untrusted comment: signature from openbsd 5.9 base secret key
RWQJVNompF3pwVAgfrp7vECCMZoD2Hl2l33QiUnMyrjP5f4jESBQeXxJt7B6zO9DEnn13/zWKkUIygjFmFXD3wAhC9jmhxSqvQY=

OpenBSD 5.9 errata 5, May 3, 2016:

Fix multiple vulnerabilities in libcrypto relating to ASN.1 and encoding.
From OpenSSL.

Apply by doing:
   signify -Vep /etc/signify/openbsd-59-base.pub -x 005_crypto.patch.sig \
           -m - | (cd /usr/src && patch -p0)

And then rebuild and install libcrypto:
       cd src/lib/libcrypto
       make obj
       make depend
       make
       make install


Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
===================================================================
RCS file: lib/libssl/src/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
diff -N lib/libssl/src/crypto/constant_time_locl.h
--- /dev/null   1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/constant_time_locl.h  30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/* crypto/constant_time_locl.h */
+/*-
+ * Utilities for constant-time cryptography.
+ *
+ * Author: Emilia Kasper ([email protected])
+ * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley
+ * (Google).
+ * ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young ([email protected])"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson ([email protected])"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+# define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*-
+ * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true
+ * and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result
+ * of a conditional in constant time. For example,
+ *
+ * if (a < b) {
+ *   c = a;
+ * } else {
+ *   c = b;
+ * }
+ *
+ * can be written as
+ *
+ * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b);
+ * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b);
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other
+ * bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit.
+ * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to
+ * replace this with something else on odd CPUs.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a,
+                                               unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a,
+                                               unsigned int b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a);
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a,
+                                               unsigned int b);
+/* Signed integers. */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b);
+/* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b);
+
+/*-
+ * Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b).
+ *
+ * When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above),
+ * the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b|
+ * (if |mask| is zero).
+ */
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+                                                unsigned int a,
+                                                unsigned int b);
+/* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+                                                   unsigned char a,
+                                                   unsigned char b);
+/* Convenience method for signed integers. */
+static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b);
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a)
+{
+    return 0 - (a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_msb(a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b)));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+    return ~constant_time_lt(a, b);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a)
+{
+    return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b)
+{
+    return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask,
+                                                unsigned int a,
+                                                unsigned int b)
+{
+    return (mask & a) | (~mask & b);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask,
+                                                   unsigned char a,
+                                                   unsigned char b)
+{
+    return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b));
+}
+
+static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b)
+{
+    return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)));
+}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif                          /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c,v
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -p -r1.11 a_d2i_fp.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c       13 Jul 2014 11:10:20 -0000      1.11
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c       30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FI
}

#define HEADER_SIZE   8
+#define ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE (16 * 1024)
static int
asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
{
@@ -167,18 +168,22 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
               if (want >= (len - off)) {
                       want -= (len - off);

-                       if (len + want < len || !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
-                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                       if (len + want < len ||
+                           !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
+                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                   ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                               goto err;
                       }
                       i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
                       if ((i < 0) && ((len - off) == 0)) {
-                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
+                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                   ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
                               goto err;
                       }
                       if (i > 0) {
                               if (len + i < len) {
-                                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                           ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
                                       goto err;
                               }
                               len += i;
@@ -206,7 +211,8 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                       /* no data body so go round again */
                       eos++;
                       if (eos < 0) {
-                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
+                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                   ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG);
                               goto err;
                       }
                       want = HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -221,28 +227,45 @@ asn1_d2i_read_bio(BIO *in, BUF_MEM **pb)
                       /* suck in c.slen bytes of data */
                       want = c.slen;
                       if (want > (len - off)) {
+                               size_t chunk_max = ASN1_CHUNK_INITIAL_SIZE;
+
                               want -= (len - off);
                               if (want > INT_MAX /* BIO_read takes an int length */ ||
                                   len+want < len) {
-                                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
+                                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                           ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
                                       goto err;
                               }
-                               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + want)) {
-                                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                               /*
+                                * Read content in chunks of increasing size
+                                * so we can return an error for EOF without
+                                * having to allocate the entire content length
+                                * in one go.
+                                */
+                               size_t chunk = want > chunk_max ? chunk_max : want;
+
+                               if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(b, len + chunk)) {
+                                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
+                                           ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                                       goto err;
                               }
-                               while (want > 0) {
-                                       i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), want);
+                               want -= chunk;
+                               while (chunk > 0) {
+                                       i = BIO_read(in, &(b->data[len]), chunk);
                                       if (i <= 0) {
                                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO,
                                                   ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA);
                                               goto err;
                                       }
-                                       /* This can't overflow because
-                                        * |len+want| didn't overflow. */
+                                       /*
+                                        * This can't overflow because |len+want|
+                                        * didn't overflow.
+                                        */
                                       len += i;
-                                       want -= i;
+                                       chunk -= i;
                               }
+                               if (chunk_max < INT_MAX/2)
+                                       chunk_max *= 2;
                       }
                       if (off + c.slen < off) {
                               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG);
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c,v
retrieving revision 1.16
diff -u -p -r1.16 a_type.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c 19 Mar 2015 14:00:22 -0000      1.16
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/a_type.c 30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -127,9 +127,7 @@ ASN1_TYPE_cmp(ASN1_TYPE *a, ASN1_TYPE *b
               break;

