SOME FILES RELEVANT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR,
DECEMBER 7, 1941.
The file contains the following documents in the order of
appearance in the file:
(1) UNITED STATES NOTE TO JAPAN NOVEMBER 26, 1941
(2) MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN DECEMBER 6
(3) JAPANESE NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 7, 1941
(Generally referred to as the "Fourteen Part Message.")
(4) SELECTED DISPATCHES
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(1) UNITED STATES NOTE TO JAPAN NOVEMBER 26, 1941
(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)
The text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the
Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941, which consists of two
parts, one an oral statement and one an outline of a proposed
basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, reads
as follows:
"Oral
"Strictly confidential
"November 26, 1941
"The representatives of the Government of the United States and
of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past
several months informal and exploratory conversations for the
purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions
relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of
peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These
principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial
integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries; the principle of equality, including equality of
commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of
reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the
prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for
improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and
processes.
"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been
made in reference to the general principles which constitute the
basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area.
Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese
Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed
toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Pacific
area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere
favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a
temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect
while the conversations looking to peaceful settlement in the
Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador
communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to
temporary measure to be taken respectively by the Government of
Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures
are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes
above indicated.
"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to
contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and
stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity
for the continuance of discussion with the Japanese Government
directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace
throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented
by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features
which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the
fundamental principles which form a part of the general
settlement under consideration and to which each Government has
declared that it is committed. The Government of the United
States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be
likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring
peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it
suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences
of view in regard to the practical application of the
fundamental principles already mentioned.
"With this object in view the Government of the United States
offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan
of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific
area as one practical exemplification of a program which this
Government envisages as something to be worked out during our
further conversations.
"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the
gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of
September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems
underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan
contains provisions dealing with the practical application of
the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our
conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile
international relations. We hope that in this way progress
toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments
may be expedited."
"Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment
"November 26, 1941.
"Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United
States and Japan
"Section I
"Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy
"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that
their national policies are directed toward lasting and
extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no
territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of
threatening other countries or of using military force
aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that,
accordingly, in their national policies they will actively
support and give practical application to the following
fundamental principles upon which their relations with each
other and with all other governments are based:
"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and
sovereignty of each and all nations.
"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other countries.
"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment.
"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation
and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of
controversies and for improvement of international conditions by
peaceful methods and processes.
"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States
have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political
instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and
providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and
practically apply the following principles in their economic
relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
"(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international
commercial relations.
"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and
abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade
restrictions.
"(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations
to raw material supplies.
"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of
consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of
international commodity agreements.
"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and
arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the
essential enterprises and the continuous development of all
countries and may permit payments through processes of trade
consonant with the welfare of all countries.
"Section II
"Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by
the Government of Japan
"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
propose to take steps as follows:
"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression
pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands,
the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the
American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai
Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial
integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there
should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of
Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to
taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to
meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also
that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not
seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic
relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain
for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and
commerce with French Indochina.
"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval,
air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan will not support - militarily, politically, economically -
any government or regime in China other than the National
Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at
Chungking.
"5. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of
the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial
rights in China, including right in international settlements
and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between
the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon
reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade
barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the
United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on
Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in
Japan.
"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the
stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of
funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan
and half by the United States.
"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either
has concluded with any third power or powers shall be
interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and
preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other
governments to adhere to and to give practical application to
the basic political and economic principles set forth in this
agreement.
----------------------------------------------------------------
(3) MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN DECEMBER
6
(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)
The following message from the President to the Emperor of Japan
was dispatched Saturday afternoon, December 6, and public
announcement was made at that time that this message to the
Emperor had been sent by the President:
"Almost a century ago the President of the United States
addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer
of friendship of the people of the United States to the people
of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of
unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective
nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of
their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped
humanity.
"Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two
countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of
state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep
and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.
"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten
to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the
beneficial influence of the long peace between our two
countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.
"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the
right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the
conversations between our two Governments during these past
months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict
between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the
Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of
many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of
invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted
for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without
discrimination against or in favor of any nation.
"I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to
me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the
United States should agree to eliminate any form of military
threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high
objectives.
"More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an
agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six
thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern
French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which
were operating against China further north. And this Spring and
Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military
forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common
defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying
that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has
been contemplated.
"During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that
Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to
Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a
reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this
continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its
character.
"Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have
reached such large proportions and because they extend now to
the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is
only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the
hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of
Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of
Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more
of these many directions.
"I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of
all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves
their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your
Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in
such large numbers look askance at the establishment of
military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as
to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.
"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is
unthinkable.
"None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either
indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.
