Apply by doing:
cd /usr/src
patch -p0 < 025_kpr.patch
*PLEASE NOTE* that this patch will not apply properly if patch #013
is not applied first.
And then rebuild and install OpenSSL:
rm -fr /usr/obj/lib/libssl
cd lib/libssl
make -f Makefile.bsd-wrapper obj
make -f Makefile.bsd-wrapper depend
make -f Makefile.bsd-wrapper
make -f Makefile.bsd-wrapper install
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c,v
retrieving revision 1.7.4.1
retrieving revision 1.7.4.2
diff -u -r1.7.4.1 -r1.7.4.2
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c 30 Jul 2002 15:47:52 -0000 1.7.4.1
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_srvr.c 19 Mar 2003 23:25:40 -0000 1.7.4.2
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -1329,7 +1328,7 @@
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
}
if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
@@ -1345,30 +1344,29 @@
(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (
http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
+ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
+ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
+ * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
+ p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-20";
}
}
if (al != -1)
{
-#if 0
- goto f_err;
-#else
/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
* against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
- * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
- */
+ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
ERR_clear_error();
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-#endif
}
s->session->master_key_length=
