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The Small Improvement Argument, Epistemicism, and Incomparability
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                          ABSTRACT

The Small Improvement Argument (SIA) is  the  leading  argument  for
value incomparability. All vagueness-based accounts of the SIA  have
hitherto   assumed   the    truth    of    supervaluationism,    but
supervaluationism has some well-known problems. This paper  explores
the implications of epistemicism, a leading rival theory.  We  argue
that if epistemicism is true, then options are comparable  in  small
improvement cases. Moreover, even if SIAs do not exploit  vagueness,
if epistemicism is true, then  options  cannot  be  on  a  par.  The
epistemicist account of  the  SIA  has  an  advantage  over  leading
existing rival accounts of the SIA because it accounts  for  higher-
order hard cases.