"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States
of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were
to be withdrawn therefrom.
"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the
Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and
the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for
the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus
a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result
in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South
Pacific area.
"I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent
hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this
definite emergency to way of dispelling the dark clouds. I am
confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only
of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in
neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore
traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in
the world."
----------------------------------------------------------------
JAPANESE NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 7, 1941
(Generally referred to as the "Fourteen Part Message.")
(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)
On November 26 the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese
representatives a document which stated the principles governing
the policies of the Government of the United States toward the
situation in the Far East and setting out suggestions for a
comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific
area.
At 1 p.m. December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an
appointment for the Japanese representatives to see the
Secretary of State. The appointment was made for 1:45 p.m. The
Japanese representatives arrived at the office of the Secretary
of State at 2:05 p.m. They were received by the Secretary at
2:20 p.m. The Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of
State what was understood to be a reply to the document handed
to him the Secretary of State on November 26.
Secretary Hull carefully read the statement presented by the
Japanese representatives and immediately turned to the Japanese
Ambassador and with the greatest indignation said:
"I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese
Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one
word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record.
In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a
document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and
distortions - infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so
huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on
this planet was capable of uttering them."
The text of the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to
the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m., December 7, 1941, reads as
follows:
"Memorandum
"1. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to
come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the
United States in order that the two countries by their joint
efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby
contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued
negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the
Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and
advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization
of the Pacific Area.
"The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its
views concerning the claims the American Government has
persistently maintained as well as the measure the United States
and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight
months.
"2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to
insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and
thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in
the world.
"Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the
part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the
Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and
it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the
extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end
that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pace
with Germany and Italy.
"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted
to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as
to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan
and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours
toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the
Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they
have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of
common prosperity in cooperation with these regimes.
Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with
France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both
American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it
as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the
Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets
freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan.
While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these
countries have strengthened their military preparations
perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a
situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.
"Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of
Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the
United States for a discussion of important problems between the
two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the
American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese
proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an
agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential
questions.
"3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government
submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the
American Government, taking fully into consideration past
American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated
discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement
of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised
proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding
the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and
endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American
Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions,
failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of
conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
"Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its
utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations,
submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to
arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent
questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated
the following points:
"(1) The Government of Japan and the United States undertake
not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting
French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern
Pacific area.
"(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing
the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods
and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
"(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial
relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the
required quantity of oil.
"(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to
resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for
the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
"(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of
peace between Japan and China or establishment of an equitable
peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the
Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the
northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
"As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its
readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United
States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China
as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the
part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the
restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have
commenced direct negotiations.
"The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned
new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid
to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned
above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called
'introducer' of peace between Japan and China, pleading that
time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an
attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles
it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a
proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of
profound regret to the Japanese Government.
"4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese
Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and
moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it
made all possible concessions often in spite of great
difficulties. As for the China question which constitutes an
important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government
showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of
non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the
American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world,
and declared that along with the actual practice of this
principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour
to apply the same in the Pacific area including China, and made
it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China
economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable
basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing
troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even
volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate
evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a
measure of easing the situation.
"It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the
utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is
fully appreciated by the American Government.
"On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast
to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an
inch on its impractical principles, cause undue delay in the
negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the
American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call
the attention of the American Government especially to the
following points:
"1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace
those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese
Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may
be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable
formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and
mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such
as ignores realities and impose (sic) one's selfish views upon
others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the
consummation of negotiations.
"Of the various principles put forward by the American
Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there
are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in
principle, but in view of the world's actual condition it seems
only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to
attempt to force their immediate adoption.
"Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression
pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the
Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned
after the old concept of collective security, is far removed
from the realities of East Asia.
"2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states -
'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has
concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted
by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose
of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace
throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above
provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from
fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the
United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such,
it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and
opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the
war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by
stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand,
in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of
self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to
establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at
variance with the many principles upon which the American
Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area
through peaceful means.
"3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it
rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through
military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great
Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse
to such pressure as a means of dealing with international
relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane
that military pressure.
"4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the
American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in
coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant
position in has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other
areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries
of East Asia have for the past two hundred years or more have
been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-
American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice
themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese
Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation
since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to
enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
"The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to
French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-
mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries, - Japan, the
United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China,, and
Thailand, - excepting France, should undertake among themselves
to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French
Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would
be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint
guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from
the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of
France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that
such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to
French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty
structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present
predicament of East Asia.
"5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government
regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or
unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination
in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of
China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American
Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily,
politically or economically any regime other than the regime at
Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking
Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiations.
