Eagle S, the Russia-linked tanker suspected of damaging an underwater
  electricity cable on Christmas Day, was kitted out with special
  transmitting and receiving devices that were used to monitor naval
  activity, according to a source with direct involvement in the ship,
  which has since been detained by Finnish police

  RUSSIA-LINKED dark fleet* tanker Eagle S ([1]IMO: 9329760), seized by
  Finland on December 25 for damaging an undersea cable, had transmitting
  and receiving devices installed that effectively allowed it to become a
  “spy ship” for Russia, Lloyd’s List has learnt.

  The hi-tech equipment on board was abnormal for a merchant ship and
  consumed more power from the ship’s generator, leading to repeated
  blackouts, a source familiar with the vessel who provided commercial
  maritime services to it as recently as seven months ago.

  As well as Eagle S, another related tanker from the same ownership
  cluster, UK-sanctioned Swiftsea Rider ([2]IMO: 9318539), also had
  similar equipment installed, Lloyd’s List was told.

  Cook Islands-flagged Eagle S and Honduras-flagged Swiftsea Rider are
  two of 26 elderly Russia-linked tankers with opaque ownership
  structures connected to three related shipmanagers, including two
  sanctioned by the UK government 12 months ago for “propping up Putin’s
  war machine”.

  The sanctions-circumventing tankers were bought between 2022 and 2023
  and placed under bareboat charter arrangements with Eiger Shipping, the
  shipping arm of Russia oil trader Litasco.

  Eagle S was boarded by Finnish forces investigating sabotage of the
  Estlink 2 undersea cable that disrupted the supply of electricity to
  Estonia from Finland.

  The tanker slowed and dragged its anchor around the cable around
  midday, December 25, Finland’s police said. Another three cables were
  also damaged.

  The source, who declined to be identified to protect their safety,
  supplied at least 60 confidential documents about Eagle S to Lloyd’s
  List in June, including the vetting report that outlined many safety
  deficiencies discovered during an inspection undertaken while at anchor
  in Danish waters that month.

  These documents, and others relating to dark fleet tankers providing
  confidential and private information about class, insurance, and flag,
  and other technical and regulatory requirements, were verified as
  genuine at the time.

  In July, Lloyd’s List reported the serious deficiencies on Eagle S that
  compromised environmental and crew safety, and underscored the poor
  maintenance and absence of adherence to regulatory and technical
  standards for the wider dark fleet.

  The source has since provided additional information, telling Lloyd’s
  List that an unauthorised person, who was not a seafarer, had been
  identified on board Eagle S.

  They said listening and recording equipment was brought on to the
  20-year-old tanker via “huge portable suitcases” along with “many
  laptops” that had keyboards for Turkish and Russian languages when
  calling at Türkiye and Russia.

  The equipment was kept on the bridge or in the “monkey island”, they
  said. The monkey island is the top-most place on the ship.

  The transmitting and receiving devices were used to record all radio
  frequencies, and upon reaching Russia were offloaded for analysis.

  “They were monitoring all Nato naval ships and aircraft,” Lloyd’s List
  was told.

  “They had all details on them. They were just matching their
  frequencies.

  “Russians, Turkish, Indian radio officers were operating it.”

  Eagle S also dropped “sensors-type devices” in the English Channel
  during a transit, they said.

  They said no further equipment returned to the ship after it was
  offloaded for analysis, to their knowledge, but other devices were
  placed on another related tanker, Swiftsea Rider.

  Claims that Russian-linked merchant ships are being used for spying and
  sabotage activities in the Baltic Sea where Russia is surrounded by
  Nato allies underscores the rising geopolitical tension in the region
  amid calls by European political leaders for increased maritime
  infrastructure defence.

  The damage to the Estlink 2 cable is the second time vital undersea
  cables between Nato allies have been damaged in two months, and the
  first time a commercial ship suspected of sabotage has been taken into
  custody by authorities.

  In November, China-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 ([3]IMO: 9224984) was
  accused of dragging anchor to damage the C-Lion 1 communication cable
  connecting Finland and Germany.

  The bulk carrier spent more than four weeks in international waters in
  the Danish straits as German, Sweden, Danish and Finnish officials
  investigated but ended up sailing last Saturday.

  The crew on Eagle S would have been aware of its spying activities “as
  this could not be hidden” but were “threatened with their life, so
  everybody kept quiet”, the source said.

  “They have replaced captains when they raised this issue,” they said.

  The beneficial owners of Eagle S and Swiftsea Rider are hidden behind
  complex corporate structures. The registered owner of Eagle S is a
  single-ship structure that purports to have an office in the business
  centre of a luxury hotel in Dubai.

  The shipmanager, Mumbai-based [4]Peninsular Maritime India Private
  Limited cannot be contacted. One of the telephone numbers on its
  website did not answer. A second number hung up when asked if this was
  the phone number for Peninsular Maritime. Emails were not answered.

  The company’s website claims the company be registered in England,
  signalling it is likely a copy-and-paste of a template, commonly found
  in dark fleet shipping companies.

  * Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as part of the dark fleet if it is aged
  15 years or over, anonymously owned and/or has a corporate structure
  designed to obfuscate beneficial ownership discovery, solely deployed
  in sanctioned oil trades, and engaged in one or more of the deceptive
  shipping practices outlined in US State Department guidance issued in
  May 2020. The figures exclude tankers tracked to government-controlled
  shipping entities such as Russia’s [5]Sovcomflot, or Iran’s [6]National
  Iranian Tanker Co, and those already sanctioned.

  Download our explainer on the different risk profiles of the dark fleet
  [7]here

References

  1. https://www.seasearcher.com/vessel/360693/overview
  2. https://www.seasearcher.com/vessel/356589/overview
  3. https://www.seasearcher.com/vessel/307669/overview
  4. https://www.seasearcher.com/company/515740/overview
  5. https://www.seasearcher.com/company/47511/overview
  6. https://www.seasearcher.com/company/10753/overview
  7. https://bit.ly/3Lv5sI4