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From: CERT Advisory <[email protected]>
Newsgroups: comp.lang.perl.announce,comp.lang.perl.misc
Subject: CERT Advisory CA-96.12 - Vulnerability in suidperl
Followup-To: comp.lang.perl.misc
Date: 26 Jun 1996 16:02:37 GMT
Organization: CERT Coordination Center
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=============================================================================
CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.12
June 26, 1996

Topic: Vulnerability in suidperl

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of a vulnerability in
systems that contain the suidperl program and that support saved
set-user-ID and saved set-group-ID. By exploiting this vulnerability,
anyone with access to an account on such a system may gain root access.

Saved set-user-IDs and set-group-IDs are sometimes referred to as POSIX
saved IDs. suidperl is also known as sperl followed by a version number,
as in sperl5.002.

Perl versions 4 and 5 can be compiled and installed in such a way that
they will be vulnerable on some systems. If you have installed the
suidperl or sperl programs on a system that supports saved set-user-ID and
set-group-ID, you may be at risk.

The CERT Coordination Center recommends that you first disable the
suidperl and sperl programs (Section III.A). If you need the
functionality, we further recommend that you either apply a patch for
this problem or install Perl version 5.003 (Section III.B). If neither
a patch nor a new version are viable alternatives, we recommend
installing the wrapper written by Larry Wall as a workaround for this
problem (Section III.C).

As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will
place it in

       ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.12.README

We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on
advisories that relate to your site.

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I.   Description

    On some systems, setuid and setgid scripts (scripts written in the
    C shell, Bourne shell, or Perl, for example, with the set user or
    group ID permissions enabled) are insecure due to a race condition in
    the kernel. For those systems, Perl versions 4 and 5 attempt to work
    around this vulnerability with a special program named suidperl, also
    known as sperl. Even on systems that do provide a secure mechanism for
    setuid and setgid scripts, suidperl may also be installed--although it
    is not needed.

    suidperl attempts to emulate the set-user-ID and set-group-ID
    features of the kernel. Depending on whether the script is
    set-user-ID, set-group-ID, or both, suidperl achieves this emulation
    by first changing its effective user or group ID to that of the
    original Perl script. suidperl then reads and executes the script as
    that effective user or group. To do these user and group ID changes
    correctly, suidperl must be installed as set-user-ID root.

    On systems that support saved set-user-ID and set-group-ID, suidperl
    does not properly relinquish its root privileges when changing its
    effective user and group IDs.

II.  Impact

    On a system that has the suidperl or sperl program installed and
    that supports saved set-user-ID and saved set-group-ID, anyone with
    access to an account on the system can gain root access.

III. Solution

    The command in Section A helps you determine if your system is
    vulnerable and, if it is, optionally disables the suidperl and
    sperl programs that it locates. After you have run this command
    on all of your systems, your system will no longer be vulnerable.

    If you find that your system is vulnerable, then you need to replace
    the suidperl and sperl programs with new versions. Section B describes
    how to do that.

    Finally, Section C identifies a wrapper that can be used in place of
    the suidperl program.

    A. How to determine if your system is vulnerable

       To determine if a system is vulnerable to this problem and to
       disable the programs that are believed to be vulnerable, use the
       following find command or a variant. Consult your local system
       documentation to determine how to tailor the find program on your
       system.

       You will need to run the find command on each system you maintain
       because the command examines files on the local disk only. Substitute
       the names of your local file systems for FILE_SYSTEM_NAMES in the
       example. Example local file system names are /, /usr, and /var.
       You must do this as root.

       Note that this is one long command, though we have separated
       it onto three lines using back-slashes.

            find FILE_SYSTEM_NAMES -xdev -type f -user root \
                   \( -name 'sperl[0-9].[0-9][0-9][0-9]' -o -name \
                   'suidperl' \) -perm -04000 -print -ok chmod ug-s '{}' \;

       This command will find all files on a system that are
           - only in the file system you name (FILE_SYSTEM_NAMES -xdev)
           - regular files (-type f)
           - owned by root (-user root)
           - named appropriately (-name 'sperl[0-9].[0-9][0-9][0-9]'
                                   -o -name 'suidperl')
           - setuid root (-perm -04000)

       Once found, those files will
           - have their names printed (-print)
           - have their modes changed, but only if you type `y'
             in response to the prompt (-ok chown ug-s '{}' \;)


    B. Obtain and install the appropriate patch according to the
       instructions included with the patch.

       Vendor patches
       --------------
       You may be vulnerable if your vendor supports saved set-user-ID
       and set-group-ID and ships suidperl or sperl. You need to get
       a patched version from your vendor. Appendix A contains
       information provided by vendors as of the date of this advisory.
       When we receive updated information, we will put it in CA-96.12.README.

       Until you can install a patch, we recommend disabling suidperl.
       The find command above will help you do that. If you need
       suidperl or sperl, an alternative is to install the wrapper
       described in Section C.

       Source code patches
       -------------------
       If you have installed Perl from source code, you should install
       source code patches. Patches are available from the CPAN
       (Comprehensive Perl Archive Network) archives.

