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lite.cnn.com - on gopher - inofficial | |
ARTICLE VIEW: | |
Kim has long sought recognition as a nuclear power. Xi may have just | |
given it to him | |
Analysis by Nectar Gan, Yoonjung Seo, CNN | |
Updated: | |
2:15 AM EDT, Wed September 10, 2025 | |
Source: CNN | |
Of the more than two dozen foreign leaders invited to Xi Jinping’s in | |
Beijing last week, no one reaped a bigger diplomatic windfall than Kim | |
Jong Un. | |
The reclusive North Korean leader seized the global spotlight with a | |
high-profile debut in multilateral diplomacy, with Xi and Russia’s | |
Vladimir Putin in a defiant demonstration to the West that he enjoys | |
the backing of the world’s two most powerful autocrats – and a | |
central role in the alternative global order they are shaping. | |
On the sidelines, Kim underscored his bond with Putin, who vowed to the | |
sacrifices of North Korean troops fighting for Russia against Ukraine. | |
He also held his , restoring ties with a longtime patron strained by | |
Pyongyang’s growing military alliance with Moscow. | |
To cap it off, Kim was hosted by Xi for tea and a banquet at his | |
residence in Zhongnanhai, the walled leadership compound at the heart | |
of Chinese political power. That privilege was granted to none of the | |
other 26 foreign guests at the parade, except Putin. | |
For a young leader who had long been treated as a junior partner by | |
both Beijing and Moscow, the elevated treatment was a resounding | |
propaganda coup. | |
Yet his most consequential victory may not have been what was staged | |
for the cameras, but what was left unsaid. | |
For the first time, official readouts of the Xi-Kim summit made no | |
mention of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula – a striking | |
departure from the language of the five summits they held between 2018 | |
and 2019. | |
Analysts say the omission could signal that Kim has secured what he | |
long sought: China’s tacit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear | |
power. | |
That would mark a stunning turn for Beijing, which had long championed | |
the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, even as Pyongyang | |
accelerated its illegal nuclear and missiles programs under Kim. | |
“With the denuclearization goal now formally removed from the | |
official readout of the Xi-Kim meeting, a significant shift in | |
China’s long-term policy is confirmed,” said Tong Zhao, a senior | |
fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. | |
“Reluctantly but significantly, North Korea’s most powerful ally | |
has abandoned the pursuit of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.” | |
Emboldened by his trip to Beijing, Kim on Monday of North Korea’s new | |
high-thrust rocket engine, which state media said would be used to | |
power Pyongyang’s newest intercontinental ballistic missile, the | |
Hwasong-20. | |
“North Korea has been given justification to continue holding onto | |
its nuclear power,” said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam | |
University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, noting that | |
both leaders pledged to strengthen relations “no matter how the | |
international situation changes.” | |
Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in | |
Seoul, said Kim was the biggest winner from Beijing’s Victory Day | |
parade. | |
“Kim’s international standing was significantly elevated,” he | |
said, adding that “restored ties with China through economic | |
cooperation could be leveraged in (future) negotiations with the US.” | |
US President Donald Trump has to re-engage diplomatically with Kim, | |
despite the collapse of his first-term attempt to strike a | |
denuclearization deal with the North Korean leader. | |
But the US president is already beset by a host of foreign policy | |
headaches: his attempt to end Russia’s war on Ukraine is getting | |
nowhere, and Israel’s unprecedented strike on Hamas officials in | |
Qatar, an American ally, has to his international credibility. | |
Tacit acceptance | |
As North Korea’s main ally and economic lifeline, China has long been | |
central to global efforts to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions | |
– at times working in tandem with the United States. Beijing has | |
played an instrumental role in bringing the Kim regime to the | |
negotiating table and, at multiple junctures, voted in favor of United | |
Nations sanctions. | |
But as US-China relations have deteriorated amid intensifying strategic | |
rivalry, Beijing has scaled back its cooperation on curbing North | |
Korea’s nuclear ambitions. So has Russia – once a staunch advocate | |
of nuclear nonproliferation – since its invasion of Ukraine. | |
In 2022, China and Russia a US-led resolution at the UN Security | |
Council that sought additional sanctions over North Korea’s renewed | |
ballistic missile launches. | |
The last time China reaffirmed its commitment to a nuclear-free Korean | |
