RFC
[RFC-959] and relies on the TLS protocol [RFC-2246] and the FTP
security extensions [RFC-2228].

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2. Introduction

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and
"OPTIONAL" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as
described in [RFC-2119].

This document is an attempt to describe how three other documents
should combined to provide a useful, interoperable, secure file
transfer protocol. Those documents are:-

RFC 959 [RFC-959]

The description of the Internet File Transfer Protocol

RFC 2246 [RFC-2246]

The description of the Transport Layer Security protocol
(developed from the Netscape Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
protocol version 3.0).

RFC 2228 [RFC-2228]

Extensions to the FTP protocol to allow negotiation of security
mechanisms to allow authentication, confidentiality and message
integrity.

The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) currently defined in [RFC-959] and
in place on the Internet is an excellent mechanism for exchanging
files. The security extensions to FTP in [RFC-2228] offer a
comprehensive set of commands and responses that can be used to add
authentication, integrity and confidentiality to the FTP protocol.
The TLS protocol is a popular (due to its wholesale adoption in the
HTTP environment) mechanism for generally securing a socket
connection.
There are many ways in which these three protocols can be combined
which would ensure that interoperation is impossible. This document
describes one method by which FTP can operate securely in such a way
as to provide both flexibility and interoperation. This necessitates
a brief description of the actual negotiation mechanism ; a much more
detailed description of the policies and practices that would be
required and a discussion of the expected behaviours of clients and
servers to allow either party to impose their security requirements
on the FTP session.

3. Audience

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This document is aimed at developers who wish to implement TLS as a
security mechanism to secure FTP clients and/or servers.

4. Session negotiation on the control port

The server listens on the normal FTP control port {FTP-PORT} and the
session initiation is not secured at all. Once the client wishes to
secure the session, the AUTH command is sent and the server MAY then
allow TLS negotiation to take place.

4.1 Client wants a secured session

If a client wishes to attempt to secure a session then it SHOULD,
in accordance with [RFC-2228] send the AUTH command with the
parameter requesting TLS {TLS-PARM}.

The client then needs to behave according to its policies depending
on the response received from the server and also the result of the
TLS negotiation. i.e. A client which receives an AUTH rejection
MAY choose to continue with the session unprotected if it so
desires.

4.2 Server wants a secured session

The FTP protocol does not allow a server to directly dictate client
behaviour, however the same effect can be achieved by refusing to
accept certain FTP commands until the session is secured to an
acceptable level to the server.

The server response to an 'AUTH TLS' command which it will honour, is
'234'.

Note. The '334' response as defined in [RFC-2228] implies that an
ADAT exchange will folow. This document does not use the ADAT
command and so the '334' reply is incorrect.

Note. The FTP protocol insists that a USER command be used to
identify the entity attempting to use the ftp server. Although the
TLS negotiation may be providing authentication information (in the
form of a client's X.509 certificate), the USER command must still be
isssued by the client. However, it will be a server implementation
issue to decide which credentials to accept and what consistency
checks to make between any client cert used and the parameter on the
USER command.

5. Response to the FEAT command

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The FEAT command (introduced in [RFC-2389]) allows servers with
additional features to advertise these to a client by responding to
the FEAT command. If a server supports the FEAT command then it MUST
advertise supported AUTH, PBSZ and PROT commands in the reply as
described in section 3.2 of [RFC-2389]. Additionally, the AUTH
command should have a reply that identifies 'TLS' as one of the
possible parameters to AUTH. It is not necessary to identify the
'TLS-C' synonym separately.

Example reply (in same style is [RFC-2389])
C> FEAT
S> 211-Extensions supported
S> AUTH TLS
S> PBSZ
S> PROT
S> 211 END

6. Data Connection Behaviour

The Data Connection in the FTP model can be used in one of three
ways. (Note: these descriptions are not necessarily placed in exact
chronological order, but do describe the steps required. - See
diagrams later for clarification)

i) Classic FTP client/server data exchange

- The client obtains a port; sends the port number to the
server; the server connects to the client. The client issues a
send or receive request to the server on the control connection
and the data transfer commences on the data connection.

ii) Firewall-Friendly client/server data exchange (as discussed
in [RFC-1579]) using the PASV command to reverse the direction
of the data connection.

