The Project Gutenberg EBook of Personal recollections and experiences
concerning the Battle of Stone River, by Milo S. Hascall

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org


Title: Personal recollections and experiences concerning the Battle of Stone River

Author: Milo S. Hascall

Release Date: February 20, 2008 [EBook #24653]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS ***




Produced by Graeme Mackreth andThe Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive/American Libraries.)







Personal Recollections and Experiences

CONCERNING THE

Battle of Stone River.


A Paper Read by Request before the Illinois Commandery of the Military
Order of the Loyal Legion of the U.S., at Chicago, Ill., Feb. 14, 1889.

BY

MILO S. HASCALL,

OF GOSHEN, INDIANA,

Formerly a Lieutenant in the U.S. Army, and Brigadier-General of
Volunteers during the War of the Rebellion.

Times Publishing Company, Goshen,--Indiana. 1889.

Personal Recollections and Experiences Concerning the Battle of Stone
River.


As will be perceived by the above caption to this paper, it is proposed
to relate what happened to me, and what I observed during the battle
alluded to, and might not inappropriately be styled "What I know about
the battle of Stone River."

In doing so I shall not undertake to give a general account of the
battle, but shall confine myself to that portion which came under my own
observation, and to necessary inferences as to what happened elsewhere.
In setting out it will be well to give a brief account of the history of
the Army of the Cumberland, and its commanders, so far as I know, up to
the time of the memorable battle which is the subject of this paper. My
having been a cadet at West Point from June, 1848, to June, 1852, when I
graduated in the same class with Sheridan, Stanly, Slocum, Crook,
Bonaparte and others, whose names have since become so distinguished,
and my service in the regular army subsequently till the fall of 1853,
threw me in contact with, and was the means of my knowing personally, or
by reputation, most, if not all the prominent characters on both sides,
that were brought to the knowledge of the public by the War of the
Rebellion.

This knowledge of the men in the army of those times served me well all
through the war, as it was seldom I came in contact with an officer on
the other side, but what I knew all his peculiar characteristics, and
idiosyncrasies. For illustration of this idea, as we were approaching
Atlanta, my division had the advance of the Army of the Ohio the morning
we came in sight of the city. My advance guard captured a rebel picket
post, and one of the men captured, had a morning paper from Atlanta, in
which was Johnston's farewell order to his troops, and Hood's order
assuming command. I had been three years at West Point with Hood, he
having graduated in 1853, in Schofield's class. I knew Hood to be a
great, large hearted, large sized man, noted a great deal more for his
fine social and fighting qualities, than for any particular scholastic
acquirements, and inferred, (correctly as the result showed) that
Johnston had been removed because Davis, and his admirers, had had
enough of the Fabian policy, and wanted a man that would take the
offensive. I immediately sent word to Gen. Sherman, who, with his staff,
was not far off, and when he came to the front, informed him of the news
I had, and the construction I put upon it, and in consequence, an
immediate concentration to resist an attack was made in the vicinity,
where we were. It was none too soon, as Hood, upon taking command
immediately moved out to Decatur with nearly his entire army, fell upon
McPherson's corps, with the besom of destruction, killing the gallant
McPherson early in the engagement, and with his vastly superior force,
beating back the Army of the Tennessee so fast, that there is no telling
what might have happened, had we not made the concentration we did, and
been prepared to give them a tremendous enfilading fire as soon as they
came opposite the flanks of the Army of the Ohio. It was my fortune to
be stationed at Ft. Adams, Newport, Rhode Island, as soon as my furlough
expired after graduating at the Military Academy, and there found Lieut.
W.S. Rosecrans, (afterward the commanding general at Stone River), and
from being stationed some ten months at the same post, became somewhat
familiarly acquainted with him and his peculiarities. I had never met
Gen. Don Carlos Buel, and knew but little of him, although he was a
regular army man, until the fall of '61, upon my return from service in
West Virginia, during the first summer of the war. I was then Colonel of
the 17th Indiana, and was assigned to the command of a brigade in
Nelson's Division of Buel's Army, which was then in and around
Louisville, Ky., and whose purpose was a forward move against Nashville.

While Buel's Army, the Army of the Cumberland, was concentrating in and
about Louisville, preparing for the forward movement, Gov. Morton, of
Indiana, was frequently in Louisville, consulting with Gen. Buel, and
offering suggestions as to army movements etc., and these, after a time,
came to be regarded by Gen. Buel as meddlesome, and uncalled for, so
much so, that he finally intimated to Gov. Morton that it would be as
well for him to attend to his duties as Governor of Indiana, while he
would attend to his as Commanding General of the forces in the field. It
is important to mention this circumstance here, as it will be seen
further on, that this matter had an important bearing upon Gen. Buel's
subsequent career. It will not be necessary, nor appropriate in this
paper, to enter into a detailed account of the operations of the Army of
the Cumberland in its march upon, and capture of Nashville--in its
subsequent march to Shiloh, and the part it took in that most
unfortunate, not to say (in many respects) disgraceful battle to our
army--in its subsequent advance upon Corinth, and its operations
there--in its subsequent march into northern Alabama and the vicinity of
Chattanooga, and the forced march back to Louisville, made necessary by
Bragg's advance upon that city through the Sequatchie Valley, from
Chattanooga. All this is known to the public, and the public has arrived
at its own conclusions as to the merits or demerits of these various
operations. It is not too much to say, however, that those of us who
accompanied Gen. Buel in this remarkable march and counter-march, and
particularly those who had important commands during the same, had ample
opportunity to arrive at intelligent conclusions as to the merits and
demerits of the man. It may be inferred from what has already been said
that, Gen. Buel was not particularly popular with political soldiers,
newspaper correspondents, and others who were carrying on the war from
safe distances in the rear. He was eminently and emphatically a soldier,
with no ambition or expectations outside the line of his duty, and with
honor and integrity so entirely above suspicion, that the camp follower
and money getter did not presume to even enter into his presence.
Notwithstanding all this, by the time of the return of the Army of the
Cumberland to Louisville, though that army had then performed services
that justly entitled it to the lasting gratitude of the country, and
notwithstanding its eminent commander enjoyed, so far as I knew, the
entire confidence of the officers and men in regard to his loyalty,
patriotism and ability, yet there had sprung up a fire in the rear party
that was constantly impugning his loyalty, his ability, and his fitness
to command, and demanding his removal. In the light of what has already
been said, it can now be seen whence, and from what source this hue and
cry proceeded.

