Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL's newsletter focusing on the key issues
  concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their
  relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe's Eastern
  neighborhoods.

  I'm RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I'm drilling
  down on two issues: the Baltic states connecting to the continental
  electricity grid and the EU’s proposed new sanctions package.

Briefing #1: Baltic States To Join Europe's Electrical Grid

  What You Need To Know: This coming weekend it will finally happen. The
  three Baltic states -- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania -- will
  disconnect on February 8 from the IPS/UPS electricity transmission grid
  that links Russia, Belarus, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The
  following day, the three countries will join the synchronous grid of
  Continental Europe (also known as the UCTE grid), which includes most
  European countries, from Portugal in the west to Ukraine and Turkey in
  the east.

  For the Baltic countries, this move, known as the "Baltic Synchro," is
  a historic moment. It means that they, not Moscow, will be able to
  better manage and control their own electricity supplies. Diplomats
  from the Baltic region that I have spoken to see the move as shaking
  off the last vestiges of the Soviet era, comparing it to when Soviet
  troops left the countries in the 1990s.

  Envisaged to initially happen at the end of 2025, the "Baltic Synchro"
  was brought forward by nearly 11 months, in large part due the war in
  Ukraine and the Baltic countries' desire to become completely
  independent from potential Russian energy blackmail.

  Deep Background: It has been a long journey. The Baltic countries first
  signaled their readiness to join the continental grid back in 2007 and
  then applied in 2018. Last year, they informed Moscow and Minsk that
  they would [1]leave the Brell agreement that has kept them in IPS/UPS.

  In the background, they have been preparing for a while. The
  synchronization is not just a technical process, it's a legal one as
  well with plenty of paperwork and negotiations. "It's not too
  dissimilar from joining the euro zone or [the visa-free] Schengen
  [zone]," one Baltic diplomat told me.

  The Baltic countries have been preparing their infrastructure as well,
  to the tune of 1.6 billion euros ($1.64 billion), 75 percent of which
  comes from the EU budget. This money was needed to build overhead power
  lines, boost frequency management, enhance and build out electricity
  substations, and upgrade IT systems.

  The main investment has been the connection of the Baltic power system
  to the continental grid. So far, there is only one interconnection --
  the LitPol Link, between Lithuania and Poland. Another link between the
  countries, named Harmony, is expected to be ready in 2030-31.

  Drilling Down
    * The Baltic states are connected to Finland and Sweden via links
      such as Estlink 1&2 and Nordbalt. But while these links are vital
      for energy import and export, they cannot be used for so-called
      "frequency control" and "balancing services," key components of
      managing a power grid. There is also another issue here: Sweden,
      Finland, Norway, as well as eastern areas of Denmark, are not part
      of the continental grid but the Nordic one.
    * Estonia initially pushed to synchronize with the Nordic system, but
      the three countries eventually opted for the continental
      connection.
    * The fact that there is just one interconnector, the LitPol Link,
      for the next few years with the continental grid could be
      problematic. In between disconnecting from the IPS/UPS grid on
      February 8 and synchronizing with the continental grid on February
      9, the Baltics will be in so-called "island mode." There will
      probably not be any electricity cuts, but the challenge will be to
      manage the frequencies when not connected to a particular grid.
    * A diplomat with insight into the process, who wished to remain
      anonymous, told me that he will be worried on February 8 and that
      "the run-up is really tense." And with just one interconnector to
      the continent, "island mode" could happen more often in the case of
      repairs or bad weather.
    * The Baltic countries could also be vulnerable to so-called hybrid
      attacks. It has not gone unnoticed that several undersea Baltic
      pipelines and cables have been [2]severed or damaged in the last
      year, with suspicion that Russia is responsible. To some degree,
      this has also vindicated the decision to connect the grids via land
      to Poland rather than undersea.
    * Baltic diplomats I have spoken to say they are sure that the recent
      incidents at sea are related to the impending "Baltic Synchro." One
      told me that "there is an obvious link to what is happening in the
      Baltic Sea, especially if you look at intent, capacity,
      capabilities, and track record." Another diplomat said that "the
      Russians are annoyed. I can only speculate but this is the
      dismantling of the infrastructure of the old empire. But there is
      no way back, desynchronization will have to happen."
    * So far, Baltic diplomats have said that Russia and Belarus have
      been professional and played by the rules when it comes to leaving
      the Brell agreement. But even if nothing untoward happens at the
      weekend, there are still fears that the Kremlin could shift gears
      and launch various "hybrid" measures in the future.
    * Regardless, the Baltic countries will remain vulnerable. There are
      thousands of kilometers of overhead power lines, hundreds of
      substations, and it is physically impossible to protect everything.
      Although, as one Baltic diplomat optimistically said, there are
      enough connections and reserves to "operate in island mode without
      major inconvenience."

Briefing #2: New EU Proposed Sanctions To Target Shadow Fleet, LNG

  What You Need To Know: The European Commission last week sent out to EU
  member states its proposal for the next round of sanctions on Russia
  and Belarus, with a goal to have the package unanimously agreed by the
  time of the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
  late February. The proposal, seen by RFE/RL, would mean more sanctions
  targeting Russian aluminum, media, and the so-called "shadow fleet" but
  would lack any more meaningful restrictions on Russian energy. Brussels
  is clearly mindful that some member states are wary about soaring
  energy prices in the bloc.