- The client requests that the server open a port; the server
obtains a port and returns the address and port number to the
client; the client connects to the server on this port. The
client issues a send or receive request on the control
connection and the data transfer commences on the data
connection.

iii) Client initiated server/server data exchange (proxy or
PASV connections)

- The client requests that server A opens a port; server A
obtains a port and returns it to the client; the client sends

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this port number to server B. Server B connects to server A.
The client sends a send or receive request to server A and the
complement to server B and the data transfer commences. In
this model server A is the proxy or PASV host and is a client
for the Data Connection to server B.

For i) and ii) the FTP client MUST be the TLS client and the FTP
server MUST be the TLS server.

That is to say, it does not matter which side initiates the
connection with a connect() call or which side reacts to the
connection via the accept() call; the FTP client as defined in
[RFC-959] is always the TLS client as defined in [RFC-2246].

In scenario iii) there is a problem in that neither server A nor
server B is the TLS client given the fact that an FTP server must act
as a TLS server for Firewall-Friendly FTP [RFC-1579]. Thus this is
explicitly excluded in the security extensions document [RFC-2228],
and in this document.

7. Mechanisms for the AUTH Command

The AUTH command takes a single parameter to define the security
mechanism to be negotiated. As the SSL/TLS protocols self-negotiate
their levels there is no need to distinguish SSL vs TLS in the
application layer. The proposed mechanism name for negotiating TLS
will be the character string identified in {TLS-PARM}. This will
allow the client and server to negotiate TLS on the control
connection without altering the protection of the data channel. To
protect the data channel as well, the PBSZ:PROT command sequence MUST
be used.

Note: The data connection state MAY be modified by the client issuing
the PROT command with the new desired level of data channel
protection and the server replying in the affirmative. This data
channel protection negotiation can happen at any point in the session
(even straight after a PORT or PASV command) and as often as is
required.

See also Section 16, "IANA Considerations".

8. SASL Considerations

SASL is the Simple Authentication Security Layer. Currently, its
definition can be found in [RFC-2222]. This document attempts to

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define the means by which a connection-based protocol may identify
and authenticate a client user to a server, with additional optional
negotiation of protection for the remainder of that session.

Unfortunately, the SASL paradigm does not fit in neatly with the FTP-
TLS protocol, mainly due to the fact that FTP uses two (independent)
connections, and under FTP-TLS these may be at different (and
possibly renegotiable) protection levels. Consequently, it is
envisaged that SASL will sit underneath TLS on the control
connection, and TLS (on both, either or neither connection) will be
used for confidentiality and integrity (with optional authentication
from TLS on either connection).

9. Data Connection Security

The Data Connection security level is determined by the PROT command

The PROT command, as specified in [RFC-2228] allows client/server
negotiation of the security level of the data connection. Once a
PROT command has been issued by the client and accepted by the
server returning the '200' reply, the security of subsequent data
connections MUST be at that level until another PROT command is
issued and accepted; the session ends; a REIN command is issued;
or the security of the session (via an AUTH command) is re-
negotiated.

Data Connection Security Negotiation (the PROT command)

Note: In line with [RFC-2228], there is no facility for securing
the Data connection with an insecure Control connection.
Specifically, the PROT command MUST be preceded by a PBSZ command
and a PBSZ command MUST be preceded by a successful security data
exchange (the TLS negotiation in this case)

The command defined in [RFC-2228] to negotiate data connection
security is the PROT command. As defined there are four values
that the PROT command parameter can take.

'C' - Clear - neither Integrity nor Privacy

'S' - Safe - Integrity without Privacy

'E' - Confidential - Privacy without Integrity

'P' - Private - Integrity and Privacy

As TLS negotiation encompasses (and exceeds) the Safe /

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Confidential / Private distinction, only Private (use TLS) and
Clear (don't use TLS) are used.

For TLS, the data connection can have one of two security levels.

1)Clear (requested by 'PROT C')

2)Private (requested by 'PROT P')

With 'Clear' protection level, the data connection is made without
TLS at all. Thus the connection is unauthenticated and has no
confidentiality or integrity. This might be the desired behaviour
for servers sending file lists, pre-encrypted data or non-
sensitive data (e.g. for anonymous FTP servers).

If the data connection security level is 'Private' then a TLS
negotiation must take place on the data connection, to the
satisfaction of the Client and Server prior to any data being
transmitted over the connection. The TLS layers of the Client and
Server will be responsible for negotiating the exact TLS Cipher
Suites that will be used (and thus the eventual security of the
connection).