On account of a contemporaneous popularity that Gen. Rosecrans had
achieved about that time, at the battle of Iuka, there arose a demand in
the press that Gen. Buel be superseded in the command of the Army of the
Cumberland by that officer. As I have said, my acquaintance with Gen.
Rosecrans previous to his assuming command of the Army of the
Cumberland, had been confined to the ten months I had been stationed
with him at Newport, R.I., in '52-3.

My recollections of him were not such as to inspire me with confidence
in him as the proper person to be placed in command of an army. At that
time he seemed to be a great enthusiast in regard to the Catholic
Church; seemed to want to think of nothing else, talk of nothing else,
and in fact do nothing else, except to proselyte for it and attend upon
its ministrations. No night was ever so dark and tempestuous, that he
would not brave the boisterous seas of Newport Harbor to attend mass,
and no occasion, however inappropriate, was ever lost sight of to
advocate its cause; in fact, he was what would nowadays be called most
emphatically a crank on that subject, and might not inappropriately be
considered a one-ideaed man lacking in the breadth and poise, so
necessary to success in the commander of an army in the field. While
Buel's Army was in Louisville getting reinforcements and preparing to
renew operations against Bragg, I obtained a few days leave of absence
and had no end of inquiries on my way home and after arriving there, as
to what I thought of the propriety and necessity of relieving Buel. I
uniformly replied that as far as the Army was concerned there was not
that I knew of, any want of confidence in Buel, but on the other hand,
nothing but the most sincere confidence and respect. That the only
reason that could be assigned was the want of confidence that the fire
in the rear might have caused in the country at large, and that even if
this was thought to be necessary, it would be very bad policy to
substitute Rosecrans in his stead. How near correct I was in this
estimate the public is now prepared to judge. Of course the possibility
of Buel's removal dispirited him, and perhaps inspired some of the
officers under him, that might by possibility be selected to succeed
him, with a desire that such might be the case. At all events, shortly
after the army again took the offensive, the notorious and disastrous
affair at Perryville took place, in regard to which it was charged at
the time by Gen. Buel, and believed by others, that it was brought on by
Gen. A. McD. McCook separating himself more from the body of the army
than his orders justified, and beyond supporting distance, in order that
an engagement might be brought on, in which, if successful, he might
claim the sole credit, and thereby supersede Buel in command. However
this may be, this engagement was the culminating affair in Buel's
career. The blame was (as I think) unjustly attached to him, and he was
relieved of his command, and Gen. W.S. Rosecrans appointed in his place.
After this battle, the Army resumed offensive operations against Bragg
and in due time arrived in Nashville, when offensive operations were for
a time suspended, in order to get supplies forward, and put the army in
shape for active, and if possible, decisive operations. During the weeks
that we thus lay encamped about Nashville I had frequent opportunities
to see Gen. Rosecrans and observe his manner, characteristics and
surroundings and had hoped to be enabled to form a more favorable
opinion of the man and his fitness for the high position to which he had
been called than I had theretofore entertained. I was sorry, however, to
be forced to the conclusion that my estimate of the man had been even
more favorable than the facts would justify. His head seemed to have
been completely turned by the greatness of his promotion. Instead of the
quiet dignity, orderly and business methods that had formerly obtained
at the headquarters of the Army, the very reverse seemed to be the rule.