       case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-       case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
       case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-       case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
       case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
       case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING:
       case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE:
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c,v
retrieving revision 1.29
diff -u -p -r1.29 tasn_dec.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c       12 Dec 2015 21:05:11 -0000      1.29
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c       30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -861,9 +861,7 @@ asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const uns
               break;

       case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-       case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
       case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-       case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
               tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval;
               if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len))
                       goto err;
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c,v
retrieving revision 1.17
diff -u -p -r1.17 tasn_enc.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c       22 Dec 2015 08:44:44 -0000      1.17
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c       30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -603,9 +603,7 @@ asn1_ex_i2c(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned
               break;

       case V_ASN1_INTEGER:
-       case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER:
       case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED:
-       case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED:
               /* These are all have the same content format
                * as ASN1_INTEGER
                */
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c,v
retrieving revision 1.9
diff -u -p -r1.9 e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c     10 Sep 2015 15:56:25 -0000      1.9
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c     30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include "evp_locl.h"
+#include "constant_time_locl.h"

#ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER
#define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER      0x200000
@@ -281,6 +282,8 @@ aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CT
                       maxpad = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1);
                       maxpad |= (255 - maxpad) >> (sizeof(maxpad) * 8 - 8);
                       maxpad &= 255;
+
+                       ret &= constant_time_ge(maxpad, pad);

                       inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1);
                       mask = (0 - ((inp_len - len) >>
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c,v
retrieving revision 1.20
diff -u -p -r1.20 encode.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c  7 Feb 2015 13:19:15 -0000       1.20
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/encode.c  30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

+#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

@@ -124,13 +125,13 @@ EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, un
    const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
       int i, j;
-       unsigned int total = 0;
+       size_t total = 0;

       *outl = 0;
       if (inl == 0)
               return;
       OPENSSL_assert(ctx->length <= (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
-       if ((ctx->num + inl) < ctx->length) {
+       if (ctx->length - ctx->num > inl) {
               memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[ctx->num]), in, inl);
               ctx->num += inl;
               return;
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, un
               *out = '\0';
               total = j + 1;
       }
-       while (inl >= ctx->length) {
+       while (inl >= ctx->length && total <= INT_MAX) {
               j = EVP_EncodeBlock(out, in, ctx->length);
               in += ctx->length;
               inl -= ctx->length;
@@ -155,6 +156,11 @@ EVP_EncodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, un
               *(out++) = '\n';
               *out = '\0';
               total += j + 1;
+       }
+       if (total > INT_MAX) {
+               /* Too much output data! */
+               *outl = 0;
+               return;
       }
       if (inl != 0)
               memcpy(&(ctx->enc_data[0]), in, inl);
Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c,v
retrieving revision 1.27
diff -u -p -r1.27 evp_enc.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c 10 Sep 2015 15:56:25 -0000      1.27
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c 30 Apr 2016 16:16:32 -0000
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u
               return 0;
       }
       if (i != 0) {
-               if (i + inl < bl) {
+               if (bl - i > inl) {
                       memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl);
                       ctx->buf_len += inl;
                       *outl = 0;
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c,v
retrieving revision 1.57
diff -u -p -r1.57 s3_pkt.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c 12 Sep 2015 16:10:07 -0000      1.57
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c 30 Apr 2016 16:14:30 -0000
@@ -956,6 +956,7 @@ start:

               memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
               if (!peek) {
+                       memset(&(rr->data[rr->off]), 0, n);
                       rr->length -= n;
                       rr->off += n;
                       if (rr->length == 0) {