In addition, the PBSZ (protection buffer size) command, as
detailed in [RFC-2228], is compulsory prior to any PROT command.
This document also defines a data channel encapsulation mechanism
for protected data buffers. For FTP-TLS, which appears to the FTP
application as a streaming protection mechanism, this is not
required. Thus the PBSZ command must still be issued, but must
have a parameter of '0' to indicate that no buffering is taking
place and the data connection should not be encapsulated.
Note that PBSZ 0 is not in the grammar of [RFC-2228], section
8.1, where it is stated:
PBSZ <sp> <decimal-integer> <CRLF> <decimal-integer> ::= any
decimal integer from 1 to (2^32)-1
However it should be noted that using a value of '0' to mean a
streaming protocol is a reasonable use of '0' for that parameter
and is not ambiguous.

Initial Data Connection Security

The initial state of the data connection MUST be 'Clear' (this is
the behaviour as indicated by [RFC-2228].)

10. A Discussion of Negotiation Behaviour

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10.1. The server's view of the control connection

A server MAY have a policy statement somewhere that might:

- Deny any command before TLS is negotiated (this might cause
problems if a SITE or some such command is required prior to
login)
- Deny certain commands before TLS is negotiated (such as USER,
PASS or ACCT)
- Deny insecure USER commands for certain users (e.g. not
ftp/anonymous)
- Deny secure USER commands for certain users (e.g.
ftp/anonymous)
- Define the level(s) of TLS to be allowed
- Define the CipherSuites allowed to be used (perhaps on a per
host/domain/... basis)
- Allow TLS authentication as a substitute for local
authentication.
- Define data connection policies (see next section)

It is possible that the TLS negotiation may not be completed
satisfactorily for the server, in which case it can be one of
these states.

The TLS negotiation failed completely

In this case, the control connection should still be up in
unprotected mode and the server SHOULD issue an unprotected
'421' reply to end the session.

The TLS negotiation completed successfully, but the server
decides that the session parameters are not acceptable (e.g.
Distinguished Name in the client certificate is not
permitted to use the server)

In this case, the control connection should still be up in a
protected state, so the server MAY either continue to refuse to
service commands or issue a protected '421' reply and close the
connection.

The TLS negotiation failed during the TLS handshake

In this case, the control connection is in an unknown state and
the server SHOULD simply drop the control connection.

Server code will be responsible for implementing the required
policies and ensuring that the client is prevented from
circumventing the chosen security by refusing to service those

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commands that are against policy.

10.2. The server's view of the data connection

The server can take one of four basic views of the data connection

1 - Don't allow encryption at all (in which case the PROT
command should not allow any value other than 'C' - if it is
allowed at all)
2 - Allow the client to choose protection or not
3 - Insist on data protection (in which case the PROT command
must be issued prior to the first attempted data transfer)
4 - Decide on one of the above three for each and every data
connection

The server SHOULD only check the status of the data protection
level (for options 3 and 4 above) on the actual command that will
initiate the data transfer (and not on the PORT or PASV). The
following commands, defined in [RFC-959] cause data connections to
be opened and thus may be rejected (before any 1xx) message due to
an incorrect PROT setting.

STOR
RETR
NLST
LIST
STOU
APPE

The reply to indicate that the PROT setting is incorrect is
'521 data connection cannot be opened with this PROT setting'
If the protection level indicates that TLS is required, then it
should be negotiated once the data connection is made. Thus, the
'150' reply only states that the command can be used given the
current PROT level. Should the server not like the TLS
negotiation then it will close the data port immediately and
follow the '150' command with a '522' reply indicating that the
TLS negotiation failed or was unacceptable. (Note: this means
that the application can pass a standard list of CipherSuites to
the TLS layer for negotiation and review the one negotiated for
applicability in each instance).

It is quite reasonable for the server to insist that the data
connection uses a TLS cached session. This might be a cache of a
previous data connection or of the control connection. If this is
the reason for the the refusal to allow the data transfer then the

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'522' reply should indicate this.
Note: this has an important impact on client design, but allows
servers to minimise the cycles used during TLS negotiation by
refusing to perform a full negotiation with a previously
authenticated client.

It should be noted that the TLS authentication of the server will
be authentication of the server host itself and not a user on the
server host.