Having by this time surrounded himself, in addition to the usual staff
and appliances ordinarily to be found at the headquarters of an army in
the field, with a numerous coterie of newspaper correspondents, and
Catholic priests, who seemed in his estimation to be vastly more
important than anyone else about him, and laid in a good supply of
crucifixes, holy water, _spiritus frumenti_, Chinese gongs, flambeaux,
jobbing presses, printers' devils, javelins, white elephants, and other
cabalistic emblems and evidences that a holy crusade was about to be
entered upon, and having daily announced through his various newspaper
correspondents, jobbing presses, and other means of reaching the public
and the Confederate Army lying immediately in our front, exactly what
was going on, one could but wonder at the sublime indifference of Bragg,
and his Army remaining in the State of Tennessee, in the midst of
preparations for their destruction such as these. As this magnificent
and resplendent cavalcade of Holy, Oriental, and gorgeous splendor moved
about from camp to camp during the weeks that we lay at Nashville making
these gigantic and awe-inspiring preparations for the advance, every
knee was bowed, and every tongue confessed, that Allah was great, and
thrice illustriously great was this Savior that had been sent to us. All
things though, however grand and glorious, must have an end, and it was
finally announced during the last days of December, 1862, that the army
was ready for a forward move. You will not be surprised to be informed
after what has preceded, that it was my opinion that the Catholic
officers having command in that army would fare well when the honors of
the campaign came to be distributed. Accordingly, I made a prediction in
writing that every one of these, consisting of Brig.-Gen. Philip H.
Sheridan, Brig.-Gen. D.S. Stanly, Brig.-Gen. James S. Negley, and Capt.
James St. Claire Morton, would all be promoted entirely regardless of
what the fortunes of war might have in store for them. This I did
without the slightest feeling of unkindness or jealousy towards these
officers, but simply on account of my belief that the Commanding
General was such a narrow-minded bigot in regard to Catholicism, that it
was impossible for him not to allow considerations of this kind to
control his estimate of men. We shall see how nearly correct I was in
this estimate further on. At the time this campaign was entered upon the
National Forces had not been divided into Army Corps and numbered. Each
Army commander divided his army as to him seemed best. Rosecrans divided
his into three grand divisions called the Right, Center, and Left, and
each of these into three ordinary divisions of four brigades each, the
Right, Center and Left commanded respectively by Generals A. McD.
McCook, George H. Thomas and Thos. L. Crittenden.

At the time of this advance and for a long time previous thereto, I was
commanding a brigade in Gen. Thos. J. Wood's division of the left wing.
The advance movement all along the line finally commenced about the 26th
day of December, 1862. The first day Palmer's division of the left wing
had the advance and on the evening of that day, had reached the vicinity
of Lavergne, having had some pretty sharp skirmishing in so doing. The
next day by rotation Wood's division had the advance.

It was not the place of my brigade to lead the division that day, but I
was specially requested to take the advance, however, as the progress
made the day before had not been satisfactory. I consented to do so upon
condition that the cavalry, which had been in advance the day before
should be retired to the rear of my brigade ready to be brought into use
should we succeed in routing the enemy, and should the topography of the
country admit of the successful use of cavalry. I had seen so many
disastrous results ensue from the use of squadrons of cavalry in advance
of an army under such circumstances as we were advancing, that I did not
want to run any such risks in addition to the ordinary and inevitable
risks of such advances against an army in the field. The cavalry
necessarily has to retire before any effective work can be done, and
usually comes back pell mell with a lot of riderless horses, and creates
infinitely more confusion, consternation, and even danger to the
advancing army, than anything the enemy would be likely to do at that
stage of the operations.

Having thus arrived at the front and got the cavalry out of the way to
the rear, I found the enemy securely lodged in the town of Lavergne, and
masked from our view by the buildings, shrubbery and fences. My orders
contemplated an immediate advance along the main pike toward
Murfreesboro. Thus no opportunity was given for flanking them, and so
compelling them to abandon the town. The country was open between my
command and the town, and afforded no shelter whatever for the troops. I
formed the brigade in two lines about 200 yards apart, with a strong
line of skirmishers about the same distance in advance of the first
line, with a section of artillery in the interval between the infantry
lines. As these dispositions were about completed preparatory to
ordering an advance of the line a heavy infantry fire was opened upon us
from the buildings and cover the town afforded to the enemy, and their
fire was taking effect even upon the first line of infantry back of the
skirmish line. At this juncture I ordered the infantry to lie down, the
artillery to open with shot and shell upon the town, and the heavy line
of skirmishers to fix bayonets and on double quick to make the distance
between them and the town; to be immediately followed by the main lines
of infantry as soon as the skirmishers had reached the town. This
movement was entirely successful; we soon had routed the enemy from the
town, but had left some forty or fifty dead comrades behind us to be
cared for by those in our rear.

As soon as we had driven the enemy beyond the town, we continued the
same order with two regiments in line of battle about 200 yards apart to
the left of the main pike, and two to the right in like manner, all
preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers, and pushed forward with all
possible dispatch. A heavy rain set in about the time we commenced the
advance beyond the town, which continued all day, so the corn-fields and
other plowed fields soon became ankle deep with mud. Nevertheless we
pressed forward continuously. If we encountered the enemy in any
considerable force, the skirmish line gradually slackened their
progress until the main line came up with them. Artillery was brought
forward and fired advancing along the road. In this manner we kept up an
almost continuous advance, our dead and wounded being cared for by those
in our rear. By night-fall we had made an advance of nearly eight miles,
to Stewart's Creek. As we approached Stewart's Creek we discovered that
the enemy had set the bridge over the same on fire. I immediately
concentrated four pieces of artillery on a little eminence to the right
of the road, and commenced shelling the enemy beyond the creek. Under
the cover of this fire the infantry was ordered forward at double quick,
and succeeded in subduing the flames before sufficient damage had been
done to prevent the use of the bridge by our army. So rapid had been our
advance that three companies of rebel cavalry that had been hovering on
our left flank during the advance, were cut off before they reached the
bridge, and were captured by us with all their horses and accoutrements.
In the evening we were congratulated by all our superior officers for
having accomplished a very satisfactory day's work.