Peninsula was at a trilateral summit with Japan and South Korea in | |
2024. It drew a blistering response from Pyongyang, which denounced the | |
joint declaration as a “grave political provocation” and a | |
violation of its sovereignty. | |
Since then, Beijing has refrained from referencing that goal in its | |
official statements or documents, Zhao noted. | |
Meanwhile, Russia’s growing military ties with North Korea – capped | |
with the signing of a mutual defense treaty last year – have raised | |
concerns that in exchange for arms and troops, Putin may assist | |
Pyongyang in enhancing its missile technology and nuclear weapons | |
delivery systems. | |
In public, Russian officials have edged closer to openly endorsing | |
North Korea’s nuclear program. Last September, Russian Foreign | |
Minister Sergey Lavrov that Moscow considered the denuclearization of | |
North Korea a “closed issue,” saying it understood Pyongyang’s | |
reliance on nuclear weapons as the foundation of its defense. By July, | |
Lavrov went a step further, saying Russia “respects” North | |
Korea’s nuclear ambitions. | |
While Beijing hasn’t gone as far as Moscow, its quiet abandonment of | |
the denuclearization goal marks a subtle yet consequential shift – | |
one that could open the door to closer China-North Korea ties, or even | |
bolster momentum for trilateral cooperation with Russia, Zhao said. | |
Despite their unprecedented joint appearance atop Beijing’s Gate of | |
Heavenly Peace during the military parade, Xi, Putin and Kim were not | |
reported to have convened a trilateral summit on the sidelines. | |
‘Troubling signal’ | |
Wu Qiang, an independent political analyst in Beijing, said acceptance | |
of North Korea’s nuclear status may well form part of Xi and | |
Putin’s no longer dominated by the US and its allies. | |
“At the very least, China’s indulgence of Pyongyang and the nuclear | |
threat it poses to Asia-Pacific security suggest that such disruption | |
is considered to serve China’s strategic interests. So long as the | |
undermining of the existing order aligns with its goals, Beijing may be | |
willing to shield it,” he said. | |
That marks a stark contrast to less than a decade ago, when China and | |
Russia voted with the US at the UN Security Council to tighten | |
sanctions against North Korea in 2016 and 2017. | |
In fact, in 2015 it was South Korea’s then President Park Geun-hye | |
– not Kim Jong Un – who stood beside Xi and Putin on the Tiananmen | |
rostrum to review the military parade marking 70 years since the end of | |
World War II. | |
Some experts have cautioned that the public omission of | |
denuclearization by Xi and Kim might not amount to a shift in China’s | |
official stance. | |
Shuxian Luo, an assistant professor of Asian studies at the University | |
of Hawaii, Mānoa, said although the usual call for denuclearization | |
was dropped at the summit, Beijing is unlikely to have abandoned this | |
position in private discussions with North Korean officials, given its | |
longstanding concern about a “nuclear domino effect” in East Asia. | |
Beijing has long viewed Pyongyang as both a strategic asset and a | |
destabilizing liability. | |
While North Korea has served as a geopolitical buffer against the US | |
and its allies in East Asia, its pursuit of nuclear weapons and | |
ballistic missiles has undermined regional security and handed | |
Washington a justification to expand its military presence on China’s | |
doorstep. It also risks triggering a chain reaction, provoking other | |
regional powers like South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear | |
arsenals – especially amid doubts over the reliability of the US | |
nuclear umbrella under Trump. | |
Already, South Korea is facing growing calls at home for a long-term | |
security solution – potentially including an indigenous nuclear | |
deterrent, Zhao said. “While unlikely under the current progressive | |
government, the overall likelihood of such a development has | |
increased,” he added. | |
China’s tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status may also | |
have been influenced by signals from senior officials in the Trump | |
administration expressing tolerance for allied nuclear proliferation, | |
as well as Beijing’s concerns about AUKUS – a program through which | |
the US and UK will assist Australia in building nuclear-powered | |
submarines, Zhao said. China has portrayed AUKUS as a step toward | |
transferring nuclear weapons materials. | |
“By interpreting these actions as evidence that Washington is | |
drifting away from a principled nonproliferation stance, Beijing may | |
thus feel justified in prioritizing its geopolitical interests over | |
global nonproliferation norms,” Zhao said. “This sends a troubling | |
signal that could embolden other would-be nuclear states to exploit | |
great-power rivalry for their own proliferation ambitions.” | |
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