10.3. The client's view of the control connection

In most cases it is likely that the client will be using TLS
because the server would refuse to interact insecurely. To allow
for this, clients SHOULD be able to be flexible enough to manage
the securing of a session at the appropriate time and still allow
the user/server policies to dictate exactly when in the session
the security is negotiated.

In the case where it is the client that is insisting on the
securing of the session, it will need to ensure that the
negotiations are all completed satisfactorily and will need to be
able to inform the user sensibly should the server not support, or
be prepared to use, the required security levels.

Clients SHOULD be coded in such a manner as to allow the timing of
the AUTH, PBSZ and PROT commands to be flexible and dictated by
the server. It is quite reasonable for a server to refuse certain
commands prior to these commands, similarly it is quite possible
that a SITE or quoted command might be needed by a server prior to
the AUTH. A client MUST allow a user to override the timing of
these commands to suit a specific server.
For example, a client SHOULD NOT insist on sending the AUTH as the
first command in a session, nor should it insist on issuing a
PBSZ, PROT pair directly after the AUTH. This may well be the
default behaviour, but must be overridable by a user.

Note: The TLS negotiation may not be completed satisfactorily for
the client, in which case it will be in one of these states:

The TLS negotiation failed completely

In this case, the control connection should still be up in
unprotected mode and the client should issue an unprotected
QUIT command to end the session.

The TLS negotiation completed successfully, but the client
decides that the session parameters are not acceptable (e.g.

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Distinguished Name in certificate is not the actual server
expected)

In this case, the control connection should still be up in a
protected state, so the client should issue a protected QUIT
command to end the session.

The TLS negotiation failed during the TLS handshake

In this case, the control connection is in an unknown state
and the client should simply drop the control connection.

10.4. The client's view of the data connection

Client security policies

Clients do not typically have 'policies' as such, instead they
rely on the user defining their actions and, to a certain extent,
are reactive to the server policy. Thus a client will need to
have commands that will allow the user to switch the protection
level of the data connection dynamically, however, there may be a
general 'policy' that attempts all LIST and NLST commands on a
Clear connection first (and automatically switches to Private if
it fails). In this case there would need to be a user command
available to ensure that a given data transfer was not attempted
on an insecure data connection.

Clients also need to understand that the level of the PROT setting
is only checked for a particular data transfer after that transfer
has been requested. Thus a refusal by the server to accept a
particular data transfer should not be read by the client as a
refusal to accept that data protection level in toto, as not only
may other data transfers be acceptable at that protection level,
but it is entirely possible that the same transfer may be accepted
at the same protection level at a later point in the session.

It should be noted that the TLS authentication of the client
should be authentication of a user on the client host and not the
client host itself.

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11. Who negotiates what, where and how

11.1. Do we protect at all ?

Client issues 'AUTH TLS', server accepts or rejects.
If server needs AUTH, then it refuses to accept certain commands
until it gets a successfully protected session.

11.2. What level of protection do we use on the Control connection ?

Decided entirely by the TLS CipherSuite negotiation.

11.3. Do we protect data connections in general ?

Client issues PROT command, server accepts or rejects.

11.4. Is protection required for a particular data transfer ?

A client would already have issued a PROT command if it required
the connection to be protected.
If a server needs to have the connection protected then it will
reply to the STOR/RETR/NLST/... command with a '522' indicating
that the current state of the data connection protection level is
not sufficient for that data transfer at that time.

11.5. What level of protection is required for a particular data
transfer ?

Decided entirely by the TLS CipherSuite negotiation.

Thus it can be seen that, for flexibility, it is desirable for the
FTP application to be able to interact with the TLS layer upon which
it sits to define and discover the exact TLS CipherSuites that are to
be/have been negotiated and make decisions accordingly.

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12. Timing Diagrams

12.1. Establishing a protected session

Client Server
control data data control
====================================================================

socket()
bind()
socket()
connect() ----------------------------------------------> accept()
<---------------------------------------------- 220
AUTH TLS ---------------------------------------------->
<---------------------------------------------- 234
TLSneg() <----------------------------------------------> TLSneg()
PBSZ 0 ---------------------------------------------->
<---------------------------------------------- 200
PROT P ---------------------------------------------->
<---------------------------------------------- 200
USER fred ---------------------------------------------->
<---------------------------------------------- 331
PASS pass ---------------------------------------------->
<---------------------------------------------- 230

Note 1: the order of the PBSZ/PROT pair and the USER/PASS pair (with
respect to each other) is not important (i.e. the USER/PASS can happen
prior to the PBSZ/PROT - or indeed the server can refuse to allow a
PBSZ/PROT pair until the USER/PASS pair has happened).