This brought us up to the evening of the 27th of December. During the
time between this and the afternoon of the 30th of the same month, all
portions of our army had pressed forward along the different lines of
march laid out for them, encountering the usual incidents of driving in
the enemy's cavalry and outposts, until finally at that time our entire
army had arrived along the left bank of Stone River, opposite the city
of Murfreesboro, some two or three miles further on. Here we encountered
the enemy in force and their fortifications were plainly visible all
along opposite us on the right bank of the river, between it and the
city of Murfreesboro, and here it was very evident Bragg intended to
make his stand and accept the gauge of battle.

There was desultory firing all along the line during that memorable
afternoon, but during that time our army was finally concentrated,
McCook, with his three divisions on the right, Thomas, with his three in
the center, and Crittenden, with his three on the left. The whole line,
with the intervals for artillery and cavalry, occupying a distance of
two or three miles, more or less. Crittenden's three divisions were
formed, two divisions in line of battle, and one in reserve, as follows:
Palmer's division on the right, Wood's on the left, and Van Cleve in
reserve opposite the interval between Palmer's and Wood's, and each
division consisting likewise of three brigades, were formed in like
manner, two in line and one in reserve. In Wood's division Wagner's
brigade was on the right, my own on the left, and Harker in reserve.
This arrangement brought my brigade on the extreme left of the entire
army. During that evening we were made acquainted with the plan of the
attack which was to be made by our army under cover of the gray of the
morning the following day, the memorable 31st day of December, 1862.
This was for the left wing (Crittenden's) to cross Stone River--which
was at that time fordable at all points for all arms of the service--and
deliver a furious attack on the enemy's extreme right, this to be
followed up by a wheel to the right by other portions of our army in
case Crittenden was successful in his attack, until all portions of our
army should become engaged and the battle become general all along the
line.

This plan was well conceived, and might have worked well enough perhaps,
if the enemy had waited for us. The same mistake (or a similar one
rather) was made here that was made by Grant at Shiloh, only the latter
was much more faulty. In that case Grant was moving his army up the
Tennessee River to Savannah, the object being to attack Beauregard, then
at Corinth, some twenty miles from Savannah, as soon as he should have
made a junction with Buell's army, then at Nashville, Tenn., and which
was to march from that place to Savannah. Grant's army proceeding by
boats, arrived at Savannah by detachments first, and should have all
been landed on the side of the river toward Grant's reinforcements,
instead of on the side toward the enemy--unless he considered from the
time he landed, anything more than a picket force of cavalry to keep him
advised of the enemy's movements on the side toward them--that he had
enough to successfully cope with him. If he thought the latter, he
should have been with his troops on the side of the river toward the
enemy instead of eight miles below on the other side. Thus the most
elementary principles of grand tactics and military science, that, in
case two armies are endeavoring to concentrate with a view of delivering
an attack on a superior force of the enemy, the inferior force nearest
the enemy, should be careful to oppose all natural obstructions, such as
rivers, mountains, heavy forests, impassable marshes, between it and the
enemy until a junction can be made. In this case the detachments of
Grant's army were allowed to land on the side toward the enemy, select
their locations as best they could without instructions or concert of
action of any kind, and this within fifteen to eighteen miles of the
enemy in force, in the enemy's country, where it was known to all that
he had daily and hourly opportunity from the citizens who fell back
before our forces, to find out all the time the exact locations and
strength of Grant's and Buel's armies, respectively. Under circumstances
like these, the merest tyro in military knowledge ought to have known
that an experienced, able officer, such as Beauregard was known to be,
would not wait for the concentration, before anticipating the attack. So
it was no surprise to any one except the troops on that side the river
towards Corinth, and possibly to Grant, then at Savannah, that on that
fatal Sunday morning in April, 1862, when Grant had got sufficient
troops on that side of the river to make it an object for Beauregard to
destroy or capture them, and when Buel's advance had approached within
twenty to twenty-five miles of Savannah, that Beauregard determined upon
an attack, and declared he would crush or capture the troops on that
side, and water his horse in the Tennessee river that night, and that
but for the timely arrival by forced marches of Buel's advance of two
divisions on the field about four o'clock that afternoon, he would
undoubtedly have executed his purpose. If Buel had been guilty of such
blundering (not to call it by any worse name than this) it would have
been impossible to make the country at the North believe that he did not
meditate its destruction. For this blunder Grant was promptly relieved
of his command, by the proper authorities, and it was many years
afterwards, before anyone was found, who did not think this was very
moderate punishment, under such circumstances. The fault in the case
under consideration differs in kind, but not in its disastrous effects
upon our cause and our army.

The right of our army at Murfreesboro, judging from what happened (and
as I said at the outset, when I don't know personally what happened, I
speak from necessary inference) seemed to think that inasmuch as our
plan of battle contemplated an attack by the extreme left, to be
followed up by them subsequently during the day, that they had nothing
to do at that early hour in the morning, but to keep a picket force out,
send their artillery horses to a distant point for water, stack their
arms, and get breakfast. They did not seem to think possibly Bragg might
have plans of his own, and that our attack might be anticipated, and
that our right might receive a desperate attack while our left was
preparing to deliver one. This, as you all know, was what happened, and
you all know its disastrous results.