       Patch for Perl Version 4:
           File                src/fixsuid4-0.pat
           MD5 Checksum        af3e3c40bbaafce134714f1381722496

       Patch for Perl Version 5:
           File                src/fixsuid5-0.pat
           MD5 Checksum        135c96ee400fd37a38a7ef37edd489e9

       In addition, Perl version 5.003 contains this patch, so installing
       it on your system also addresses this vulnerability. Perl 5.003 is
       available from the CPAN archives. Here are the specifics:

           File                src/5.0/perl5.003.tar.gz
           MD5 Checksum        b1bb23995cd25e5b750585bfede0e8a5

       The CPAN archives can be found at the following locations:

       CPAN master site
         ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/languages/perl/CPAN/
       Africa
         ftp://ftp.is.co.za/programming/perl/CPAN/
       Asia
         ftp://dongpo.math.ncu.edu.tw/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.lab.kdd.co.jp/lang/perl/CPAN/
       Australasia
         ftp://coombs.anu.edu.au/pub/perl/
         ftp://ftp.mame.mu.oz.au/pub/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.tekotago.ac.nz/pub/perl/CPAN/
       Europe
         ftp://ftp.arnes.si/software/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.ci.uminho.pt/pub/lang/perl/
         ftp://ftp.cs.ruu.nl/pub/PERL/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/mirrors/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/languages/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.ibp.fr/pub/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.leo.org/pub/comp/programming/languages/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.pasteur.fr/pub/computing/unix/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.rz.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/pub/programming/languages/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.sunet.se/pub/lang/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.switch.ch/mirror/CPAN/
         ftp://unix.hensa.ac.uk/mirrors/perl-CPAN/
       North America
         ftp://ftp.cis.ufl.edu/pub/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.delphi.com/pub/mirrors/packages/perl/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.sedl.org/pub/mirrors/CPAN/
         ftp://ftp.sterling.com/programming/languages/perl/
         ftp://ftp.uoknor.edu/mirrors/CPAN/
         ftp://uiarchive.cso.uiuc.edu/pub/lang/perl/CPAN/


       C. If you need setuid or setgid Perl scripts and are unable to apply
          the source code patches listed in Section B, we suggest that you
          retrieve Larry Wall's fixsperl script noted below. fixsperl is a
          script that replaces the suidperl and sperl programs with a wrapper
          that eliminates the vulnerability. The script is available from the
          CPAN archives as

           File                src/fixsperl-0
           MD5 Checksum        f13900d122a904a8453a0af4c1bdddc6

          Note that this script should be run one time, naming every suidperl
          or sperl file on your system. If you add another version of
          suidperl or sperl to your system, then you must run fixsperl
          on those newly installed versions.


- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Paul Traina, Larry Wall, Eric
Allman, Tom Christiansen, and AUSCERT for their support in the development
of this advisory.
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT
Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by
email. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP.
Contact the CERT staff for more information.

Location of CERT PGP key:

        ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key

CERT Contact Information
- ------------------------
Email    [email protected]

Phone    +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
               CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST
               (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for
               emergencies during other hours.

Fax      +1 412-268-6989

Postal address
       CERT Coordination Center
       Software Engineering Institute
       Carnegie Mellon University
       Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
       USA

CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other
security-related information are available for anonymous FTP from
       http://www.cert.org/
       ftp://info.cert.org/pub/

CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup
       comp.security.announce

To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your
email address to
       [email protected]


Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University
This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided
it is used for non-commercial purposes and the copyright statement is
included.

CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

........................................................................
Appendix A: Vendor Information

Current as of June 26, 1996
See CA-96.12.README for updated information.

Below is information we have received from vendors concerning the
vulnerability described in this advisory. If you do not see your vendor's
name, please contact the vendor directly for information.

Apple Computer, Inc.
====================
       A/UX 3.1.1 and earlier support saved set-{user,group}-ids.

       A/UX 3.1.1 and earlier do not have Perl as part of the standard
       product.

Data General Corporation
========================
       Data General does support saved set-user-IDs and set-group-IDs on
       DG/UX.

       Data General does not ship suidperl or sperl* with DG/UX.

Hewlett-Packard Company
=======================
       HP/UX versions 8.X, 9.X, and 10.X all support saved set-user-id.

       None of HP/UX versions 8.X, 9.X, and 10.X have Perl as part of the
       standard product.

IBM Corporation
===============
       AIX versions 3.2.5 and 4.X support saved set-user-id.

       AIX versions 3.2.5 and 4.X do not have Perl as part of the standard
       product. However, the SP2's PSSP software does contain suidperl, but
       the program is not installed with the setuid bit set.

Linux
=====
       Linux 1.2 and 2.0 support saved set-user-id.

       Most distributions of Linux provide suidperl and sperl.

       The fixsperl script works on linux, and it is recommended that this
       fix be applied until a new Perl release is made.


Open Software Foundation
========================
        OSF/1 1.3 or later support saved set-user-id

        OSF/1 1.3 or later does not have Perl as part of the standard
        product.

Sony Corporation
================
       NEWS-OS 4.X does not support saved set-user-id and therefore any
       version of Perl on that system is not vulnerable.

       NEWS-OS 6.X does support saved set-user-id.

X.org
=====
       None of X.org's development systems are vulnerable to the saved
       set-user-IDs and set-group-IDs problems, and suidperl is not shipped
       with either of our products.








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