Note 2: the PASS command might not be required at all (if the USER
parameter and any X.509 client certificate presented provide sufficient
authentication). The server would indicate this by issuing a '232'
reply to the USER command instead of the '331' which requests a PASS
from the client.

Note 3: the AUTH command might not be the first command after the
receipt of the 220 welcome message.

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12.2. A standard data transfer without protection.

Client Server
control data data control
====================================================================

socket()
bind()
PORT w,x,y,z,a,b ----------------------------------------->
<----------------------------------------------------- 200
STOR file ------------------------------------------------>
socket()
bind()
<----------------------------------------------------- 150
accept() <----------- connect()
write() -----------> read()
close() -----------> close()
<----------------------------------------------------- 226

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12.3. A firewall-friendly data transfer without protection

Client Server
control data data control
====================================================================

PASV -------------------------------------------------------->
socket()
bind()
<------------------------------------------ 227 (w,x,y,z,a,b)
socket()
STOR file --------------------------------------------------->
connect() ----------> accept()
<-------------------------------------------------------- 150
write() ----------> read()
close() ----------> close()
<-------------------------------------------------------- 226

Note: Implementors should be aware that then connect()/accept()
function is performed prior to the receipt of the reply from the
STOR command. This contrasts with situation when (non-firewall-
friendly) PORT is used prior to the STOR, and the accept()/connect()
is performed after the reply from the aforementioned STOR has been
dealt with.

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12.4. A standard data transfer with protection

Client Server
control data data control
====================================================================

socket()
bind()
PORT w,x,y,z,a,b -------------------------------------------->
<-------------------------------------------------------- 200
STOR file --------------------------------------------------->
socket()
bind()
<-------------------------------------------------------- 150
accept() <---------- connect()
TLSneg() <----------> TLSneg()
TLSwrite() ----------> TLSread()
close() ----------> close()
<-------------------------------------------------------- 226

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12.5. A firewall-friendly data transfer with protection

Client Server
control data data control
====================================================================

PASV -------------------------------------------------------->
socket()
bind()
<------------------------------------------ 227 (w,x,y,z,a,b)
socket()
STOR file --------------------------------------------------->
connect() ----------> accept()
<-------------------------------------------------------- 150
TLSneg() <---------> TLSneg()
TLSwrite() ---------> TLSread()
close() ---------> close()
<-------------------------------------------------------- 226

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13. Discussion of the REIN command

The REIN command, defined in [RFC-959], allows the user to reset the
state of the FTP session. From [RFC-959]:
REINITIALIZE (REIN)
This command terminates a USER, flushing all I/O and account
information, except to allow any transfer in progress to be
completed. All parameters are reset to the default settings
and the control connection is left open. This is identical to
the state in which a user finds himself immediately after the
control connection is opened. A USER command may be expected
to follow.
When this command is processed by the server, the TLS session(s)
MUST be cleared and the control and data connections revert to
unprotected, clear communications. It MAY be acceptable to use
cached TLS sessions for subsequent connections, however a server MUST
not mandate this.

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14. Security Considerations

This entire document deals with security considerations related to
the File Transfer Protocol.

14.1. Verification of Authentication tokens

14.1.1. Server Certificates

Although it is entirely an implementation decision, it is
recommended that certificates used for server authentication of
the TLS session contain the server identification information
in a similar manner to those used for http servers. (see
[RFC-2818])

Similarly, it is recommended that the certificate used for
server authentication of Data connections is the same
certificate as that used for the corresponding Control
connection.

14.1.2. Client Certificates

- Deciding which client certificates to allow and defining
which fields define what authentication information is entirely
a server implementation issue.

- It is also server implementation issue to decide if the
authentication token presented for the data connection must
match the one used for the corresponding control connection.

14.2. Addressing FTP Security Considerations [RFC-2577]

14.2.1. Bounce Attack

A bounce attack should be harder in a secured FTP environment
because:

- The FTP server that is being used to initiate a false
connection will always be a 'server' in the TLS context.
Therefore, only services that act as 'clients' in the TLS
context could be vulnerable. This would be a counter-
intuitive way to implement TLS on a service.