Current reports at the time were to the effect that the right was found
when the attack came upon them in the condition already described, and
the prompt manner in which they were hurled from the field, corroborates
this view of the case. This, of course, caused the troops to their left
to be immediately out-flanked, and no resistance, to amount to anything,
from that portion of our line could be expected under such
circumstances. How much Gen. Rosecrans and his staff are properly to
blame for the state of things existing on the right at the time of the
attack, I have no means of knowing, and do not undertake to say but that
it was the prime cause of the very serious disaster to our arms, and to
the prestige of our army that happened at that battle, there can be no
doubt or chance for two opinions. How the battle raged, and what
happened, so far as I then knew, I cannot better describe than by
extracting from my official report of that day's proceedings, made on
the 6th of January, following, and which I do as follows:

    HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE, 1ST DIV'N, LEFT WING, NEAR
    MURFREESBORO', TENN., Jan. 6, 1863.

_Capt. M.P. Bestow, A.A.A.G._:

  Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the
  operations of my brigade, (formerly the 15th Brigade, 6th Division,
  but under the new nomenclature, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, left wing)
  on the eventful 31st of December, 1862.--During the night of the 30th
  I had received notice through Gen. Wood, our division commander, that
  the left wing, Crittenden's corps, would cross Stone river and attack
  the enemy on their right. My brigade was posted on the extreme left
  of our entire line of battle and was guarding and overlooking the
  ford over which we were to cross. On the morning of the 31st heavy
  firing was heard on the extreme right of our line, (McCook's corps)
  but as they had been fighting their way all the distance from
  Nolensville as we had from Lavergne, no particular importance was
  attached to this, and I was getting my brigade into position, ready
  to cross as soon as Gen. Van Cleve's division, which was then
  crossing, was over. All this time the firing on the right became
  heavier, and apparently nearer to us, and our fears began to be
  aroused that the right wing was being rapidly driven back upon us. At
  this juncture Gen. Van Cleve halted his division and the most
  terrible state of suspense pervaded the entire line, as it became
  more and more evident that the right was being driven rapidly back
  upon us. On and on they came till the heaviest fire was getting
  nearly around to the pike leading to Nashville, when General
  Rosecrans appeared in person, and ordered me to go with my brigade at
  once to the support of the right, pointing toward our rear, where the
  heaviest fire was raging. Gen. Van Cleve's division and Col. Harker's
  brigade of our division received the same order. I at once changed
  the front of my brigade to the rear, preparatory to starting in the
  same direction, but had not proceeded more than 200 yards in the new
  direction before the fugitives from the right became so numerous, and
  the fleeing mule-teams and horsemen so thick, that it was impossible
  for me to go forward with my command without its becoming a confused
  mass. I therefore halted, and awaited developements. Gen. Van Cleve
  and Col. Harker not meeting with so much opposition pressed forward
  and got into position beyond the railroad, ready to open on the enemy
  as soon as our fugitives were out of the way. They soon opened fire,
  joined by some batteries and troops belonging to the center (Gen.
  Thomas' corps) and Estep's battery of my brigade, and after about an
  hours' fighting along this new line, during which time I was moving
  my command from point to point, ready to support any troops that most
  needed it. The onslaught of the enemy seemed to be in a great
  measure checked, and we had reasonable probability of maintaining
  this line. During all this time my men were exposed to a severe fire
  of shot and shell from a battery on the other side of the river, and
  several men were killed. About this time an aid of Gen. Palmer's came
  galloping up to me, and said that unless he could be supported his
  division would give way. Palmer's division formed the right of Gen.
  Crittenden's line of battle on the morning of the 31st. After
  consulting with Gen. Wood he ordered me to send a regiment to support
  Gen. Palmer. Accordingly I sent the 3d Kentucky regiment, commanded
  by Lieut. Col. Sam'l McKee. Before the regiment had been ten minutes
  in its new position, Capt. Kerstetter, my Adjutant General, reported
  to me that Col. McKee had been killed and the regiment badly cut up.
  I therefore moved with the other three regiments of my command to
  their relief. The line they were trying to hold was that port of our
  original line of battle lying immediately to the right of the
  railroad, and forming an acute angle with the same. This portion of
  our original line, about two regimental fronts, together with two
  fronts to the left held by Colonel Wagner's brigade, was all of our
  original line of battle but what our troops had been driven from; and
  if they succeeded in carrying this they would have turned our left,
  and a total route of our forces could not then have been avoided.
  Seeing the importance of the position, I told my men that it must be
  held even if it cost the last man we had. I immediately sent in the
  26th Ohio, commanded by the gallant Major Wm. H. Squires, to take
  position on the right of the 3d Kentucky, and support it, and
  dispatched an aid for the 18th Indiana battery to come to this point
  and open on the enemy. No sooner had the 26th Ohio got in position
  than they became hotly engaged, and the numerous dead and wounded
  that were immediately brought to the rear told how desperate was the
  contest. The gallant Lieut. McClellan of that regiment was brought to
  the rear mortally wounded, and expired by my side in less than five
  minutes from the time the regiment took position. Still the fight
  went on, and still brave men went down. The 3d Kentucky, now reduced
  to less than one-half its original number, with ten officers out of
  its fourteen remaining ones, badly wounded, was still bravely at
  work. In less than ten minutes after the fall of Lieut. Col. McKee,
  the gallant Major Daniel R. Collier, of that regiment, received two
  severe wounds, one in the leg and one in the breast. Adjutant Bullitt
  had his horse shot from under him, but nothing could induce either of
  them to leave the field. Equally conspicuous and meritorious was the
  conduct of Major Squires and Adjutant Franklin, of the 26th Ohio.
  Major Squires' horse was three times shot through the neck;
  nevertheless, he and all his officers stood by throughout and most
  gallantly sustained and encouraged their men.