  This proposed round of sanctions, the 16th in three years, comes just a
  week after Hungary threatened to veto the six-month rollover of the
  previous packages. Budapest was expressing annoyance that Russian gas
  to the EU via Ukraine was halted at the new year. While not being able
  to reverse that decision, Budapest finally gave its green light to the
  rollover ahead of the January 31 deadline. That came after the bloc
  agreed on a joint statement in which the European Commission would get
  assurances from Kyiv regarding the continuation of oil supplies via
  pipeline to the EU.

  It is in this context that the European Commission decided not to
  propose fresh sanctions on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), despite
  several EU member states, notably in the Nordic-Baltic region, calling
  for it.

  Moscow's LNG exports to the bloc skyrocketed last year, with 9 percent
  of Germany's gas imports coming from Russia. Instead, there will just
  be minor measures such as the banning of Russian LNG going to EU
  terminals not connected to the bloc's gas system and prohibiting the
  temporary storage of Russian crude oil and petroleum products within
  the EU.

  Deep Background: The headline-grabbing stuff in this round of proposed
  sanctions is an EU broadcast ban on TASS, Russia's state news agency.
  Similarly to the previous rounds of sanctions against RT and RIA
  Novosti, this means that journalists from these media organizations can
  still operate in the EU, but you won't be able to access their content
  on EU territory. Other Russian media outlets such as Zvezda, Lenta.ru,
  and RuBaltic will also be targeted.

  Then there is the suggested import ban on primary aluminum, the pure
  form of the metal obtained without recycling or reprocessing, from
  Russia. Given that import of other types of aluminum are already
  banned, Brussels is aiming to now have a blanket prohibition of Russian
  aluminum products entering the bloc. The proposed sanctions also
  include export bans from the EU to Russia on gaming controllers and
  consoles, given fears in the EU that their components are being used to
  build drones.

  Drilling Down
    * Russia's "[3]shadow fleet" -- the network of tankers and other
      vessels used by Russia to evade Western oil sanctions -- will also
      be targeted, according to the proposal. So far, the EU has drawn up
      a list of 79 vessels that can't dock or receive any shipping
      services in the EU. Under the proposal, an additional 74 vessels
      would be added -- although, curiously, this does not include the
      vessels involved in recent incidents in the Baltic Sea that damaged
      undersea infrastructure.
    * Under the proposal, there would be more bans on exporting dual-use
      goods to companies based in China, India, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and
      Uzbekistan, among others. Brussels suspects these firms of
      reexporting such dual-use goods to Russia.
    * Seventeen regional Russian banks would also be subject to being
      locked out of SWIFT, the global financial message system, for
      cross-border money transfers, joining most of the big Russian banks
      that have already been "de-SWIFTED." Interestingly, though perhaps
      not surprisingly, Gazprombank, which many EU countries have
      dealings with, has not yet met this fate.
    * According to the sanctions proposal, an additional 35 people would
      be slapped with asset freezes and visa bans. They are mainly
      directors of military companies and politicians Russia has
      installed in occupied parts of eastern Ukraine. A few names do
      stick out. One is Kristina Potupchik, a famous Russian blogger, who
      the EU claims "disseminates misinformation on the war in Ukraine"
      and the TV presenter Yulia Baranovskaya, who, according to the
      document seen by RFE/RL, stands accused of "publicly promoting
      Russian war crimes such as the forced deportation of Ukrainian
      children." Aleksandr Stuglev, the organizer of the St. Petersburg
      International Economic Forum, is also proposed for blacklisting.
    * Lastly, new sanctions on Belarus have been proposed. The sanctions
      would largely mean EU export bans on electronic devices,
      conductors, and telecommunications, navigation, and aviation
      equipment, as well as on various types of sensors and lasers.

Looking Ahead

  Poland currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the
  European Union and, on February 6-7, the entire European Commission
  will travel to the northern Polish city of Gdansk to meet the Polish
  government. Expect that the Polish hosts will be flashing their
  credentials as one of the bloc's preeminent members, especially now
  that both France and Germany are struggling with various domestic
  issues. There will likely be plenty of references to Solidarity, as
  Gdansk is the birthplace of the trade union that was pivotal in the
  country's transition from communism to democracy.

  That's all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these
  issues on Twitter @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at
  [4][email protected].

  Until next time,

  Rikard Jozwiak

  If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition
  subscribe [5]here.

References

  1. https://balticsecurity.eu/securing_energy_supply_baltics/
  2. https://www.rferl.org/a/baltic-sea-sabotage-undersea-cables-russian-shadow-fleet/33290689.html
  3. https://www.rferl.org/a/baltic-sea-sabotage-undersea-cables-russian-shadow-fleet/33290689.html
  4. https://mailto:[email protected]/
  5. https://www.rferl.org/p/8961.html?nocache=1

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