- The FTP server would detect that the authentication
credentials for the data connection are not the same as
those for the control connection, thus the server policies
COULD be set to drop the data connection.

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- Genuine users are less likely to initiate such attacks
when the authentication is strong and malicious users are
less likely to gain access to the FTP server if the
authentication is not easily subverted (password guessing,
network tracing, etc...)

14.2.2. Restricting Access

This document presents a strong mechanism for solving the issue
raised in this section.

14.2.3. Protecting Passwords

The twin solutions of strong authentication and data
confidentiality ensure that this is not an issue when TLS is
used to protect the control session.

14.2.4. Privacy

The TLS protocol ensures data confidentiality by encryption.
Privacy (e.g. access to download logs, user profile
information, etc...) is outside the scope of this document (and
[RFC-2577] presumably)

14.2.5. Protecting Usernames

This is not an issue when TLS is used as the primary
authentication mechanism.

14.2.6. Port Stealing

This proposal will do little for the Denial of Service element
of this section, however, strong authentication on the data
connection will prevent unauthorised connections retrieving or
submitting files.

14.2.7. Software-Base Security Problems

Nothing in this proposal will affect the discussion in this
section.

15. IANA Considerations

{FTP-PORT} - The port assigned to the FTP control connection is 21.

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{TLS-PARM} - The parameter for the AUTH command to indicate that TLS
is required. To request the TLS protocol in accordance with this
document, the client MUST use 'TLS'

To maintain backward compatability with older versions of this
document, the server SHOULD accept 'TLS-C' as a synonym for 'TLS'

Note - [RFC-2228] states that these parameters are case-
insensitive.

16. Network Management

NONE

17. Internationalization

NONE

18. Scalability & Limits

There are no issues other than those concerned with the ability of
the server to refuse to have a complete TLS negotiation for each and
every data connection, which will allow servers to retain throughput
whilst using cycles only when necessary.

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19. Applicability

This mechanism is generally applicable as a mechanism for securing
the FTP protocol. It is unlikely that anonymous FTP clients or
servers will require such security (although some might like the
authentication features without the confidentiality).

20. Acknowledgements

o Netscape Communications Corporation for the original SSL protocol.

o Eric Young for the SSLeay libraries.

o University of California, Berkley for the original implementations
of FTP and ftpd on which the initial implementation of these
extensions were layered.

o IETF CAT working group.

o IETF TLS working group.

o IETF FTPEXT working group.

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21. References

[RFC-959] J. Postel, "File Transfer Protocol"
RFC 959, October 1985.

[RFC-1579] S. Bellovin, "Firewall-Friendly FTP"
RFC 1579, February 1994.

[RFC-2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels"
RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC-2222] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer"
RFC 2222, October 1997.

[RFC-2228] M. Horowitz, S. Lunt, "FTP Security Extensions"
RFC 2228, October 1997.

[RFC-2246] T. Dierks, C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"
RFC 2246, January 1999.

[RFC-2389] P Hethmon, R.Elz, "Feature Negotiation Mechanism for the
File Transfer Protocol"
RFC 2389, August 1998.

[RFC-2487] P Hoffman, "SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over
TLS"
RFC 2487, January 1999.

[RFC-2577] M Allman, S Ostermann, "FTP Security Considerations"
RFC 2577, May 1999.

[RFC-2817] R. Khare, S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1"
RFC 2817, May 2000.

[RFC-2818] E. Rescorla, "HTTP Over TLS"
RFC 2818, May 2000.

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22. Authors' Contact Addresses

The FTP-TLS draft information site is at http://www.ford-
hutchinson.com/~fh-1-pfh/ftps-ext.html

Please send comments to Paul Ford-Hutchinson at the address below

Tim Hudson Paul Ford-Hutchinson
RSA Data Security IBM UK Ltd
Australia Pty Ltd PO Box 31
Birmingham Road
Warwick
United Kingdom
tel - +61 7 3227 4444 +44 1926 462005
fax - +61 7 3227 4400 +44 1926 496482
email - [email protected] [email protected]

Martin Carpenter Eric Murray
Verisign Ltd Wave Systems Inc.
email - [email protected] [email protected]

Volker Wiegand
SuSE Linux
email - [email protected]

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