  Estep's battery came up in due time, and taking a position on a
  little rise of ground in the rear of the 26th Ohio, and 3d Kentucky,
  opened a terrific fire of shot and shell over the heads of our
  infantry. About one hour after the 26th Ohio got into position, this
  terrible attack of the enemy was repulsed, and they drew back into
  the woods, and under cover of an intervening hill, to reform their
  shattered columns and renew the attack. I now took a survey of the
  situation, and found that along the entire line to the right and left
  of the railroad, which had not yet been carried by the enemy, I was
  the only general officer present, and was therefore in command, and
  responsible for the conduct of affairs. Col. Hazen, commanding a
  brigade in Gen. Palmer's division, was present with his brigade to
  the left of the railroad. Col. Gross, commanding another brigade in
  the same division, was also present with what there was left of his
  brigade, and most nobly did he co-operate with me, with the 6th and
  25th Ohio to the right of the railroad, while Col. Wagner, commanding
  the 2d brigade, 1st division, (left wing) nobly sustained his front,
  assisted by Col. Hazen to the left of the railroad. I now relieved
  the 3d Kentucky regiment, who were nearly annihilated, and out of
  ammunition, with the 58th Indiana regiment of my brigade, commanded
  by Col. Geo. P. Buell; and this being a much larger regiment than the
  3d Kentucky, filled up the entire space from where the right of the
  3d Kentucky rested, to the railroad. I then threw forward the right
  of the 6th Ohio regiment of Col. Gross' brigade, which was on the
  right of the 26th Ohio, so that its line of battle was more nearly
  perpendicular to the railroad, and so its fire would sweep the front
  of the 26th Ohio, and 58th Indiana, and supported the 6th Ohio with
  Estep's battery on a little eminence to its right, and brought the
  97th Ohio, Col. Lane, from Wagner's brigade, to still further
  strengthen the right. These dispositions being made, I galloped a
  little to the rear, and found Gen. Rosecrans, and called his
  attention to the importance of the position I was holding, and the
  necessity of keeping it well supported. He rode to the front with me,
  approved of the dispositions I had made, spoke a few words of
  encouragement to the men, cautioning them to hold their fire until
  the enemy had got well up, and had no sooner retired than the enemy
  emerged from the woods over the hill, and were moving upon us again
  in splendid style, and in great force.--As soon as they came in
  sight, the 6th and 26th Ohio, and Estep's battery opened on them, and
  did splendid execution; but on they came, until within 100 yards of
  our line, when Col. Buell, of the 58th Indiana, who had lost three
  men, but had not fired a gun, ordered his men to fire. The effect
  was indescribable; the enemy fell in winrows, and went staggering
  back from the effects of this unexpected volley. Soon, however, they
  came up again and assaulted us furiously for about one and a half
  hours, but the men all stood their ground nobly, and at the end of
  that time compelled the enemy to retire as before.

  During the heat of this attack a heavy cross fire was brought to bear
  on the position I occupied, and Corporal Frank Mayer, of the 3d Ohio
  Volunteer Cavalry, in command of my escort, was shot through the leg,
  and my Adjt. General, Capt. Ed. R. Kerstetter, was shot through his
  coat, grazing his back. The regiments all behaved splendidly again,
  and the 58th Indiana won immortal honors. Lieut. Blackford, of that
  regiment, was shot dead, and several of the officers, including
  Capts. Downey and Alexander, badly wounded. Estep's battery was
  compelled to retire from the position assigned to it after firing a
  half dozen rounds, but it did terrible execution while there. The 6th
  and 26th Ohio did noble service, as did the 97th, but their own
  immediate commanders will no doubt allude to them more particularly.
  Thus ended the third assault upon our position. I should have
  remarked that the 100th Illinois, the other regiment composing my
  brigade, which was in reserve during the first engagement described
  above, had, under instruction of Col. Hazen, moved to the front on
  the left of the railroad, and taken up a position at right angles
  with the railroad, where they fought splendidly in all the actions
  that took place on the left of the road. There was no formidable
  attack made upon them, though they were almost constantly under fire
  of greater or less severity, particularly from shot and shell, and
  suffered quite severely in killed and wounded. Lieut. Morrison
  Worthington, of that regiment, was killed while gallantly sustaining
  his men, and six other commissioned officers, including Major
  Hammond, were wounded. Their operations being to the left of the
  railroad, in a wood, did not come so immediately under my personal
  observation, but their conduct, from Col. Bartleson down, was such as
  leaves nothing to be desired. The 58th Indiana having now been over
  three hours in action, and the 26th Ohio about four hours, were
  exhausted and very near out of ammunition. I therefore relieved the
  58th Indiana with the 40th Indiana from Col. Wagner's brigade, and
  the 26th Ohio was relieved by the 23d Kentucky. There was now not
  more than an hour of the day left, and though the enemy was
  constantly maneuvering in our front, no formidable attack was made
  upon us, except with artillery. The enemy having been three several
  times repulsed in their attack on that position, seemed satisfied to
  keep at a respectful distance, and the sun set upon us, masters of
  the situation. We had sustained ourselves _and held the only portion
  of the original line of battle that was held throughout by any
  portion of our army_. To have lost this position would have been to
  lose everything, as our left would then have been turned also, and
  utter rout or capture inevitable.