This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in
line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the
Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the
American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal
relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to
East Asia.
"5. (sic) In brief, the American proposal contains certain
acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including
the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the
freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar
exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China.
On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores
Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair,
menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour
and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation.
"6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early
conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the
conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to
be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries.
The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However,
since the American Government has made the proposal of November
26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain,
Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by
catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions
of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at
one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to
conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct
Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the
creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve
Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at
war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course
of the present negotiation.
"Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the
peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American
Government has finally been lost.
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the
American Government that in view of the attitude of the American
Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach
an agreement through further negotiations.
"December 7, 1941."
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(4) SELECTED DISPATCHES
The following is a collection of dispatches relevant to the
topic. Care should be taken in noting that not all the
information enclosed was known to all parties and that some of
the coded messages were not decyphered until well after the
commencement of hostilities.
LWJ
================================================================
To: Tokyo
Date: 16 Jan. 41
"... 2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning
of the 16th was as follows: 5 battleships... 5 light
cruisers...19 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders...about six small
submarines...and three transports.
" The Yorktown is not in port.
" The CinCUS shifted the flag from the New Mexico to the
Pennsylvania on 15 Jan. 41."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
Date: 21 Feb. 41
" 1. The capital ships and others departed from Pearl Harbor
on the 13th and returned on the 19th. (It is said that they
will depart again on the coming Wednesday and return on the
following Wednesday). Judging from the statements by various
sailors who were on these vessels, the training was apparently
held in the vicinities of Kauai, Lahaina, and Hilo."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Naval Intelligence, Washington
To: alcon
Date: 1 Apr. 1941
" Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be
advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows
[sic] the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular
field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the
country concerned they should take steps on such days to see
that proper watches and precautions are in effect."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
==============================================================
From: Japanese Foreign Ministry
To: Washington
Date: 31 Jul. 1941
" Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third
countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually
becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much
longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must
take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas.
Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this
ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven
under the guidance and with the participation of England and the
United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep.
This is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-
China and to have our troops occupy that territory..."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
Date: 21 Sep. 41
" Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports
concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as
possible: [The message divides Pearl Harbor waters into a number
of areas which are delineated.]
" 2. With regard to war ships and aircraft carriers, we
would like to have you report on those at anchor...tied up to
wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes
briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of
the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same
wharf."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Navy Department
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor
Date: 16 Oct. 41
" The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave
situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be
strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet
remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new
mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U.S. In
either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong
possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by
Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a
possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of
these possibilities you will take due precautions including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic
intentions nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Japanese Naval General Staff
To: alcon
Date 5 Nov. 1951
" Navy Order No. 1
" By Imperial Order, the Chief of the Naval General Staff
orders Yamamoto Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets as
follows:
" 1. Expecting to go to war with the United States, Britain
and the Netherlands early in December for self-preservation and
self-defense, the Empire has decided to complete war
preparation.
" 2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will carry
out the necessary operational preparations.
" 3. Its details will be directed by the Chief of the Naval
General Staff."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
Date: 15 Nov. 41
" As relations between Japan and the United States are more
critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a
rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware,
please take extra care to maintain secrecy."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
date: 19 NOV 1941
" Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an
emergency.
" In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic
relations), and the cutting off of international communications,
the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily
Japanese language short-wave news broadcast:
" 1) In case of Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO
KAZE AME ("east wind rain")
" 2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITA NO KAZE KUMORI ("north
wind cloudy")
" 3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE ("west wind
clear")
" This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as
a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice.
When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is
as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
" Forward as urgent intelligence."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Date: 20 Nov. 1941
" There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we
wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if
within the next three or four days you can finish your
conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be
completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you-twenty-
ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get
an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in
short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait
until that date. This time we mean it, the deadline absolutely
cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to
happen."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
==============================================================
From: Navy Department
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor
Date: 24 Nov. 41
" Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very
doubtful.
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government
and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our
opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction
including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief
of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action
addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost
secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense
situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed
separately."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: War Department, Washington
To: Army Hq. Hawaii
Date: 27 Nov. 1941
" War Department Msg No. 472
" Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all
practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the
Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible
at nay moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.
This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting
you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measures shout be carried out so as not, repeat not, to
alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures
taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks
assigned in Rainbow Five [the Army's basic war plan] so far as
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly
secret information to minimum essential officers.
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Navy Department
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor
Date: 27 Nov. 41
" This despatch is to be considered a war warning.
Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of
conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by
Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and
equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task
forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the
Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute
an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out
the tasks assigned in WPL-46.
Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is
being sent by the War Department. SPENAVO inform British.
Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate
measures against sabotage."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: War Department, Washington
To: Army Hq. Hawaii
Date: 28 Nov. 1941
" War Department Message 482
" Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken
immediately against subversive activities...Also desired that
you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to
provide for protection of you establishments, property, and
equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against
subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against
espionage. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal
measures are authorized. Protective measures should be confined
to those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity
and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams
are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not
affect you responsibility under existing instructions."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
Date: 29 Nov. 41
" We have been receiving reports from you on ship movement,
but in future will you also report even when there are no
movements."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor, alcon
Date: 1 Dec. 41
" Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated
clearly that extensive preparations are underway for
hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters
are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast
ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and
Formosan ports. Present movements tot he south appear to be
carried out by small individual units, but the organization of
an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably
take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task
force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet,
appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one
gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the
other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force
of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force,
destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of
battleships also may be assigned the major capital ship strength
remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the
carriers.
" The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment,
including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in
the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large
reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of
construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Date: 2 Dec. 1941
" Take great pains that this does not leak out.
" You are to take the following measures immediately:
" 1. With the exception of one copy each of the O[pa-k2] and
the L[LA] codes, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this
includes the codebooks for communication between the three
departments [HATO] and those for use by the Navy).
" 2. As soon as you have completed this operation wire the
one word HARUNA.
" 3. Burn all secret records of incoming and outgoing
telegrams.
" 4. Taking care not to arouse outside suspicion, dispose of
all secret documents in the same way.
" Since these measures are in preparation for an emergency,
keep this within your consulate and carry out your duties with
calmness and care."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
Date: 2 Dec. 41
" In view of the present situation, the presence in port of
warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost
importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me
know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are
any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any
indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether
or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Adm. Nagumo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 2 Dec. 1941
" This force is already in the anticipated scouting areas
from Kiska and Midway Islands. Tonight we will pass the 180
degree line and near the enemy zone. More strict air alert and
strict lookout against enemy ships suspected of tracking us will
be maintained. Particular attention will be paid not to reveal
any light at night and to limit blinker signals as much as
possible.
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 2 DEC 1941
" Climb Mount Niitaka."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
==============================================================
From: Adm. Nagumo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 3 Dec. 1941
" 1. It has already been ordered to go to war on 8 December,
but so critical has become the situation in the Far East that
one can hardly predict was would not explode by that time. So
far no new information on Hawaii area received and also no
indications of our Task Force being detected. But since the
enemy intention is naturally far beyond prediction, strict
attention will directed to meet any unexpected encounter
with an enemy.
" 2. It is intended that this force will operate as
scheduled even if war breaks out before 8 December.."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
Date: 4 Dec. 41
" On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered
Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the
4th...
" Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a
sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and
received some mail in return."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
Date: 5 Dec. 41
" 1. During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships
mentioned in my message [previously] arrived here. They had
been at sea for eight days.
" 2. The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the
same day.
" 3. The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the
5th: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
Date: 6 Dec. 41
" Please wire immediately movements of the fleet subsequent to
the fourth."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
Date: 6 Dec. 41
" 1. On the American Continent in October the Army began
training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina.
Not only have they ordered four of five hundred balloons, but it
is understood that they are considering the use of these
balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as
Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the
neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring
equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them.
Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the
maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At present time
there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it
is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However,
even though they have actually made preparations, because they
must control the air over the water and land runways of the
airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickham, Ford, and
Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I
imagine that in all probability there is considerable
opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against
these places.
" 2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo
nets..."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
Date: 6 Dec. 41
" The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17
destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2
destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane
carriers have all left).
" 2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted
by the fleet air arm."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final
Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret),
Naval History Division, Washington, 1968
==============================================================
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Date: 7 Dec. 1941
" Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States
Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to
the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
==============================================================
From: Gen. Marshall
To: alcon
Date: 7 Dec. 1941
" Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time
today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to
destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just what
significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on
alert accordingly Stop."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
================================================================
From: USS WARD
To: Commandant 14th Naval District
Date: 7DEC41 0654 local
" We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges on a
submarine operating in the defensive sea area."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Radio Communication Station, Hawaii
To: alcon
Date: 7 Dec. 1942
" Air raid. Pearl harbor. This is not drill."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
==============================================================
From: Adm. Nagumo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 7 Dec. 1941
" Brilliant success was achieved for our country through the
splendid efforts of you men. But we still have a great way to
go. After this victory we must tighten the straps of our
helmets and go onward, determined to continue our fight until
the final goal has been won."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
----------------------------------------------------------------
Collected, formatted, and edited by
Larry W. Jewell
[email protected]