  During the evening of the 31st, I was officially notified that in
  consequence of the indisposition of Gen. Wood, and a wound received
  by him during the forenoon of that day, he was relieved of the
  command of the division, and that the same would devolve upon myself.
  I therefore turned over the command of the brigade to Col. Geo. P.
  Buell, of the 58th Indiana, and assumed command of the division. All
  of which is respectfully submitted.

    MILO S. HASCALL, Brig. Gen. Vols., Com's Brigade.

 ED. R. KERSTETTER, Capt. & A.A.G.   (Official.)

      *       *       *       *       *

After the battle was over, during the evening, Colonel Harker's brigade
that had gone to the assistance of the right, returned to where we had
been in action during the day, and thus the division was once more
together, and on this ground we did the best we could towards getting
something to eat, and prepared to bivouac on the same ground for the
night. About eleven o'clock that night, I was visited by Capt. John
Mendenhall, Chief of Artillery on Gen. Crittenden's staff, and who
belonged to the Regular Army of the United States, and a gentleman of
first-class intelligence, and purity of character, and informed that
since the cessation of hostilities for the night, a council of war had
been held at Gen. Rosecrans' headquarters, by himself and his Grand
Division Commanders, and that a general retreat to Nashville had been
decided upon, and that all except Gen. Crittenden concurred in the
advisability of such movement, and he was overruled by the others, and
that in pursuance of such determination, I was forthwith to send all the
transportation of my division, except one wagon for each brigade, to the
rear, and when the transportation was all under way, this was to be
followed by a general retreat of our army to Nashville. Mendenhall said
that Crittenden was very much incensed at the proposition for retreat;
said his army was in position and on hand, and that if he were overruled
and if a retreat was decided upon, that he would cross the river and
retreat by way of Gallatin to Nashville. However, the retreat was
decided upon, and the baggage had been sent to the rear as above
directed, and we were laying on our arms awaiting the further order to
retreat, when a very singular circumstance caused Rosecrans to change
his mind, and conclude to fight it out where we were. A large number of
our straggling, demoralized detachments in the rear of our army, being
hungry and thirsty, had concluded to disobey orders, and make fire and
try and get something to eat. One party would make a fire, another would
go there to get a fire brand to start another, and when this became
general along our rear, Rosecrans concluded the enemy had got in our
rear, and were forming line of battle by torch lights, and hence
withdrew the order for a general retreat. After this, about one o'clock,
I was informed also by Capt. Mendenhall, that the retreat had been given
up, and that I was ordered to fall back with my division about half a
mile, and take up a position that would there be assigned me.
Accordingly I did so, and in the morning found myself occupying a
position with no advantages for offensive or defensive operations, and
very much exposed to the enemy's fire, with no chance for returning it
with any effect. The enemy were occupying the position I had fallen back
from, and at that point concentrated a large number of pieces of
artillery, with which, about nine o'clock in the morning, they opened
upon us a tremendous artillery fire, under the cover of which I supposed
their infantry would charge upon us, but for some strange reason or
other, they did not do so. Desultory firing afterwards, was kept up
during the day, until about three o'clock in the afternoon. In the
meantime we had sent a division across the river to the left, which was
occupying the high ground near where the enemy's right was resting
originally. About three o'clock Breckenridge's troops, of the rebel
army, fell furiously upon this division, and drove them rapidly from
their position, on account of their superior numbers. At this juncture
Crittenden ordered Mendenhall to concentrate his artillery on the bank
of the river to our front and left, which he promptly did, and ordered
me, with my division, to promptly cross the river in support of the
division already there in retreat. Upon our arrival on the other side of
the river, the furious fire from Mendenhall's artillery had checked the
rebel advance, and the division over there turned upon their assailants,
and with the assistance of my division, drove Breckenridge back to the
position he had occupied before making the assault. The latter part of
these operations were carried on in the darkness, and we slept upon our
arms, amidst the dead and wounded. It had been raining hard all the
night, and the river was rising very rapidly, so much so that if we had
remained there until morning, there would have been danger that the
river would become impassable, and the divisions been left there by
themselves in the presence of the whole rebel army. Accordingly, about
two o'clock at night, we were ordered to recross the river, and take up
positions where we had been during the previous day. We arrived back
there between that time and morning, thoroughly wet through, and
completely jaded out, having had no sleep, and but little to eat during
the previous forty-eight hours. Both armies continued after this during
the third day, to occupy the positions they had on that morning. It was
cold, wet, and very disagreeable weather; both armies were completely
tired out, and seemed content to do nothing more than to engage in some
desultory firing, and watch each other closely. On the morning of the
fourth day, January 3, or rather, during the forenoon of that day, the
stragglers from the right, during the first day's battle, who had not
stopped in their flight until they reached Nashville, began to return in
large numbers, in companies, and even regiments, and Bragg, observing
this, concluded we were receiving large bodies of reinforcements from
the north, and therefore concluded to fall back and give up the contest.
He accordingly did so, and on the fourth day, January 4, he took
possession of Murfreesboro without the firing of a gun. Thus ended the
great battle of Stone River. We had not made a single attack during the
whole time; were badly beaten and well nigh driven from the field the
first day, and only saved from an ignominious retreat upon Nashville by
the ridiculous misconception on the part of Rosecrans, already alluded
to on the first night after the battle commenced. As it was, we lost all
our transportation, by sending it to the rear, that night, preparatory
for the retreat, the whole having been burned by the rebels at Lavergne,
notwithstanding we were supposed to have some cavalry in our rear, under
Gen. Stanley. Where it was at the time our transportation was being
burned by the rebel cavalry, I have never heard.

Finally our fugitives from the first day's battle began to return,
thereupon Bragg became very much frightened and beat a retreat, and we
thus gained Murfreesboro. After this reports were written up to praise
the men it had been determined upon in advance to promote, and these
identical men that I had predicted would be favored, were promoted; one
of them, St. Claire Morton, from Captain to Brigadier-General, while
others, upon whom rested the heat and burden of the day, and who saved
the army from utter annihilation, were not only not promoted, but in
many instances not even mentioned. It was, for instance, Sheridan's fate
to be early driven from the field, whether from his fault or not, it is
not necessary to inquire. Enough for this occasion that it was so, and
the facts of his subsequent career no more justify what was done for him
on this occasion, than would the subsequent illustrious career of Gen.
Grant justify his promotion for the terrible blunders committed by him
concerning the most unfortunate battle of Shiloh.

In what I have said in this paper in regard to the Catholic Church, I do
not wish to be understood as having any desire to say anything against
that church, but simply to condemn the idea of making membership in
that, or any other particular church, a necessary concomitant to
advancement, either in a military or civil capacity, under our
government. Farther, in all that I have said nothing has been said in
malice towards any officer or person, but simply that that criticism so
necessary to the establishment of right and justice in regard to the
late war may be freely indulged in, whether it affect the highest
officer, or the lowest private that offered his life in defense of his
country. It will be seen that my estimate of the fitness of Gen.
Rosecrans to command an army was not enhanced by his career during and
preceding the battle of Stone River. When disaster came to the right, he
should have given his attention personally to that, and lent the magic
of his personal presence to rallying the fleeing troops from that
division, in place of going to the extreme left himself--instead of by a
staff officer--for ordering the movement of troops in that direction.
When the whole affair was over, and quiet restored, I made an
application to be transferred to another army on account of want of
confidence in him as the commander of an army in the field. This I
supposed would cause my arrest, and give an opportunity for me to
demonstrate the great cause that existed for my apprehensions, but
instead of doing this, he returned my application endorsed that he could
not spare the services of so useful an officer as myself, and that there
would be no forward movement of the army for six months, and detailed me
to proceed to Indianapolis, Ind., to superintend the work of returning
deserters from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Just before my leaving
Murfreesboro for Indianapolis we saw Bragg's telegraphic account to
Richmond, of the first day's proceedings. It was as follows: "This
morning, under cover of the darkness, we attacked the enemy on his
extreme right, and have routed him from every portion of his line except
upon his extreme left, where he has successfully resisted us." As I left
there was a proposition started in Crittenden's command to raise money
to present Bragg a sword for making the above truthful statement of the
first days operations. While at Indianapolis, I was, at the request of
Gen. Burnside, transferred by the War Department, to the army of the
Ohio and given the command of a division in that army. The next that we
heard of Gen. Rosecrans was at the battle of Chickamauga, and that was
the last we heard of him in a military way, and all can now see how much
cause there was for the apprehensions I entertained. This was not the
first instance that great unfitness achieved high rank in our armies and
it was quite common for great merit to be entirely unrewarded, and
indeed entirely unknown. But time is a great healer, and let us hope
that honest merit will in the end get its recognition, trusting in the
truthfulness of the idea that

    "Ever the world goes round and round,
    And ever the truth comes uppermost,
    And justice shall be done."





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Personal recollections and experiences
concerning the Battle of Stone River, by Milo S. Hascall

*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS ***

***** This file should be named 24653.txt or 24653.zip *****
This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
       https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/5/24653/

Produced by Graeme Mackreth andThe Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive/American Libraries.)


Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
will be renamed.

Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
redistribution.



*** START: FULL LICENSE ***

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
https://gutenberg.org/license).


Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic works

1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works.  See paragraph 1.E below.

1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.

1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
States.

1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org

1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
1.E.9.

1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.

1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg-tm License.

1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
that

- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
    the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
    you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
    owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
    has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
    Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
    must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
    prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
    returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
    sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
    address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
    the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."

- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
    you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
    does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
    License.  You must require such a user to return or
    destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
    and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
    Project Gutenberg-tm works.

- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
    money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
    electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
    of receipt of the work.

- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
    distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.

1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
your equipment.

1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.

1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.


Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm

Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org.


Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation

The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
https://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.

The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
[email protected].  Email contact links and up to date contact
information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
page at https://pglaf.org

For additional contact information:
    Dr. Gregory B. Newby
    Chief Executive and Director
    [email protected]


Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation

Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
particular state visit https://pglaf.org

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
donations.  To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate


Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
works.

Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.


Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.


Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:

    https://www.gutenberg.org

This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.

You are viewing proxied material from 1436.ninja. The copyright of proxied material belongs to its original authors. Any comments or complaints in relation to proxied material should be directed to the original authors of the content concerned. Please see the disclaimer for more details.